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NORMS AND CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE




A. THE ALLURE OF SOCIAL NORMS
The last decade has seen the emergence of what is now
commonly called the study of law and social norms.' This cluster of
legal commentary has been unusually confident in purporting to offer
a fresh perspective on the relationship between law and social
behavior. Most broadly put, this school addresses informal social and
moral standards and rules which regulate the group and individual
behavior to which law attends, and which do so as pervasively as, or
perhaps even more pervasively than, the law itself.' In its
programmatic work, the norms school argues that a useful strategy
for lawmakers is to accommodate, ally with, and exploit these social
norms to achieve legal goals more efficaciously.' In its analytic
mode, this school often seeks to redeem microeconomic approaches
to law from excessive abstraction,4 to draw on corrections to rigid
* Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford University.
I The most visible announcements that there was indeed such a distinct "school" dealing
with law and social norms came in Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police: Following the Law
Because You'd Be Too Embarrassed Not To, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20-27 1997, at 170-81, and
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
2 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943 (1995).
4 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).
ROBERT WEISBERG
rational choice theory supplied by experimental psychology,' to
enrich rational choice theory with the deep strategic logic of game
theory,6 and, occasionally, in its focus on the phenomenon of "social
meaning," to pay some fealty to cultural anthropology or the
Humanities.'
This article will largely address one important part of the norms
school-its application to criminal law. The norms school has been
at its most aggressive, in both explanatory8 and programmatic ways,9
in dealing with criminal law. This may be no surprise, since criminal
law is the area of social regulation where norms of behavior are most
invested with moral judgment and political contention, where the
reference to "norms" most strongly suggests that those who do not
comply with norms are "deviant." Indeed, in the last few decades of
American politics, criminal law has been the most attractive and
exploited medium by which lawmakers have purported to offer
solutions to cultural disorder or antisocial behavior." For another,
criminal law has been a relatively open academic market for the
norms school, since the explanatory and programmatic scholarship of
economics, critical legal studies, and other fields have attended far
more to private law and to other forms of public law than to criminal
law." In any event, the law-and-norms school has often turned to
criminal law to support some of its basic tenets: that social actors are
governed less by formal laws than by patterns of behavior which
have accrued normative, if not obligatory force; that norms often
govern in a manner indifferent to legal rules, sometimes helping or
5 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057-58
(2000).
6 POSNER, supra note 2, at 172-75; Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and
Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1864-65
(1996); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CI. L. REV. 1225, 1226-29 (1997).
7 Lessig, supra note 3, at 962-63.
8 See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 3, at 352-61; POSNER, supra note 2, at 88-
111.
9 See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999)
[hereinafter Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame] ; Dan M. Kahan & Eric Posner, Shaming White-
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. &
ECON. 365 (1999).
1o See generally STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL
PROCESS AND CULTURAL OBSESSION (1991).
11 Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992).
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impeding the enforcement of rules; that norms are immanent with
social meaning which lawmakers would do well to heed, and which
they can usefully exploit; and that people are susceptible to the
conforming force of charismatic individuals or majoritarian patterns
of behavior.
The law-and-norms school has faced heavy criticism for its
premises and implementation. Much of that criticism has challenged
the norms school for failing to meet the standards of rigor for social
science. Other criticism has challenged the norms school for failing
to deliver on its promise of a new kind of interpretive method, an
adaptation of social science analysis that incorporates a kind of social
anthropologist's feel for identifying, and tracing the changes in,
cultural values. In this article, I examine those criticisms and
conclude that on the whole the problems these critics have uncovered
are especially evident in the field of criminal law.
The new law-and-social norms school echoes, in ways both
obvious and unacknowledged, parts of the enterprise of the old Legal
Realism of the 1930's.2 One strand of the Realist School, for
example, oscillated somewhat nervously between, on the one hand a
kind of cultural anthropology, by which both legal institutions and
the social behavior which law sought to regulate were patterns of
custom and habit, induced by both material and nonmaterial culture
and both biological and social inheritance, and, on the other, a more
ambitious scientism that sometimes led to formal elaboration and
aspirations toward mathematical precision." By contrast, modern
12 See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60 (1986) (reviewing
work of great Yale Realists, including Jerome Frank, Myres McDougal, and Grant Gilmore).
13 The story of one major, if now-forgotten, Realist, Underhill Moore, is poignantly told
by John Henry Schlegel in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 115-
46 (1995). Moore argued that
the common assumption that propositions of law are exhibited by the state to most people, that
responses to them are conditioned in most cases by punishment inflicted by the state and that
therefore law is a peculiar class of signs to which is given responses differing in degree from
responses to other signs, is erroneous.
Id. at 135 (quoting Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A
Study in Legal Control, 53 Yale L. J. 1, 17 (1920)). For Moore, law could indeed affect
behavior, but any change in behavior after a legal regulation is enacted varied in proportion
to the ratio observed before the regulation between behavior consistent with and behavior
inconsistent with the regulation. Moore believed that great insights could be gained by
looking at mundane, if legally arcane, matters like the habits of commercial banks in
handling their debtors' checking accounts, or even like the pattern of parking in downtown
New Haven. He assumed that there was some meaningful structure to this behavior which
law might partly control, or which it might well seek to parallel. Moore set out to acquire
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law-and-norms scholars have smoothly, and sometimes too glibly,
elided the conflicts among disciplinary methods.
For one thing, instead of struggling in frustration to achieve
scientific rigor, the criminal law norms scholarship has occasionally
claimed an immunity from formal social science standards. For
another, this school has developed an additional set of methods and
principles as well-a kind of cultural studies interpretivism-that
raises problems parallel to those on the social science side. Though
lacking clear grounding in humanistic method, some norms-school
scholars implicitly claim an almost vatic ability to discern the temper
of the times and the values of political entities (ranging from so-
called "communities" all the way up to the nation as a whole). The
norms school thus runs the risk of wielding a kind of academic
populism that can both authorize programmatic prescriptions and
issue broad cultural and even political dicta.
The law-and-norms school finds a deceptively useful level of
generalization about social behavior to coordinate our understanding
of individual and group conduct. But it does so with little distinct
theory other than a few general concepts like conformity and esteem-
seeking and a sense of fairness, and some borrowings from
behavioral cognitive theory and game theory. As means to
understand individual behavior, these concepts add little to
conventional psychology but often claim explanatory power beyond
the judiciously limited applications proffered by most behaviorists.
As means to understand group behavior, these concepts are too
disembodied to take account of religion, ethnicity, class, or even the
more abstracted notions of social groups treated by sociology. And, I
argue, in its loose eclecticism norms analysis is peculiarly
incongruent with the realm of criminal law, because the criminals
society most, and most rightly fears, exhibit both a pathological
indifference to, and a compulsive inability to obey, the social norms
that supposedly guide good behavior. As a result, in its quest for
ways to engineer social behavior to avoid crime, the norms school
may have little utility outside minor areas of crime committed by
otherwise socially sensitive individuals. Though it purports to take
"precise knowledge of the specific effects of law on behavior," believing that "until such
knowledge is available, any discussion of the relative desirability of alternative social ends
which may be achieved by law is largely day-dreaming and discussion of the 'engineering'
methods by which law may be used to achieve those ends is largely futile." Id. at 134
(quoting Moore & Callahan, Learning Theory, at 206-07). Rather, most responses which are
thought of as responses to propositions of law "are responses to the behavior of others." Id.
at 135.
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on larger questions about social behavior, the norms school is gravely
limited in its ability to usefully address serious matters of crime and
criminal law, and it tends to disrespect the more substantial questions
of the social costs and benefits of the conventional criminal
punishments which are sure to remain the currency of our criminal
justice system.
B. THE UNCERTAIN DISCIPLINARY LOCATION OF SOCIAL NORMS
I will first briefly treat the more general kind of social norm
analysis, both to lay out the background for the criminal law work,
but also to suggest the capacities, limitations, and risks of the general
law-and-norms enterprise. The more self-consciously economics-
oriented norms work has been sensibly cautious in claiming grand
theoretical or practical implications. Instead, it makes some useful
corrections or adjustments to rational choice theory, and respectfully
suggests how other disciplines can usefully, if indirectly, enrich
understanding of the interaction of law and norms. In fact, it is only
when some legal academics who draw on behavioral economics and
norms overreach to very large claims of moral theory or
psychological interpretation that they lapse into some of the
conclusory writing to which norms writing is susceptible.
As new as the norms school is, its critics are already numerous,
attacking it for false claims of originality, and lack of analytic rigor in
its general pronouncements, 4  or for the unsoundness of its
programmatic recommendations in specific legal areas. 5 Perhaps the
gist of the criticism has been that the "norms" school has not clearly
offered a new Realism at all, but rather a new and vague vocabulary
that might at best appear to provide a new synthesis of, or
14 Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 1751, 1763-71 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Everything Old is New Again: Early Reflections
on the "New Chicago School", 1998 Wis. L. REV. 579, 586-89 (1998).
15 See, e.g., Albert W. Alchsuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or
Bedrock Rights-A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEG. F. 215
(1998); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 645 (1997); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998)
[hereinafter Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject]; Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social
Meaning Turn ": Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary
Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 L. & Soc'y REV. 179 (2000) [hereinafter Harcourt, After
the "Social Meaning Turn ']; James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).
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compromise between, law and economics and the social
constructivism once associated with critical legal studies and now
with postmodernist approaches to law. Indeed, the more acerbic
critics have attacked the norms school for (a) an unwarranted
confidence in claiming to have discovered the rather obvious fact that
social norms influence the behavior it seeks to regulate, and (b)
insufficient attention to the traditions and disciplines of the social
sciences that have long known about the relation of law and norms in
complex ways that the new norms school does not appreciate. 6 One
line of criticism for example, chastises the norms school for barely
mentioning a half-century tradition of social psychology about
norms. 7 Norms, this line of criticism suggests, are, ironically, both
more deep-seated and more ephemeral than the law-and- norms
writing acknowledge. In this view, the shock-force of random social
or political, or economic crises will often overwhelm the effect of
norms, leaving many of the law-and-norms claims either false or
tautological. 8
I will conclude that in the area of criminal law, the school of
social norms has prematurely claimed to identify a distinct and
definable interpretive method or predictive apparatus. 9 It has
encountered, and failed to meet, the challenge of refining rational
choice and microeconomic analysis of law by coordinating causal
analyses of social behavior and law with the interpretive
understandings of law supplied by law-and-humanities scholarship.
In its applications to criminal law, the law and norms scholarship has
16 E.g., Tushnet, supra note 14, at 588-89.
17 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI. KENT L. REv. 1537, 1540
(2000).
" Id. at 1556-67.
'9 For a usefully skeptical look at whether "social norms" describe any coherent concept,
see Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U.
PA. L. REv. 1869 (2001). Marcel Kahan worries that
any type of rule ... governing how to conduct oneself, which is regularly followed by at least a
relevant subset of actors and which is not a command of a law, is a norm. This set, however,
includes (for example,] rules that are followed because they are internalized and rules that are
followed because of external (nonlegal) sanctions (with sanctions referring to both a negative
sanction-punishment-and a positive one-reward). It includes rules that are enforced by
second-party sanctions (that is, sanctions administered by the party who suffers from the rules
violation) and rules that are enforced by third-party sanctions (that is, sanctions administered by
a person other than the party who suffers from the rules violation). And it includes rules in
which enforcement is motivated by self-protection and rules in which enforcement is intended to
punish the rule-violator (or reward the rule-abider).
Id. at 1873-74.
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oscillated between claiming to refine rational choice theory while
staying within the boundaries of social science, and, on the other
hand, implicitly and often clumsily appropriating notions of social
constructivism and literary sensibility from the humanities. And it has
done this while also aiming for short-term political purchase by
claiming valence in contemporary policy analysis.
Various phenomena that can be called "social norms" surely
influence crime and the criminal law, and criminal law scholarship
surely benefits from attending to these phenomena in their various
concrete forms-indeed, that is what much of criminology is all
about. The study of crime and criminal law offers a tempting
entanglement of moral, psychological, and instrumental
understandings of behavior and hence a tempting opportunity for
interdisciplinary-sounding or dialectical-sounding insights. For
similar reasons, it is also the area of law most connected to the world
of political and media-sound-bite posturings about social policy, and
hence the area where the legal academy might find it most tempting
to make itself relevant to popular and political discourse and offer
visible and marketable prescriptions."
Other academic critics have criticized the norms scholarship on
criminal law for so falling prey to these temptations as to clash with
constitutional principles"1  or to produce unsound policy
prescriptions.22 But I will largely downplay those concerns. Instead,
I will take a deliberately more parochial academic view, stressing the
troublesome implications of law-and-norms commentary for criminal
law scholarship itself. The norms school is a symptom of the
continuing anxiety of contemporary legal scholarship about its
inability to devise a satisfactory alternative to economics or rational
choice. In declaring a new disciplinary approach, it has found it
possible to speak in a remarkably confident voice, in part because the
notion of social norms ties in very easily with short-term cultural,
political, and social trends, and so is never short of material on which
to purportedly base analysis and prediction, but also in part because
repeated appeals to the phenomena of social relations enable it to
20 This is most obvious in its recommendations about "shaming" penalties, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996) [hereinafter
Kahan, Alternative Sanctions] ; and restrictions on individual constitutional rights in light of
local desires for order, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis
of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L. J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Coming
Crisis]. These recommendations are discussed at length in later sections.
21 See, e.g., Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 226-38;
22 See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 14, at 1763-70 (1999).
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claim superiority to the atomistic individualism often attributed to
modem law and economics work. Thus, the norms school grants
itself a kind of normative halo by claiming a form of
communitarianism, and by occasionally borrowing from the
vocabulary and intellectual capital of the humanities. But it has done
these things with insufficient attention to the philosophical risks of
communitarianism and to the interpretive complexity the humanities
demands.
As a descriptive matter, the norms school might seem to offer an
opportunity for a Geertzian "thick description" of the interplay
between social concepts of honor and virtue, on the one hand, and
legal rules on the other.23 At least in the area of criminal law, the
norms school has not itself provided that description. Rather, it
seems to repeat calls for that kind of research while claiming that the
notion of norms somehow empowers or sets criteria for that kind of
description.24 Its failure to actually do the descriptive work might not
be fatal if it did indeed motivate or aid scholars as the claim suggests.
But its claiming seems weak in light of its indifference to the vast
amount of legal scholarship that has always done roughly what the
norms school claims should be done.
The norms school's supposedly value-free value lies in
identifying a kind of efficiency goal: it urges that lawmakers seek
some sort of optimal manipulation of norms if they want to reach
certain behavioral goals.2  But, at best, we know that norm
manipulation may affect behavior; we have no idea how it should
affect behavior. And even if viewed as only a value-neutral tool,
norms analysis carries implications of prescription-as some critics
have suggested, a kind of authoritarian/expertise model of social
engineering. And in any event, in the criminal law area, the norms
writers do indeed explicitly prescribe, in two senses: we need a
corrective to overly severe sentencing, and it is self-evident that
various shaming techniques are less onerous. 6 But its calls for new
penalties disrespect huge questions of the moral and political bases
for criminal punishment, addressing these, at best, with episodic
references to political and moral philosophy.
23 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 24-25 (1983).
24 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves. Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan, Gentle Nudges].
25 Id. at 608-09.
26 Id. at 640-45.
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The deceptive intellectual attraction of norms can create a sense
of an especially creative and resilient interdisciplinary perspective.
Indeed, as I will argue, the almost seductive fertility of the very word
"norms" has led to a morphing of the term and concept into more
complex matters of "value" and "belief' that the behavioral apparatus
of the norms school cannot fully comprehend. As a result, I also
hope to demonstrate, in the volatile context of crime and criminal
laws the norms school seems impelled by its own self-conception to
attempt unfortunately bold forays into areas like political theory and
cultural studies, where the tempting amorphousness of the notion of a
social norm has had unfortunate consequences for criminal law
scholarship.
II. THE LAW-AND-NORMS SCHOOL
A. AN INTRODUCTORY MAP
In one sense, the norms school is a response or corrective to
standard microeconomic or rational choice approaches to law: Under
the rational choice approach, law creates rewards and penalties that
alter, for better or worse, the willingness of individual actors to act on
their preferences, preferences which are exogenous to legal rules and
which, to ensure the "parsimony" of the model, must go unexplained.
Recently, economists have qualified and adapted their notions of both
the utility sought by individual actors-it can certainly include all
manner of nonmaterial goods-and the rational methods they employ
in achieving them. These economists have done so by reflecting
some of the lessons about "bounded rationality" supplied by
experimental behaviorism, lessons about the cognitive errors made so
often by supposedly rational individuals as to suggest they may be
hard-wired into our rational capacities.2 7
1. Key Terms and Principles of the Norms School
The norms school might be seen as an outgrowth of these
adaptations in rational choice economics, though it has just barely
acknowledged the linkage. It first notes that the rules or standards to
be obeyed come not just from positive law, but also from social
27 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23, 45-50 (2000).
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customs or consensus social ethics.28 It suggests that even, or
especially, under a rational choice approach, the transaction-costs
savings of relying on norms to solve collective actions are so huge
that no society can sustain its positive legal order without them.2 9 So
far, that argument is venerable, dating back at least as far as early
20th-century Legal Realism and Llewellynist commercial
jurisprudence. 3' But in perhaps the most enduring work of the norms
school, Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law,31 the premise is given
very rich and convincing demonstration through a very detailed
sociological analysis of a particular local market.
Next, the norms school tries to examine how norms affect
behavior, and at this point it invokes a phenomenon called "social
meaning."32 This is the most elusive and troublesome term in this
new enterprise. Unfortunately, as Edward Rubin has forcefully
shown, the law-and-norms school has essentially ignored the key
modem source for the notion of "social meaning" as an engine of
individual and group behavior-the work of Edmund Husserl and the
school of phenomenology. 3 For now let us say that the norms school
uses this term to suggest a few things: first, that when lawmakers
make law, they do not just aim to directly control behavior through
measurable, if not material, rewards and punishments: they also hope
to express certain social or cultural values they attach to that
behavior. Hence, we have the "expressivist" component of the norms
school.34 Next, that norms themselves can be seen as non-legal
standards which express value as well as offer rewards or
punishments; next, that laws work more efficiently when they
appropriate meaning from social norms-that is to align their
28 DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 106 (1990).
29 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 11-13.
30 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective," 40
YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
31 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
32 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 3, at 962-63.
33 Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 328-40
(2002). Rubin usefully summarizes how Husserl studied the phenomena of human
consciousness in acts of cognition, valuation, and aesthetic appreciation, granting them
significance despite any lack of scientific or cultural grounding.
34 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 596-97
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2024-26, 2045 (1996).
[Vol. 93
NORMS AND CRIMINAL LAW
expressive and measurable effects with consensus social
interpretations of the moral value of certain actions.
Social meaning is in turn aligned with two other concepts-
social organization35 and social influence.16 These concepts could be
quite independent, but the norms school links them because it views
the main valence of norms as enhancing social organization or as
reinforcing social organization. Moreover, the norms school finds a
significant cause of most individual behavior not in individual
motivation but rather in the contagion effects of others' behavior,
often a contagion whose power comes from its ability to transfer
meaning as a signal of the value of the behavior.37 Finally, in norms
scholarship "social meaning" sometimes seems to indicate simply
some specific non-material commodity that can enter the calculus of
rewards and punishments-most often social esteem or honor.3"
2. The Problem of Internalization
A key question about this norms approach is whether norms are
fully "internalized." Roughly speaking, a person "internalizes" a
norm if she so values obedience to it that she will invest in obeying
the norm for its own sake, independent of any consequential
advantages or disadvantages of the obedience; the person has a
"taste" for obeying the norm-she has made it part of her moral or
philosophical beliefs or intrinsic preferences. 9 Sociologists note that
norms vary in the degree to which they are internalized, and that fully
internalized norms operate more efficiently." But the general issue of
internalization has posed a special temptation and peril for the norms
school. The persistent claim to have understood the meaning of
social behavior suggests a belief both that norms get internalized and
35 Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 194-98(1998).
36 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 3, at 350-53.
37 POSNER, supra note 2, 18-22.
38 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 338, 355-66 (1997).
39 Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1583 (2000).
40 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1990). For a recent argument that what
others call internalization can be objectively observed as really the effect of a law or norm in
increasing or decreasing the certainty with which a person holds to a belief about the
consequence of actions or causes, see Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive
Law, 88 IOwA L. REv. 35 (2002).
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that the inner thinking of individuals can be understood well enough
to be regulated. Critics of norms scholarship who largely operate
within the world of law and economics, most notably Robert Scott,
challenge whether norms scholarship has any way of understanding
internalization or inner thinking and instead insist that only
observable behavior can be the basis for policy analysis.4 But more
broadly, the claim to have understood what norms and behavior
subjectively mean to individuals is part of the high intellectual self-
confidence of some norms writing, especially in criminal law. This
claim even involves a half-conscious involvement in post-modernist
theory, since the norms school at least occasionally uses the
fashionable language of social constructivism associated with post-
structuralist literary criticism and French social theory.42 But a fair
treatment of the law-and-norms school requires a look at some of its
central works, rooted in constructive dissatisfaction with
conventional microeconomic approaches to law.
B. VERSIONS OF NEW NORMS-BASED EXPLANATIONS
Twenty-years ago Ellickson sparked interest in this subject with
his famous study of ranchers in Shasta County.43 He discovered
norms of cooperation and civil negotiation among ranchers, norms
which obviated need for legal regulation, and which would
undermine or nullify contrary legal regulation.44 Had it never used
the language of "social norms," Ellickson's work would still merit
fame as superb legal sociology-original research into the social
origins and effects of law that needed to make no special theoretical
claims. But Ellickson explicitly offers his reading of Shasta county
norms as an important corrective or admonition to legal
microeconomics-in part as a striking reversal of the Coase
theorem.45 In recent years, scholars have broadened the claims
explicit and implicit in Ellickson.
41 See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86
VA. L. REv. 1603, 1631-33 (2000).
42 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 3, at 946-47.
43 ELLICKSON, supra note 31, at 15-120.
44 For example, Shasta ranchers developed informal but simple and regular formulas for
splitting the costs of repairing fences, happily indifferent to the rather complicated common
law legal rules for proportioning fence liability. Id. at 67-75.
45 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(were transactions costs zero, parties could achieve efficient allocation of resources
regardless of choice of liability rule).
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1. Expressive Legal Norms
A useful conventional introduction to the post-Ellickson writing
on norms is Cass Sunstein's. Sunstein notes that many types of laws
function not just by directly controlling or pricing behavior but also
by conveying normative messages, and that support for or opposition
to laws can be affected by concern about these messages. 46 Thus, for
example, even someone willing to believe that trading emission rights
can reduce pollution might object to a law permitting these exchanges
because the law thereby conceives the natural environment as a mere
commodity and thereby masks the moral implications of pollution.
Some might oppose the law even if they were absolutely certain it
would drastically reduce the pollution; others might be agnostic on
the immediate instrumental effects of the law but worry that the
moral legitimation might ultimately increase pollution, or perhaps
cause different kinds of environmental degradation or social harm.47
Sunstein notes that at the margins, changes in social norms can
affect behavior beyond the effect that laws can cause. On the other
hand, where norm and law are harmonious in their goals, norms can
induce greater compliance with a law than the law's direct sanctions
can. Sometimes either the norm provides a tipping point for legal
compliance, or vice-versa. Sometimes a private "norm entrepreneur"
who is willing to bear the social cost of norm violation may move
social beliefs towards a tipping point in norm change.48 Sunstein
cautiously says that "if legal statements produce bad consequences,
they should not be enacted even if they seem reasonable or noble."49
He is also agnostic and cautious about the secondary expressive
effects of laws; he notes, for example, that many laws have no effect
on norms-laws allowing market exchanges for babysitting or pets
have not led to wider social devaluations of parental responsibility or
of animals. " Thus, the success of norms in solving collective action
problems depends on a choice among numerous overlapping norms,
often of very different degrees of generality. So for example, we may
wish there were a specific norm against littering, but we might
happily discover that a disfavoring of littering is subsumed under an
46 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2024-26.
41 Id. at 2024, 2045-46.
41 Id. at 2030-31.
49 Id. at 2025.
50 Id. at 2029-30 & n.3 1.
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already established, broader norm about the environment or social
cooperation."
Moreover, Sunstein acknowledges an important problem in
assessing the internalization of norms.52 Where people act in
conformity with a norm in a way that appears to be so risky as to defy
practical reason or self-interest, we must ask whether the person
actually absorbed the norm into his set of beliefs or felt compelled to
take what he knew to be self-destructive steps out of fear of collateral
costs or penalties. This point will be important in treating norms and
criminal law, where the merely apparent authenticity of highly
contrived behavior or norm-expression proves a problem often
overlooked by the norms school.
Many of Sunstein's examples, like the expressions of social
meaning embedded in in-kind gifts,53 seem trivial or tautological-
that is, they come close to suggesting that for certain behavior there
must be something called a guiding "norm" because the behavior
seems to be socially compelled yet economically wasteful. But
Sunstein wisely notes how little one can generalize from these
examples, because they are so context-sensitive-and so he
admonishes against global judgments about how people value things
from very specific instances. Sunstein warns that "a reference to
social norms will become a conclusory response to any apparently
anomalous results.,
54
2. Mechanisms of Social Meaning
Lawrence Lessig has provided perhaps the most cited example of
identifying a distinct mechanism by which law and norms notably
interact, the old law of dueling. 5 Southern legislatures found it futile
to ban dueling, but they realized that by denying public office to
duelers they could achieve their goal indirectly by affecting the social
meaning of dueling and its association with honorable office. 6
Lessig's explanation of "tying" and "ambiguation" is indeed an all-
too-rare effort in this field to suggest a device distinct from
conventional market-intervention mechanisms by which lawmakers
SId. at 2032.
52 See id. at 2034.
I d. at 2036.
54 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945
(1996).
55 Lessig, supra note 3, at 968-72.
56 id.
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can alter social conduct.57 Lessig infers that the lawmakers learned
how to appreciate and thereby subtly exploit and modify the "social
meaning" of dueling.58
Some of Lessig's examples may lack wide applicability because
their "expressive" content is so patent-for example, fights over the
use of the Confederate flag. 9 Other examples detect subtler meanings
to explain otherwise irrational norms. Thus, seatbelts may save lives,
but to strap oneself in a Budapest taxi cab insults the driver;6"
similarly, motorcycle helmets in the old Soviet Union may have been
highly cost-effective, but represented the corrupting influence of
capitalism;6 depending on the culture, tipping (for waiters or cab
drivers) can be obligatory, appreciated, unnecessary, or insulting. For
Lessig, social meaning results from often invisible or uncontested
associational links, but partakes of the "social magic" described in
the works of Pierre Bourdieu.62 But sometimes Lessig leaves us with
perhaps too magical an understanding, because we might wish for a
more specific explanation of the agency of change, and hence must
worry that Sunstein's admonition has gone unheeded. Indeed,
Lessig's citation to Bourdieu tempts us to inquire about the more
detailed mechanics of social meaning's influence on behavior.
Bourdieu depicts a subtle and complex mix of conscious and
unconscious motivations, of spontaneous reactions, opportunistic
adjustments, and highly scripted behavioral rituals.63 Reference to
5 Id. at 1009-11, 1031-33.
58 Id. at 971.
I d. at 953.
60 Id. at 952.
61 Id. at 964-65.
62 Id. at 959 (quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 125 (1991)).
First, every social interaction has a competitive or strategic dimension. Every interaction
takes place within a general contest over cultural authority. Second, the "disciplining"
process in modem society does not mechanically form actors but engages their active, avid
participation. Third, the display of literacy, aesthetic refinement, and rhetorical skill are all
means of staking a claim to "distinction," social status, and symbolic capital. Fourth, the
exercise and conservation of power depend upon an aesthetic and dramaturgic activity of
playing "characters" to an audience. Finally, the exercise of authority is conditioned on both
the social criteria for its exercise and the discretionary application of those criteria by
particular social actors. In this sense, conserving authority involves a "negotiation" or
"exchange" of "symbolic capital" with norms, institutions and individuals. PIERRE
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 171-88 (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
63 The key to understanding human action for Bourdieu is his concept of the "habitus."
The habitus consists of (1) a repertoire of behaviors and gestures developed as a result of
either deliberate inculcation, imitation or random processes of trial and error; (2) dispositions
to so behave in response to certain situations; (3) the ability to interpret situations as calling
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Bourdieu may thus tempt us to wonder what image of the norm-
influenced individual is assumed or implied by particular versions of
law-and-norms analysis, as compared, for example to the simple
model or caricature of homo economicus.
Thus, in the Soviet example, Lessig notes that the anti-helmet
campaign peaked and then "the interests of the Soviets changed. The
government started producing Soviet helmets.... [so it was] no
longer stigmatizing to wear helmets; it was only stigmatizing to
import helmets. 64 But we may wonder why indeed the Soviet interest
changed, and why the norm change itself was then so limited.
Similarly, critics have probed the ambiguities of Lessig's dueling
example.65 Why was there no civil disobedience in response to the
law? And how did the anti-public service law get passed in the first
place? (Lessig even admits the empirical mystery surrounding
grandfathering of the law.) Yes, certain forms of behavior take on
some independent autonomy-a power over the individual's belief
beyond the person's consciousness of its practical consequences for
her; and so, as in another Lessig example, Lenin had to co-opt the old
pre-Communist forms of religious and patriotic ritual.66 But the
question remains when and how these things happen. Lessig offers
the interesting example of the lunch-counter owners in the civil rights
era, who, he says, welcomed Title VII because it helpfully
"ambiguated" their concession to serving black customers. 67 But how
do we distinguish this from a case where the change in the law has no
normative significance at all, but simply recalibrates or more subtly
targets its deterrent effect? Or might the Title VII example show
nothing more than that a background norm of obedience to law
happened to trump a particular opposing social norm? Unfortunately,
the example never shows that the merchants had their beliefs
for such behaviors; (4) experience deploying these behaviors with more or less success in
unfamiliar situations; (5) experience modifying such behaviors in unfamiliar situations; (6) a
repertoire of goals the actor experiences as appropriate and attainable for someone like
herself. And while the habitus enables some choice and creative adaptation it is also the
repository of past socialization or "discipline." Thus, practical intelligence may be very
different from the calculating rationality that economic theory ascribes to actors. Indeed,
Bourdieu argues that economic rationality should itself be seen as a habitus: a set of coping
skills peculiar to certain social groups and situations. BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF
PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 72-95; see also PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 66-
79 (Richard Nice trans., 1990).
64 Lessig, supra note 3, at 965.
65 Tushnet, supra note 14, at 583-84.
66 Id. at 983.
67 Id. at 965-67.
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changed, in part because it does not establish precisely what their
beliefs (as opposed to their behavior) were in the first place.
Lessig does venture some analysis of the mechanisms of norm-
building and norm change.68 He reviews, at an (admittedly) high
level of generality, such social processes as cultural education,
language imposition, and political and civic rituals. He notes that
some devices are defensive or negative--designed to obscure or erase
rather than to express meaning. 9 His treatment of these devices often
reveals interesting social insights, though occasionally perhaps they
stretch the notion of "meaning" too far. So, for example, perhaps the
military's "don't-ask-don't tell" policy tells us something about
meaning manipulation in its defensive form.7" But to say that anti-
miscegenation laws erase the meaning of forced integration by
reinforcing the notion of white purity, or that sodomy laws are
designed to control the meaning of homosexuality, leaves large
questions about the mechanisms of social or legal change.7
Ultimately, however, Lessig inclines back to economics because
he seeks methodological parsimony in explaining how social
meaning operates. 2 Thus, though he mentions the guilt-inducing
effects of certain penalties, he avoids overselling the notion of
internalization precisely by focusing on the economics of
reputation-for him, the cost of violating or challenging a norm is
great enough to explain norm compliance.7" Lessig criticizes Richard
Posner solely for taking too fixed a view of preferences and thereby
avoiding the "meaning" element, as in the matter of finding the right
policy to encourage use of condoms.74 But consider the possible
"meanings" of condom use that Lessig elaborates-that it either
interferes with sexual pleasure and signals health worry, or that it is a
normal and unintrusive part of sexual relations. These meanings are
rooted in changing perceptions of the practical consequences of
various actions, and indeed Lessig explicitly refers to "social
meaning costs."75 Lessig thereby implicitly invites the same criticism
68 id. at 962.
69 Id. at 986-87.
70 Id. at 987-89.
7 Id. at 990-91.
72 Id. at 992-93.
71 Id. at 995-96.
74 Id. at 1019-25 (critiquing TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE
CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993)).
71 Id. at 1022.
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that Richard Posner-see below-directs at the proponents of
behavioral economics, namely that all this notion of meaning is quite
subsumable under rational choice theories, and that, for example,
relying on tying and ambiguation to change the "meaning" of
condom use fits well within the technology described by rational
choice theory. 76 Lessig reviews the collective action model, and the
concomitant notion of "selective incentives" in norms and law, but he
confesses that in searching for norms that guide whether [one or we]
should change, we must rely on the relatively mundane economic
goals of efficiency and distribution-because there is no other
benchmark for the "normativeness" of norms.77
3. The Market of Social Esteem
Another approach to identifying the mechanisms by which social
meaning gets transmitted is that of Richard McAdams. McAdams
takes the tack that the world of norms is about a market in a distinct
social currency-social esteem. 78 McAdams acknowledges and
draws on Lessig's "social meaning" themes, but avoids many of the
risks of the amorphousness of social meaning by more firmly hewing
to an economic line.79  For McAdams, the key to behavioral
motivation is relative esteem. Desire for this precious commodity-a
form of conspicuous consumption-will produce a norm if three
conditions obtain: (1) there is a consensus on whether engaging in X
enhances or lowers esteem; (2) there is risk or possibility that
engaging in X will be detected; and (3) existence of the consensus is
well-known. Because, for McAdams, social discussion always
occurs and ensures publicity of people's esteem-seeking behavior,
mass ignorance is not an equilibrium. But where a consensus exists
against a behavior, expression of disapproval is not inevitable, since
we face information costs in knowing of others' behavior and
guessing whether others will know of ours. These costs may prevent
the communication necessary to publicize and produce a norm, or
may hide non-compliance with the norm.8" Therefore, people make
76 See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
77 Tushnet, supra note 14, at 993-96.
78 McAdams, supra note 38, at 355-56.
79 He does, however, define social meaning in terms of his disesteem concept, as "the
relationship between a specific behavioral norm and the abstract internalized norm it
implements." Id. at 385-86.
'0 Id. at 393-94. McAdams defines shame as the disesteem individual "receives" from
those who see her as deviant; guilt, by contrast, is the psychological discomfort suffered by
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their own cost-benefit analyses as to whether it is safe or beneficial to
make a normative statement by acting contrary to a perceived norm.8'
McAdams, like other norm-economists, notes that the low cost
of expressing approval or disapproval solves collective action
problems and makes it possible for norms to arise. In his calculus, a
norm arises when, for most individuals in a population, this esteem
cost exceeds the cost of following the consensus. McAdams
concludes that even a meager concern for esteem can affect behavior,
when multiplied by a large number of people whose esteem is
contingent on the behavior. Though McAdams believes people value
esteem highly, for purposes of this argument even a small value will
make a difference. A norm arises when, for most individuals in the
population, this esteem cost exceeds the cost of following the
consensus. Thus, if most group members prefer bearing the cost of
doing X to the esteem cost of failing to do X, most members will do
x.
82
McAdams thereby can offer some useful suggestions about how
the mechanisms of norm-change can operate. And while some insist
that law can publicize norms but not create them,83 McAdams shows
how law can indeed provide concrete means for implementing them.
For example, McAdams explains how even though an individual
cannot gain relative status by conforming, the desire for relative
status can cause conformity. People will go out of their way to
visibly not trade with the deviant, thereby raising the cost for those
who persist in either deviating or engaging with the deviant. Thus,
an internalizing deviant, regardless of whether others think her a deviant. Shame comes
before guilt-external sanctions thus produce internalization.
81 As with Lessig, Bourdieu supplies an interesting analogy here, especially because
Bourdieu sees "honor" as very salient in a way similar to "esteem" for McAdams. But if, for
Bourdieu, there is a common motivation for social behavior, it is honor rather than greed.
Thus, practical action is less reflective, and yet both more ritualistic and more idealistic than
rational choice theory would suggest. In some social settings, however, the pursuit of
esteem can indeed habituate actors to economic rationality. The actor is always, to some
extent, in the position of a judge trying to apply archaic rules to novel circumstances.
Practical actors learn to expect variation in the responses of others and the judgments of
observers as to which responses are socially acceptable. Nevertheless customary norms can
constrain practice, because when one judges another she deploys schemes of perception and
appreciation operative in the habitus of other participants in the practice. BOURDIEU, THE
LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 63-64.
82 McAdams, supra note 38, at 364.




both heroic and deviant behavior can have very catalytic effects:84
every act of compliance by someone raises the cost of noncompliance
by anyone else, and of course tipping points and cascades can then
occur. These effects can be induced by carefully calibrated legal
interventions that can shock and jar the system of norms in a
society.85
But by McAdams's own analysis, norms can have pernicious
effects on people who over-invest in norms when they comply with
them. To return to the dueling example, competition for esteem
lowers the level of insult for which dueling becomes the remedy-
and a collective action problem arises because no one person is
willing to declare that the insult level is too low.86 For a more
modem example, McAdams cites the problem of police officers'
over-investment in honor codes of silence. These codes were
originally designed to protect fellow officers from sanction for minor
offenses, but have come to protect egregiously corrupt police who
actually harm the fellow officers who protect them." Nevertheless,
these interesting examples may still simply be cases of conflicting
norms where compliance cost and collective action problems prevent
an optimal solution. Hence, they still do not tell us whether norms
theory offers any way of measuring or monitoring the tipping point
here.
McAdams exhibits the virtues of the more "parsimonious" norm
economists. He shows care in clarifying assumptions and
stipulations, and finds it unnecessary and unhelpful to commit to any
notion of internalization. In terms of expressive function of law, he
finds it too simple to say either that people have an internalized need
to obey the law or that they feel guilt for violating a law that states a
norm they have already internalized. McAdams indeed insists that
social norms can exist entirely without internalization. For
McAdams, norm changes can result from fairly mundane exchanges
of information: people learn that they have over or under-estimated
the percentage of people who support a particular norm, and they
change their behavior accordingly in order to enhance their social
standing. He is willing to posit that people feel "guilt" when they
believe they have violated a norm, even if they have not, and
84 McAdams, supra note 38, at 365.
85 Id. at 399.
86 Id. at 423.
87 Id. at 421-22.
88 Id. at 376-81.
[Vol. 93
NORMS AND CRIMINAL LA W
"shame" when they are perceived to have done so, even if they have
not; thus, a kind of internalization might result from the discomfort of
realizing that one has betrayed a norm that one has learned to respect
for purposes of enhancing one's reputation. Yet McAdams need not
make any ambitious psychological claims about subjective belief to
support his thesis, so long as we can assume that the desire for esteem
remains the key motivation.89
4. The Example of Blackmail
In his one detailed foray into criminal law, his treatment of
blackmail, McAdams finds a level of generality about norms and law,
and a level of "parsimony" about quantification of social variables,
that offer some reasonable promise of norms-based insight into legal
questions.9" McAdams sees blackmail as posing a more complex
dilemma than merely choosing between laws and norms as
regulators. Instead, it poses a choice between two law/norm pairs: (a)
a legal ban on blackmail working with common informational social
norms against excessive disclosure; and (b) legal permission of
blackmail, along with social norms controlling excessive secrecy. He
suggests that secrecy can be excessive not just because it might
obscure serious crimes, but also because it reduces the refinement of
social norms that disclosure and discussion of violations can produce.
A blackmail ban may raise the cost of norm violation, but it also
denies the public the opportunity for that potentially salutary
information and discussion; moreover, assuming that norm-violator
might achieve some moral improvement if exposed to public
scrutiny, the blackmail ban reduces that possibility.
Conversely, if blackmail is permitted, third parties who want
disclosure might in theory be willing to outbid the victim and win
disclosure from the secret-holder, thereby reducing excessive
secrecy. But any "contracting" between the secret-holder and these
third parties faces far higher transaction costs than the individual
blackmail contract. Ultimately, McAdams concludes in favor of the
blackmail ban because he finds the informational norms reducing
disclosure to be more successful and beneficial than their opposites.
This is partly because he takes a chance on the decency norms that
constrain harmful disclosures. But McAdams also notes the greater
difficulty of "monitoring" excessive nondisclosure, since by
89 Id. at 381.




definition omissions are harder to flush out than commissions. He
also factors in the greater transactions costs faced by opportunistic
secret-discoverers dealing with third parties as opposed to victims.91
McAdams addresses one unresolved dilemma about blackmail.
If one argument in favor of the ban is that blackmailing encourages
wasteful investments in discovering secrets, he asks whether there is
any reason to ban "opportunistic" blackmail-i.e., blackmail on
adventitious secret discovery. Pondering legalization for this subset,
McAdams concludes that
the net effect is essentially ambiguous and the literature is, to my mind, inconclusive.
Incentives do not provide a compelling argument for legalizing some subset of
blackmail, but neither do they create an independent argument for prohibition. The
economic case against blackmail is not that we know the incentive effects are bad but
that we doubt the effects are good and we do not want substantial resources invested
in what is probably a sterile activity.
92
Ultimately, the example demonstrates that some amount of norm
governance is inevitable, if only because certain legal rules will have
widespread if unintended effects on norms. Thus, "[i]f the state is to
regulate norms intentionally, it should choose an optimal mix of rules
either generally favoring or disfavoring norms in combination with
rules facilitating or obstructing particular norms." 93 By insulating the
information-holder from any monetary influences on his decision
whether to withhold or disclose the secret, a blackmail ban
maximizes the influence of norms on such decisions. Thus,
McAdams concludes, at least within close-knit groups the ban is
likely to be efficient, and this turns out to be of pivotal importance in
defending an economic explanation of the blackmail ban.
McAdams's treatment of blackmail is generally useful because it
demonstrates that on a fairly theoretical question, some reference to
social norms, if handled judiciously and with an honest degree of
abstraction, can inform and refine what is essentially a rational choice
approach to a criminal law question of (largely) conceptual and
philosophical interest.94 But in that sense, as I hope to demonstrate,
9' He offers a subtle focus, for example, on the sincerity problem: he notes that the
people least inclined to violate norms have the easiest time convincing others of their
sincerity in obeying norms, but are also the ones least affected by a ban.
92 Id. at 2269.
9' id. at 2291.
94 See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text (discussing usefulness of behavoral
psychology in improving rational choice theory).
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McAdams's work on blackmail is, unfortunately, more exceptional
than typical.
C. GENERAL CRITIQUES OF NORMS
1. The Challenge to Originality
The emergence of a law-and-social norms school has been met
rather quickly with a series of critical responses. Perhaps bluntest
have been the complaints of this school's indifference to, or
disrespect for, established scholarly traditions. So, for example,
Mark Tushnet notes in particular its disregard for the legal sociology
of the Wisconsin law-and-society school, in which, he asserts, most
of its claimed insights can be found. Moreover, Tushnet complains
that the norms school has been wholly indifferent to cultural studies
scholars who, without any pretense to scientific precision, have
enriched legal studies with interpretation of meaning.95 Tushnet also
takes the norms school to task for its failure to recognize the key
sociological grounding of norm compliance, that is, the selection of
positive and negative reference groups, and the hard work of
structural analysis done by such classic sociologists as William
Whyte.9 6
In the criminal area in particular, the norms school has been
charged with a shaky use of evidence, and with premature
extrapolations from sociology, anthropology, and journalism, for
impressionistic anecdotalism, and overly bold programmatic
conclusions.97 Toni Massaro has most frontally attacked the law-and-
norms approach to criminal law. She notes that "if law didn't have
some capacity to affect both social meanings and social norms, and to
effect some social influence and inflict some emotional harm by
denouncing the criminal act and thus conveying disapproval of the
offender, it would be pointless from a consequentialist perspective."98
Does the focus on social norms, she asks, "merely restate what is
already widely understood about how fear of social disapproval
contributes to norm observation in ways that are obviously relevant to
95 Tushnet, supra note 14, at 583.
96 Id. at 583 n. 12 (citing WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE, STREET CORNER SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF AN ITALIAN SLUM (2d ed. 1955)).
97 Tonry, supra note 14, at 1763-71.
98 TONI M. MASSARO, SHOW (SOME) EMOTIONS, IN THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80, 82 (Susan
A. Bandes ed. 1999) [hereinafter MASSARO, SHOW (SOME) EMOTIONS].
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criminal law but that are no easier to quantify, to predict accurately,
or to control than they were without the specifics of norm theory?"
99
Another charge has been, paradoxically, that the norms school
both overrates and underrates the strength of norms. That is, the
norms school has over-invested social norms with independent
strength and valence; it fails to recognize how malleable and
negotiable norms are,'00 and how often people complying norms are
strategically posturing that they have morally absorbed them.
Conversely, the norms school underrates norms in the sense of not
rooting them in deeper cultural traditions.'
Others have lamented the school's insufficient regard for
institutional context. Richard Pildes notes that
substantive rules reflected in social norms are embedded within a larger system of
social norms regarding what we might call jurisdiction, legislative process, fair notice,
prosecutorial discretion, transition policy, equitable exceptions, and the like.
Government incorporation of the substance of social norms into state policies is
perhaps not likely to take this procedural-institutional framework into account .... If
the state cannot replicate the flexibility and subtlety of the procedural-institutional
structure within which substantive norms are given content, that should give 0olicy
makers pause before rushing to embrace an effort to shape norms through law.
2. The Critique About Internalization
Another line of criticism has to do with the elision the norms
school tries to make between inner thought and manifest behavior.
As noted earlier, a continuing controversy in norms scholarship has
to do with internalization. Is it a meaningful concept? If so, does it
occur as a result of legal change? The issue is a serious one because
it affects the range of disciplines on which norms scholars draw, and
the efficacy of the legal policies it proposes. One scholar, relying on
the tools of analytic philosophy of language, has addressed this
problem at a highly abstract level. Matthew Adler focuses on the
notion of expressive law-and hence on the law-as-social-meaning
aspect of the norms school. °3 Adler argues that he has not yet found
any convincing proof that expressive law-law as linguistic
" Id. at 83.
1oo Tushnet, supra note 14, at 586.
101 Id. at 587-89; see generally Scott, supra note 41, at 1623-30.
' Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2055, 2074 (1996).
103 Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 1363, 1374-75 (2000).
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meaning-has any identity distinct from instrumentalism (once we
define instrumentalism to include the effect of certain actions on the
culture's norms or social practices).104
For my purposes, though, more salient is the less technical
critique along similar thematic lines from Robert Scott. Reviewing
recent norms scholarship, Scott worries whether law actually changes
belief, or only behavior-whether it conveys or changes meaning or
just information about others' views.1"5 Analyzing the supply and
demand sides of norms, he acknowledges that legal rules, at least in
the oft-used examples of littering and smoking rules, can solve
cooperation problems by short-cutting information searches about
standards for behavior." 6 But he puzzles over whether there is
anything distinctly expressive or normative about this phenomenon,
or rather simply phenomenon wholly subsumable under the
conventional economics of information. This puzzlement, for Scott,
helps place the norms school at the center of a wider concern about
legal academics' uses and misuses of other disciplines, a theme
central to the discussion of norms and criminal law, below.
Scott takes as the premise of law-and-norms scholarship that it
describes a way law can be efficacious that is different from
conventional instrumentalism, especially as captured by rational
choice theory. He views this as a hypothesis not yet proven, and,
reviewing the notions of certain law-and-economics scholars to treat
preferences as endogenous phenomena in choicemaking, he
skeptically refutes effort after effort to prove the hypothesis. 7 For
Scott, law can clearly work with norms to inform or to sanction; he is
unconvinced that it transforms beliefs. Scott concedes that
preferences and values are endogenous, and that a postmodernist
104 Adler summarizes his complex and sophisticated argument by noting that terms like
"expressive" and "social meaning" are dangerously confusing, and create the risk of a
"fallacy of equivocation." Adler traces the following series of propositions about expressive
law:
(1) "Social meaning" has intrinsic moral significance (with "social meaning" defined as the state
of social norms, forms and practices).
(2) Law is "expressive" (in the sense of changing or reinforcing social meanings, thus defined).
Therefore,
(3) The "expressive" properties of law (now defined as law's linguistic properties) are
intrinsically important.
Id. at 1500. Adler notes that even if the first two propositions are true, the conclusion is
false. Id.
'0' Scott, supra note 41, at 1627-28.
06 Id. at 1617.
'07 Id. at 1626-30.
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finds this notion delicious, but for the law and economics analyst, it is
a "heady" challenge to follow it out. °8
Consider Scott's deliberately mundane running example: the
Smith family normally ignores an informal social norm against taking
dogs on a nature trail, because they favor greater freedom for dogs.'09
A law is passed which affirms the no-dog norm. The law is never
enforced by the state, but the Smiths, having learned of the law,
nevertheless begin to comply. Scott then wonders about several
possible explanations of their compliance. (a) Have the Smiths
changed their beliefs-have they internalized the norm? (b) Do they
fear eventual enforcement of the rule? (c) Do they (as norms scholars
often surmise) infer from passage of the law that the informal norm is
more widely adopted than they had realized.'" 0
Further, Scott, wonders, has the law operated instrumentally, if
indirectly, just by raising the costs of dog-walking or by
"subsidizing" the objections of the neighbors? As for neighbors, if
they now begin to shame the people who violate the norm/law, have
they now internalized the rule? Or have these neighbors now merely
been given a new rhetorical script for persuading others to follow a
belief they already held? Or are they indifferent to the particulars of
dog rules but simply opportunistic in exploiting the availability of the
law-backed norm as way of signaling, for their own economic
purposes, that they are norm-adherents in a wider sense?"'
Does the norms approach tell us anything that a slightly more
resilient rational choice analysis would not? As a matter of common
sense, we may wonder whether the neighbors enforce a norm to avoid
the disapproval of others in the "norm community," or have
internalized a norm that obliges them to enforce through shaming
those norms to which they themselves adhere. And obviously the
108 Id. at 1605.
'09 Id. at 1608-18.
10 Id. at 1609-12, 1618.
.. id. at 1613-18. For a good example of how psychologists have demonstrated the
perilous complexity of internalization of social influences, see Jacquie D. Vorauer & Dale T.
Miller, Failure to Recognize the Effect of Implicit Social influence on the Presentation of
Self, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 281 (1997). Vorauer and Miller first describe the
phenomenon of "behavior-matching," that is, the tendency of people to adjust their own
behavior even to slight and nonnverbal behavior of others, and determine by experiment that
individuals are remarkably unaware that they are making these adjustments, presumably
because they are blinded by their confidence in their understanding of their own general
behavior patterns and indeed suffer such a wealth of (accurate) self-knowledge that they
cannot discern small behavioral changes.
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questions become more complicated when we consider the range of
norms, at different levels of specificity, that may bear on people's
normative choices. Is it something so specific as the no-dog rule itself
that is on the neighbors' minds? Their general concern for the
environment? Their general respect for legal commands? After
posing these questions Scott concludes that in the standard norms
analysis, "the relationship among key variables is not adequately
specified."' 12
Thus, Scott laments that any norm approach relying on
transformation of belief by virtue of social "meaning" is not
falsifiable,'13 nor is it a theory or model in any conventional sense.
We do not know enough about baselines of context to predict. So,
for example, in Lessig's famous dueling story, we do not know
enough about underlying causes or sources of the honor norm. Yes,
behavior may change after enactment of an unenforced law, but even
if the law is never enforced Scott argues, it is the "legalness" of the
norm that changes the behavior. Even where law carries no formal
sanction, it is always "state action" in a rhetorical sense. Thus, the
interaction between law and norms may exhibit much less mutual
influence than the norms scholars think. To anticipate the discussion
of criminal law below, I note Scott's example of graffiti-removal:
public officials regularly erase graffiti defacing public property, and
even if they never sanction the offenders, soon thereafter people
commit fewer criminal violations in those public spaces. Norms
scholars like to cite this as an instance of a non-legalistic, indeed
merely aesthetic, change in the public environment that nevertheless
induces greater compliance with legal rules. But, wonders Scott,
does the removal stimulate people to associate law-abiding with
beauty? Does it change the social meaning of order? Or does it
simply provide people with useful, indirect information about law
enforcement." 4 Thus, extending Scott's critique, we might ask, in
response to the graffiti example, whether people believe that a police
force that erases graffiti is much less likely to ignore robbery. Or,
more indirectly, but still instrumentally, does the graffiti-removal
make it aesthetically more attractive for law-abiding people to enter
the subway, thereby reducing the opportunities robbers have to attack
isolated victims?
112 Scott, supra note 41, at 1627.
113 Id. at 1635.
114 Id. at 1620, 1628-29.
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Scott notes the heroic efforts of some economists to analyze
endogenous preferences in this situation. Robert Cooter's notion of
"pareto self-improvement" holds that people will strive to obey and
appear to obey norms to improve their attractiveness as contractual
partners." 5 George Stigler and Gary Becker suggest that people
strive to enhance their allegiance to norms in order to augment their
"personal capital stock" of experiences and values." 6 But Scott finds
these efforts more rhetorical than real. Social science, he argues,
cannot solve the philosophical problem of whether people can
motivate themselves to change their preferences. The state may
supply people with opportunities to signal that they are better
cooperators, but that does not mean it stimulates people to improve
themselves. For one thing, it is difficult to enhance one's apparent
reliability, precisely because contracting parties can only rely on each
other's visible behavior." 7 At some point the signaling party runs
into another party who has no way of determining whether the
signaler is only being "strategically" fair. We lack any reliable way
to distinguish virtue from the effort to appear virtuous, given the
human skill at adapting their behavior to mimic attractive traits.
Moreover, as Jon Elster has noted, there is an inherent circularity
here, in that anyone who tries to adopt a lower discount rate (that is, a
willingness to sacrifice long-term for short-term advantage) needs a
pretty low one to desire to take up such a challenge in the first
place. "'
True, Scott concedes, the state can pass a law to align itself with
popular morality. But if the new law wins deeply normative
obedience, then the work is being done by the assumed
uncontroversial moral sentiment that the state is wise enough to
elevate to a civic duty; the work is not done by the new law itself."9
Moreover, the notion that law can change social meaning and create
normative belief stands it considerable tension with the counter-
tendency of new law to inspire deep civil disobedience.' 20
115 Cooter, supra note 34, at 586. This is similar to Eric Posner's notion of signaling that
one has a low discount rate, see infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
116 George Stigler & Gary Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am. Econ.
Rev. 76, 77 (1977).
117 Scott, supra note 41, at 1635.
i11 Jon Elster, More Than Enough, 64 U. CH. L. REV. 749, 754 (1997) (book review).
119 Scott, supra note 41, at 1639.
120 Id. at 1634.
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So, Scott concludes, the norms scholars purport to know more
about the world than they do. Just as legal scholars tend to
particularize economics, the norms scholars tend to generalize the
behavioral sciences. Thus, Scott underscores the problem the norms
writing raises for the practice of interdisciplinary legal research. It is
difficult "to graft the complex and highly individualized process by
which values and preferences are created and modified onto a formal
analytical framework."'' Rather, Scott argues, we should deploy
rational choice on its own terms and while looking to the social
sciences and humanities for a "situation" sense of context as we
examine legal rules and policies.'22
D. THE CAUTIONARY PARALLEL OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
1. The New Field of Behavioral Economics
Before turning to criminal law, and to close this general review
of the law and norms scholarship, consider a new academic sub-field
that underscore the challenges faced by the norms school in linking
social scientific and interpretive perspectives on social or
governmental behavior. Behavioral economics is a field not only
parallel to but closely tied to the study of law and norms-though the
two projects often seem to avoid acknowledging their relationship.
The norms school occasionally mentions the various cognitive
"errors" treated by behavioral economics in its adaptation of rational
choice. Conversely, in recent writing some adherents of behavioral
economics have spoken at least tentatively in terms of broad social
norms. They have done so in part as a rhetorical effort to underscore
and, arguably, exaggerate their differences with what they view as
conventional rational choice economics." 3 A recent debate on just
this issue underscores the interdisciplinary dilemma in which these
law-and-behavioral economics adherents find themselves, and
therefore helps us understand the situational dilemma of the norms
school as well.
121 Id. at 1647.
122 Id.
123 For introductions to behavioral economics and law, see Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, supra note 5; Daniel Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L
REV. 279 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed.,




A recent article by Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard
Thaler (JST) is a virtual manifesto for correcting rational choice
theory of law with the suppler and more realistic findings ofbehavioral economics.124 JST review the various new theories of
non-random alterations or distortions of the simple rational choice
assumptions of rationality, will-power, and self-interest. They call
for legal scholarship to incorporate the various "bounds" on these
phenomena, most notably elaborated in the famous work of
Kahneman and Tversky.125 These bounds include, for example,
attribution error 26 and availability heuristics. 27 They conclude from
new studies and theories that people are both more spiteful and
cooperative than rational choice predicts, and that, even if we assume
away all transaction costs, people exhibit cognitive biases which
skew property rights allocations far from what rational choice theory
would both predict and advocate. Most fundamentally, people
regularly invoke a norm of "fairness" which trumps any simple
notion of rational optimization.
JST exhibit an ambivalent relationship to economics that reflects
equally on the norms school, and indeed they somewhat acknowledge
their link to the norms school. They concede, and even defensively
insist, that behavioral economics is a form of economics and is quite
consistent with mainstream modeling. 2 ' They do not claim to be
chastising economics for failing to detect random exceptions to
rational choice predictions; rather they claim to be improving the
realism of the assumptions of economics and making sharper
predictions by showing that apparent random exceptions may have
explicable patterns.2 9
But when it comes to prediction, JST do very little of it, pointing
things to "future research." Most of their specific recommendations
124 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998)
[hereinafter JST].
125 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Daniel Kahenman, et al., eds., 1982).
126 Attribution error refers to the tendency, in explaining an action, for people to over-
emphasize dispositional factors about the actor, and under-emphasize situational factors. See
id. at 4-11. Thus, we will attribute a friend's recent car accident to his poor driving skills
rather than to the fact that another car had just swerved in front of him.
127 Availability heuristics refer to people's tendency to estimate the frequency of some
event by judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type-thus, a person who has
recently experienced a car accident will overrate the general probability of such accidents.
JST, supra note 124, at 1477-78.
128 Id. at 1481-89.
129 Id. at 1481-85.
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are quite mundane, drawing on the narrowest conclusions of the
behaviorism they rely on. Thus, for example, JST cautiously suggest
the potential feasibility of so limiting a jury's information about a
defendant's conduct as to force the jury to consider the defendant's
behavior solely ex ante, so as to correct for hindsight bias,13 and also
suggest that parking tickets should be made publicly visible to
convey a more realistic message about their frequency.' Yet when
it comes to murkier matters like fairness, while JST deny that they
are merely using pride or self-conception as gap-filling phrases to
explain what rational choice theory cannot, their borrowings from
behavioral economic research do little more than restate just those
phrases and suggest that they represent factors (not yet quantifiable)
to be taken into account in making predictions. They purport to
criticize rational choice theory for covering too great a multitude of
sins-utility theory, response to incentives, welfare self-
improvement, pure ends-means rationality-but if so, they do not
explain why those different things cannot remain easily subsumed
within economics.
In trying to define fairness, the best JST can do is to seek
empirical bases for normative values; hence they try to measurefairness according to what they call "reference benchmarks"-
observable averages of customary behavior."' When no measurable
benchmark is available-on such normative questions as which forms
of property can be commodified, for example-they punt the issue
over to "community sentiment."'33 They claim to explain legislation
by reference to the availability heuristic, but do little more than
confirm the intuitive observation that some people will be misled by,
and others will willfully exploit, highly salient-seeming anecdotes
underlying more complex policy questions. In their foray into crime,
they claim to correct the conventional economic approach by
suggesting that it understates the degree of discounting that criminals
do."'34 Yet, otherwise, JST simply invoke the availability heuristic in
suggesting that "community policing" will make law enforcement
more visible and effective, though criminal incentive analysis
remains subject to reference to the "role of community. '
130 Id. at 1527-29.
131 Id. at 1538.
132 Id. at 1516.
133 Id. at 1541.
114 Id. at 1538-39.
... Id. at 1538-41.
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2. Critiques of Behavioral Economics
I will commit the error of hindsight bias myself now in saying
that this ambivalence by JST clearly invited the two responses they
received.
At times, in his response to JST, Richard Posner approaches
them from one direction and says rational choice theory is capacious
enough to accommodate emotion and irreducibly subjective
preferences.136 At times, from the other direction, he happily accepts
JST's technical insights and says they are all part of his own
toolkit. 37 At times he accepts their claim to be acting consistently
with economics and yet at other times he accuses them of crude
technical or empirical errors, such as relying on unrepresentative
samplings in experiments, 38 and of failing to see that their implied
sample for criminals is self-contradictory.139
For Posner, behavioral economics does not add to, or correct,
rational choice. In Posner's view, to the extent that behavioral
economics makes any falsifiable statements, they can be wholly and
readily subsumed under rational choice theory. For Posner,
behaviorists proffer a straw man version of simplistic rational choice
theory, not realizing that this theory can easily accommodate all the
boundedness on rationality, willpower, and self-interest to which the
behaviorists point. For Posner, many instances of apparent
irrationality simply involve altered or idiosyncratic subjective
preferences which are rationally pursued. Of course, there is
behavior which rational choice theory views as irreducibly irrational,
such as voting. But even here, Posner insists, rational choice theory
supplies useful and predictive insights about differences in this
commitment among various demographic groups. 4 ° And, insists
Posner, where study subjects seem to terminate their thinking well
short of discovering available information that would help them
achieve what might seem the efficient solution, they are often
exhibiting an even greater inefficiency in putting bounds on their
search costs. Some behaviorist examples of bounded willpower,
Posner insists, can be explained by stipulating that a person may have
a multiplicity of self-conscious selves with different preferences and
136 Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN L.
REv. 1551, 1551-52 (1998).
131 Id. at 1553-58.
131 Id. at 1570.
1' Id. at 1567-68.
140 Id. at 1554-55.
[Vol. 93
NORMS AND CRIMINAL LAW
discount rates. 4 ' Some examples of bounded self-interest, especially
those implicated in altruism or falling under the behaviorists' vague
notion of "fairness," can and must be understood as predictable
residues of the evolutionary biology of kinship,14 and hence
consistent with rational choice theory in a broader sense. Similarly,
Posner concludes, the "endowment effect" finds a logical source in
earlier stages of society where possession and ownership of all
objects were inseparable.'
Thus Posner denies that behavioral economics offers any new
theory or model of decisional structure. Rather, he sees behavioral
economics as, at best, a potpourri of modest peripheral nuances of a
properly understood rational choice theory, and, at worst, a messy
blurring of neurology, neurosis, and morality in ill-coordination.
JST, Posner suggests, half-imply a new image of homo economicus, a
supposedly rational man stumbling all over himself in error and
spontaneously showing spite and altruism,'" while Posner sees a
reasonably rational man exhibiting the quirks and errors that biology
and rationality explain and predict. But in absorbing their supposedly
counter-Posnerian insights while also drawing on other disciplines,
JST end risk ending up where they do, with a strange combination of
aggressive commitment to technical, theoretical explanation and
prediction, half-guarded hedges on the completeness of their
approach, vague invocations of broad normative standards or patterns
to fill in gaps in explanation, and promises that further research can
fill them.
Thus, both JST and Posner invite the response they get from
Mark Kelman, which is that they represent two partners in an
intellectual death dance between types of economics that cannot
escape their interpretive limits. 4 Rational choice, says Kelman,
treats internal subjective preferences as given and inexplicable, but
treats the means of fulfilling those preferences as observable actions
that are part of a universal toolkit of means. By contrast, for
behavioral economists, preferences or supposedly subjective goals
are the result of such external forces as context, framing, history,
culture, and influence, while the means of fulfilling preferences are
141 Id. at 1555, 1568.
142 Id. at 1561-62.
'41 Id. at 1565.
144 Id. at 1558-59.
145 Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1579-80 (1998).
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messy stories of internal processing deficits and cognitive errors. 146
Kelman concludes that this dance simply shows how economists
struggle mightily, but futilely, to escape their own rhetorical
assumptions about narrative and framing choices. And he accuses
JST in particular of offering an impressionistic set of ad hoc counter-
stories but no coherent counter-theory or model.'47 Kelman even
rejects Posner's resort to sociobiology to solve certain rational choice
dilemmas, arguing that artful use of the framing devices of rational
choice works just as well.148
Thus, to extend Kelman, behavioral economics illustrates a
paradox noted by Amartya Sen. According to Sen, economics
inconsistently includes psychological and anti-psychological ideas, 149
and, when economics is called on to embrace other disciplinary
perspectives, it exhibits what Shira Lewin calls the "pathological
pattern" of clutching psychology to the exclusion of the discipline it
finds a more serious threat-sociology." ° Lewin reviews how early
twentieth-century economics shifted neurotically from rejecting all
psychology, to accommodating narrow positivist behaviorism, and
then quixotically declaring independence from any notions of
institutional functionalism or individual motivation or teleology.'
The new behavioral economics, at least in the form embraced by law,
shows little sign of having solved these problems, and, if anything,
some of these patterns have plagued the law-and-norms school which
mirrors behavioral economics and may be partly inspired by it.
So behavioral economics poses the same dilemma for
explanations of social behavior as does the norms school. Has it
fundamentally modified, or only slightly complicated, rational
choice? Are we left with some balance of assumption of irreducible
preferences with various instrumental, and occasionally flawed,
means of achieving them? Or have we learned qualitatively different
things about how people's normative views and self-conceptions
146 Id. at 1581-83.
141 Id. at 1586.
148 Kelman asks, for example, why is price-gouging permissible in real estate but not
mercantile markets? Isn't the endowment effect rational, given information costs? And why
do we assume that legislators are good at carrying out their own purely self-interested desire
for reelection by respecting voters' fairness norms along with raw preferences? Id. at 1588
n.31, 1590.
149 Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241 (1973).
150 Shira B. Lewin, Economics and Psychology: Lessons For Our Own Day From the
Early Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1293, 1293-1296 (1996).
' Id. at 1294-95.
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determine their behavior? Have we transformed our ability to explain
or predict behavior, slightly improved it, or just learned how to be
more critical of such efforts?
So behavioral economics is working its way through a
disciplinary identity crisis, and the behaviorists who have been
speculating about applications of their theories to law have been
sensibly cautious in claims they make. They acknowledge the
terribly difficult empirical questions raised by their own research for
those seeking prescriptive ideas for lawmakers.152 Moreover, they
stress that the very core of behavioral theory is a "situationist
perspective" whose benefits are most likely to be sensibly modest
reforms at specific points in legal procedures,"5 3 or very general
philosophical pleas for acknowledging the influence of social context
in applying objective standards of reasonable conduct. 54 Moreover,
as Jeffrey Rachlinski notes, any legal reforms impelled by behavioral
psychology are necessarily deeply paternalistic towards individual
choice autonomy, 55 and thus require careful cost-benefit analysis-
indeed, an analysis that is itself an economic question parallel to that
of transaction costs. 56 Finally, legal theory-builders need to be
especially cautious in drawing on behavioral science, because, unlike
pure rationale choice economics, it is not fundamentally geometric in
structure-that is, it offers few broad foundational bases for deriving
domain-specific applications.'57
Law-and-norms scholarship, which partly models itself on
behavioral science and energetically draws on its research and
theories, ought to recognize that it faces at least as serious an identity
crisis and ought to take the behaviorists admonitory lessons as even
more applicable to themselves. But as I hope to show, the peculiar
temptations of the criminal law have if anything led some in the
152 Lee Ross and Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1100 (2003).
153 Id. Common examples are engineering parties' or judges' decision in achieving civil
settlements, see Guthrie, supra note 123, at 1120-27, or jury instructions or rules of evidence
in regard to damage awards, see Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1198-1202 (2003).
154 See Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 152, at 1100-01.
155 Rachlinski, supra note 153, at 1165, 1176.
156 /d. at 1219, 1225
157 Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1347, 1349-50 (2003). So, for example, that a person is subject to one sort of cognitive




norms school to think that they can ignore, or that they have already
transcended, these problems.
III. CRIMINAL LAW AND NORMS
A. THE GIST OF THE SOCIAL MEANING AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE
APPROACHES TO CRIME
Criminal law, perhaps the richest field for studying and trying to
regulate the relationship of behavior and meaning, is a very ripe
target for law-and-norms scholarship. It is also the field where the
state's supposed monopoly of force may give it special power to
induce "normative change" and yet makes it harder to distinguish
subjective change in belief from response to sanction. Criminal law
also carries with it a sense of social urgency, so that the norms school
has found a fertile field for publicity in involving itself in anti-crime
initiatives and the volatile facts and perceptions about crime rates in
the United States. Also, because of this supposed sense of urgency,
criminal law has been the motivation for new, explicit, arguments by
the norms school that conventional standards of social science proof
must be relaxed.
1. Social Meaning, Influence, and Deterrence
The most visible early paper in this field was Dan M. Kahan's
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence.158 In summary,
Kahan has two key targets: standard microeconomic notions of
deterrence and criminal motivation, and standard Warren Court-style
constitutional constraints on police. Kahan argues that the economics
approach exaggerates the role of direct material or physical sanctions
on behavior, failing to appreciate that law also serves to express and
enhance social norms and affect processes of social influence and
conformity that are deeper motivations for behavior. This might
seem an uncontroversial point. But perhaps Kahan recognizes that,
while everyone accepts that non-formal and non-legal forces are the
dominant factors in behavior, lawmakers and scholars tend to forget
or greatly underestimate this phenomenon or fail to appreciate how
subtly it can be assessed and guided.
In any event, Kahan draws several rough legal conclusions.
First, we must rethink criminal penalties, recognizing that the
normative power of certain types of laws and sanctions may render
15' Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 3.
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them much more efficient than conventional laws and punishments.
In this regard, he advocates most strongly two chief legal strategies.
First, he calls for the types of police actions lumped under phrases
such as "broken windows policing"15 9 and "community policing"' 6 -
in other words, modem order-restoring police techniques. These
techniques, he argues, have centrifugal meaning-making and
morality-enforcing effects which strengthen communities and reduce
crime. Second, because he thinks the most powerful anti-crime good
the law can offer is moral condemnation, he thinks the state can
optimize punishment by reducing costly material punishments in
favor of more straightforwardly condemnatory non-material ones-
most obviously, varieties of "shaming penalties." Then, to the extent
that conventional constitutional restraints would resist these changes,
he argues that constitutional rules be re-read according to a sort of
moral consensus or majoritarian-norm test, so that his proposals can
be more readily implemented.
Kahan calls this set of conclusions the "social influence
conception of deterrence" and credits it with great explanatory
power."' He offers economics-style graphs for illustration, though
the graphs seem to simply restate the point that, the phenomenon
Kahan calls social influence can raise or lower the crime rate from
what it would be if only direct sanctions were operative. He
concludes that, even in the absence of law, norms convey information
about the effectiveness of law. Laws can both optimize the effect of
norms and can help create new norms, and, because norm-change
becomes self-reinforcing, small legal investments can have big
payoffs. 16
2
If rational choice theory imagines people as cold calculators, and
behavioral economics as partly rational creatures full of cognitive
foibles and altruistic impulses, Kahan imagines people as highly
sensitive sensors of norms and mores looking for, and responding to
signals about, what others do and what others believe. The
mechanisms for transmitting and responding to signals could take
many forms, all of which are evident at some point in Kahan's article.
At one point he says:
59 Id. at 367-73.
160 Kahan's and others' linkage of these terms is disturbing, because the terms suggest
and often refer to drastically different things, such as tough new computerized arrest-and-
investigation schemes, and a non-adversarial social-work approach to policing, respectively.
161 Kuhan, Social Influence, supra note 3, at 351.
162 Id. at 362-65, 372-73.
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Social scientists have posited a number of explanations for the phenomenon of social
influence generally. Some stress the individual rationality of conforming to behavior
of other individuals, some the reputational benefits of conforming to social norms, and
still others a deep-seated affinity between individuals that causes them to value
conformity for its own sake.
163
This passage somewhat blurs explanation for the alleged
phenomenon with different possible definitions of it, and the last
clause seems question-begging. But doubtless there are many types
of social conformity out there, and Kahan cites many respectable
social science studies demonstrating conformity's various forms and
processes. The problem is that as we unpack Kahan's claims, the
possible specific mechanisms proliferate. Consider this set:
People see evidence of law enforcement and learn the true costs of crime.
People see other individuals enjoying the fruits of crime without punishment. They
thereby learn the price of crime more effectively than they do merely by learning of
the penalty structure of the criminal code.
People conform to the behavior of those they admire, especially those who seem to
win reputational esteem from others.
People conform to the behavior of the majority of individuals most proximate to them,
so long as those individuals do not suffer any very obvious cost for that behavior.
People see convicted criminals suffering stigma or they themselves experience stigma
when they themselves break rules or norms; they are thereby sensitized to the
reputational costs of deviance. 164
People undergo some deeper process of absorbing the values of others, induced by
society or by the state.
People will learn to act as if their beliefs conform to those of others, either for status
or security, or out of some inner mechanism to finesse cognitive dissonance, but their
actual beliefs do not change much.
These phenomena are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and
the norms school might respond to a charge of ambiguity among
these mechanisms by saying that it finds all of them. On the other
hand, the multiplicity of these processes and the level of vagueness
and generality with which each is defined suggest that the norms
163 Id. at 356.
164 Stigma itself can operate in any number of ways. Kahan says: "[blut individuals fear
stigma less when they perceive that criminality is rampant. The more prevalent criminal
activity is in a particular community the less likely someone is to be condemned for it by
either those with criminal records or those without." Id. at 357. But is stigma, which we
associate with punishment, so dependent on the rate of crime? On the rate of conviction?
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school is sacrificing usefulness for eclecticism. But consider how
Kahan's explanatory discourse operates on specific issues.
For example, he notes that in the period from mid-1960's to the
mid-1980's, American crime rose dramatically even though
incarceration rates rose even higher.16 He takes this as potential
proof that imprisonment failed as a deterrent, and then infers that it
must have been self-reinforcing social influence effects raised the
crime rate.
It's quite plausible to believe that the jump in the crime rate triggered the various
mechanisms by which individual decisions to engage in crime reinforced each other:
as they observed their peers turning to crime, individuals concluded that crime isn't
particularly risky, that being a criminal doesn't necessarily threaten and might indeed
enhance one's status in the community, that obeying the law is servile, and that
engaging in crime isn't morally repugnant. These beliefs caused potential offenders to
revise ... downward their assessment of the cost of it. 
166
At its chosen level of generality, this fails as an explanation. It notes
that crime rates were positively, not negatively, correlated with
imprisonment rates, fills the apparent causal gap with various phrases
suggesting that other influences were operative, and purports to
describe those other influences. But even if the numbers do establish
that imprisonment exhibits diminishing and ultimately negative
returns, we are not left with any useful explanatory alternatives other
than the entire universe of social or economic processes not
controlled by imprisonment. Since the national crime rate has
dropped notably in the last decade while imprisonment has remained
high, Kahan presumably would argue that something has caused
these other processes to reverse the course of criminal motivation.
As noted below, he does cite one possible factor-broken-windows-
style policing. But the efficacy of that factor in reducing crime has
been greatly contested, 167 while criminologists have proliferated
possible explanations of the recent crime drop-from short-term
population trends to the lag effects of permissive abortion laws. 168 If
165 Id. at 361.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject, supra note 15, at 295-99.
168 The most comprehensive new study identifies four influential factors-increases in
police, increases in prison population, waning of the crack epidemic, and the legalization of
abortion, and specifically refutes the influence of broken-windows-style police techniques.
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s; Four Factors that Explain
the Decline and Seven That Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 2004); see generally THE
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000) (collection of
studies citing various factors).
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Kahan's purported explanation is capacious enough to accommodate
several of the proffered factors, contributes little as an explanation.
Kahan also says that the social influence theory of deterrence
explains the empirical evidence that low-severity/high-certainty
punishment schemes are more effective deterrents than high-
severity/low-certainty schemes. 69 Of course that evidence, though
useful in its consistency, merely confirms what most criminologists
have been saying for decades. Indeed, this phenomenon has usually
been explained by the rough intuitive judgment that criminals have
super-high discount rates. That intuition may not be much of a
theory of crime, yet Kahan's notion of social influence does not
clearly improve on it.
Kahan reasons as follows: a regime of high-severity/low-
certainty enforcement leads people to believe that crime does pay.
As more people decide that crime pays, they will cease to fear
reputational loss from crime, thereby "tainting obedience with
connotations of servility.""17  By contrast, a low-severity/high-
certainty strategy reduces the chance that people will infer that crime
pays; their compliance will then sustain the certainty of conviction
and reinforce stigma. In addition, the low-certainty/high-severity
strategy discourages people's cooperation with the police by reducing
the value of any individual act of cooperation, and also increases the
risk of retaliation against those who cooperate. Moreover, severe
punishments cause many law-abiding people in poor neighborhoods
to feel unfairly condemned by the state, making cooperators look
even more like traitors (even though there are fewer of them). These
are all plausible possibilities, but at this level of generality, they
operate as suggestive assertions, not analytically useful mechanisms.
Indeed, they speak, at best, at about the level of the "policy"
arguments law professors elicit from students to teach them the
rhetoric of legal conversation; as such, they can be rhetorically
reversed with little loss of plausibility.
Kahan then credits the broken-windows style of policing with
lowering the serious crime rate in New York City, citing journalistic
sources, but also relying on one empirical study by Wesley Skogan. 17
Empirical issues aside for the moment, Kahan claims that the new
policing has worked in part by changing the social meaning of
169 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 3, at 377-78.
170 Id. at 379.
171 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990).
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disorder.7 2 Yet, as noted below, he does not enable us to disentangle
fairly conventional, if indirect, forms of deterrence from this more
ethereal phenomenon about belief.
Kahan's other much-noted example of social meaning
engineering is the practice of paying students to turn in other youth
who possess guns."' Again, this example does not help us to
determine whether the benefits derive from practical interference or
disruption, on the one hand, or image-changing on the other. In the
absence of firm evidence, opposite effects can be just as easily
imagined-including severe harm inflicted on youth identified as
police cooperators.
Kahan uses gangs as another key example.'74 Gangs are a
laboratory of contagious social influences. Conventional punitive
efforts to deter gang membership fail, Kahan says, because they do
not address, or only reinforce, the positive meaning-influence of gang
membership. On the other hand, Kahan argues that municipal anti-
gang ordinances do reduce gang membership, suggesting such
mechanisms as dispersals and curfews interfere with the opportunities
for gang leaders to win conformity by exhibiting gang behavior and
gang-related esteem. Constitutional and empirical questions aside, it
is not clear what the notion of influence or meaning adds to what
might otherwise be a pretty blunt instrumental analysis here. Gang
members need to be in touch with each other to act as a gang; leaders
need proximate followers they are to lead.'75 One can just as readily
imagine widespread resistance to and evasion of these measures
exacerbating gang activity, driving it further underground, etc.
Evidence may prove one possibility true and the other false, but
laying out the obvious possible causal tracks does not advance us
very far. 176
172 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 3, at 370-71.
1 Id. at 364-65.
174 Id. at 373-77.
175 Kahan insists that being adjudicated a delinquent only enhances a gang member's
status; yet he is equally confident that effective incarceration in the form of curfews or bans
on wearing gang colors deny them the public opportunity to enhance status. Id. at 375-77.
Somehow the former type of instrument is counter-productive in terms of social meaning,
while the latter examples succeed in denigrating the social meaning of criminality. These
distinctions seem empirically unconvincing and perhaps even conceptually incoherent.
176 A side point is that Kahan questions whether private enforcement can replace public
deterrence. See id. at 385-89. He questions the economic arguments for interchangeability
between them, because they differ qualitatively in their social meaning-or might differ.
Private deterrence efforts, such as barred windows, signal concession to disorder and lack of
faith in public deterrence and society's willingness to condemn. On the other hand, he
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2. The Problem of Constitutional Rights.
Pursuing a deliberately contrarian line, Kahan argues that
constitutional restraints on police or prosecution weaken the efficacy
of the criminal law in people's minds, granting a moral victory to
criminals. He calls this the "expressive effect of rights."'77 But here,
more than elsewhere, the argument is too general to be useful. At the
level of high publicity, the most striking recent example of a criminal
getting off on a "legal technicality" and causing profession of public
distrust in the criminal justice system was O.J. Simpson, but it hardly
seems likely that his acquittal caused any increase in crime of his, or
any other, sort. As for the varieties of the exclusionary rule, whether
they lead to fewer convictions or prosecutions and thereby raise the
crime rate is highly contestable. We do not know whether as social
symbols they weaken people's faith in the condemnatory power of
the criminal law, because this social phenomenon of faith is too
amorphous to be measured. In some "communities," it is the
nonenforcement of the Fourth Amendment that causes loss of faith in
criminal justice as a legitimate condemnor of deviance. So on this
subject, because of the common political demagoguery over "legal
technicalities," Kahan inadvertently comes closest to reinforcing a
troubling kind of populist argument.
Kahan might of course argue that the key question is whether
constitutional decisions nullifying prosecutions lead people to believe
that crime is increasing. He argues that any such popular perception
will lower commitment to obedience, reinforce criminal propensities,
and reduce the stigma attached to criminality, and he then repeats his
assertions about the effect of increased crime on the social meaning
of the state's deterrent devices. Specifically, he says, increased crime
encourages law-abiding people to invite gangs to become the de facto
local police in a neighborhood. But it seems highly implausible that
a few successful suppression motions in drug or gun cases spurs an
increase in inner-city crime. It seems even more implausible that
middle-class whites, the populist icons most prone to anger about
liberal judges' decisions, are moved to criminality to as a result of
these decisions. If anything, their anger has turned into the general
concedes that context makes all the difference, since the "message" in wealthier community
watch campaigns may be more influential. But he also notes how more successful public
deterrence may either weaken or strengthen the need for private deterrence. It is unclear
whether increased private deterrence efforts in poorer neighborhoods actually increase
distrust and a sense of disorder, simply have no effect.
' Id. at 390.
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kind of law-and-order conservatism, often tinged with racism, that
was spurred by Nixon's "Southern Strategy" in 1968 and enhanced
by the evolution of the "Reagan Democrats" some years later.
According to Kahan:
Severe penalties . . . might compensate for the effect of rights in reducing the
probability of conviction, but they don't counteract the inferences that citizens draw
when they learn that convictions are being reversed because of "technicalities," or
when they see disorder in their streets. Accordingly, even if severe penalties restore
the price of crime to its pre-ri hts level, they won't completely offset the negative
effect of rights on deterrence.
How in the world is this equation to be tested? Is it supported by the
simultaneous rise of the crime rate and of the Warren Court
jurisprudence of the 1960's? Is it refuted by the continuation of the
rise in the crime rate under the Burger Court? Is it then confirmed by
the drop in crime under the 1990's Rehnquist Court? By what
mechanisms, and in what way, does the pubic draw its conclusions
about these technicalities? Has the "impeach Earl Warren" trope of
the late 1950's so embedded itself in American politics that no actual
changes in exclusionary rules make any difference? Was the prolific
work done by the last two Supreme Courts in curtailing Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights undone in the public's mind by the
occasional decision in favor of a constitutional claim, such as the
recent decision nullifying a municipal gang-loitering ordinance? 79
Has not the success of "three strikes"-type legislation, aimed directly
at severe penalties, had much more salience than constitutional
litigation?
Kahan concludes that the social influence conception reveals the
utility of order-maintenance policies and gang-loitering laws, which,
though they have little direct effect on the price of crime,
nevertheless manage to suppress criminality. Like much in his
paper, this is a non sequitur, or in any event is empirically untestable
at the level on which it verbally operates.
Most of the claims Kahan makes about broken windows policing
have been convincingly refuted. 8' The gist of Harcourt's rebuttal is
as follows: for one thing, the Skogan research on which Kahan relies
is hopelessly flawed. Second, the so-called order-maintenance
policing did not in any coherent way change the "meaning" of
anything, nor did it alter the usual mechanisms of deterrence. Rather,
78 Id. at 392-93.
179 See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
180 See Levitt, supra note 168, at 10-12.
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staying well within the boundaries of conventional punishment
theory, it relied on increasing certainty over severity and signaling
arrest policies. Third, the claim that this type of policing altered
social meaning depends on arbitrary assumptions about the social
"subjects" for whom the meaning is relevant.181
But let me render the critique more general. In imagining how
rational actors in a social system calculate costs and benefits, the
"social influence concept of deterrence" offers no mathematical rigor,
no theory of efficiency, no insights into risk aversion. As a matter of
sociology, in the form presented by Kahan, it avoids any concrete
description of institutional dynamics and equilibria, much less
empirical fact. Identifying "social norms" in this context avoids
treatment of exactly what police do, whether they are playing social
worker and using legal authority to help catalyze social belief, or
simply using conventional enforcement devices very aggressively in
ways that can effect large changes in social behavior. And to the
extent it relies on game theory, it takes common sense notions of how
people are likely to behave under certain conditions, and gives them
memorable names-like "sticky norms" or "gentle nudges" or "hard
shoves""'8 -but adds little to our understanding of the limits of
reason under limited information. Rather, the social influence
approach epitomizes the core problem of law and norms scholarship
generally-that is, it demonstrates that notions like "influence" or
"norm" are too vague to be useful, while they seduce us with the
promise of a social science rigor redeemed by great suppleness and
even humanistic understanding.
Kahan's critique of constitutional criminal procedural rights is
also telling. Here, I am not concerned with it as a constitutional
theory; indeed I will not even bother arguing that he underestimates
the strength of the individual rights interests that it would subordinate
to deterrence. Rather, I am concerned that it also portrays society in
a way that encourages a dangerously unwitting acquiescence to
populism, and a dangerous indifference to the way institutions,
including politicians and the media, can invent norms which people
allow to be imputed to them. The norms scholarship thereby risks
complicity in an aspect of our political culture which it should be the
distinct role of scholarship to combat.
181 Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject, supra note 15, at 295-299.
112 See infra notes 233-276 and accompanying text.
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B. REGULATING CRIME IN THE INNER CITY: THE "PRO-SOCIAL"
INFLUENCE
Most of the arguments and claims in Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence are repeated in Kahan's and Tracey L.
Meares's Law (and Norms) of the Inner City,'83 but here the norms
approach is made part of a more fervent methodological manifesto.
Kahan and Meares argue that the norms-and-social-influence
approach offers an "especially plausible explanation for crime in the
inner city, where the density of the population multiplies social
interactions and magnifies the reverberations of disorderly norms
through the community."'8 4  They claim to offer an "intensely
practical agenda," because "norms are created through social
dynamics that are important enough to be worth regulating but
discrete enough to be regulated efficiently."'
' 85
Most boldly, they argue that norms analysis is sufficiently
promising a policy tool that it should win them some disinhibition
from social science craft norms.'86 That is, they request freedom from
the demanding standards of social scientific proof, because the
urgency of the problems they face demands action before that proof
is available, and, under these conditions, norms analysis has
sufficiently respectable explanatory and even predictive power.
Kahan and Meares say that even where the norms approach seems to
offer, at best, subsuming explanations rather than scientific bases for
prediction (i.e., such behavioral economic explanations as adaptive
preferences, wishful thinking, behavioral spillover, or displacement)
it might, at best, usefully generate normative insights "insofar as our
appraisals depend on knowing how the world came to be the way it
is."' 87 Finessing the difference between explanation and prediction,
they suggest that, even if their approach cannot have predicted some
destructive social condition, it can help to counteract or exploit it. 88
Kahan and Meares declare then that social norms work "pregnant
with explanatory insights into the nature of inner-city crime.' ', 89 And
these insights in turn generate "normatively attractive policy
prescriptions," including curfews, gang-loitering laws, reverse stings,
183 32 LAW & Soc'y REv. 805 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Law (and Norms)].
184 Id. at 806.
185 Id.
.86 Id. at 806-07.





and police-sponsored prayer vigils, which, they say, find sufficient
grounding in norms analysis to pass what they call the "political
confidence" test. 190
Kahan and Meares suggest that where harsh punishment does not
work and drastic income redistribution is infeasible, certain norms
can produce or enhance a phenomenon called pro-social
organization' and thereby can reduce crime. They are imprecise
about what those norms are, other than general notions about self-
restraint from crime. But Kahan and Meares assume that varieties of
social links can convey the meaning of these norms in such an
influential way so as to reduce crime. It is indeed not clear what we
gain by calling these things norms at all: they are, as depicted by
Kahan & Meares, simply forms of positive adult influence manifested
by close supervision, mentoring, parental involvement in PTAs,
abetted by teenage groups that reinforce the good nors and trusting
relationships among police and civilians through "community
policing." One might ask whether these things can be differentiated
from the effects that greater income redistribution would bring, but
we might grant for the moment the argument that empirical evidence
shows that this notion of "collective efficacy" might operate
independently of income levels. 11
2
As support for this view, Kahan and Meares rely on research by
Robert J. Sampson and others on the notion of "collective efficacy,"
and, in particular, on a study of social constraints on crime in
Chicago neighborhoods.'93 This research purports to find crime-
reducing effects in neighborhoods quite distinct not only from formal
controls by police and courts, but also from standard demographic
and socioeconomic status (SES) factors. Under the term "collective
efficacy," the Sampson study includes such informal social
mechanisms as "monitoring of spontaneous play groups among
children, a willingness to intervene to prevent acts such as truancy
and street-corner 'hanging' by teenage peer groups, and the
confrontation of persons who are exploiting or disturbing public
space."' 94  In other words, "collective efficacy" is essentially the
190 Id. at 807-08.
191 Id. at 810.
192 Id. at 809.
193 Robert J. Sampson, et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
'9 id. at 918.
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willingness and ability of individuals to engage the public good out
of a sense of "mutual trust and solidarity among neighbors." '195
There is something suspiciously too logical about research that
shows that low-crime neighborhoods perfectly resemble our image of
low-crime neighborhoods. But the Sampson study does itself
acknowledge most of the limitations implicit in its design and
conclusions. The study looks at factors in layers: it starts with very
conventional measures of SES-type conditions, factors which they
label "concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and
residential stability." '196 Sampson, et al. then augment those with
semi-measurable control factors such as "organizational participation
and neighborhood services." They then build up to collective
efficacy, acknowledging that indicators of informal control and social
cohesion cannot be observed directly but must be inferred from
informant reports. These reports are based on survey questions: the
questions ask about such things as whether respondents believe there
is mutual trust in their neighborhoods or whether their neighborhoods
are close-knit in general. More specifically, they ask whether
respondents believe their neighbors would intervene to help them or
their children if in danger, or would collectively respond to some
deficit in public services. 9 The authors conclude that the SES-type
factors explain seventy percent, but not all, of collective efficacy, and
that collective efficacy, along with, and somewhat separate from
organization and neighborhood services, seems inversely correlated
with crime.198
1. Critique of Collective Efficacy
The Sampson study leaves wide open the question of the
direction of causality between collective efficacy and crime, or the
question whether low crime and these informal social controls are
both the effects of deeper causes which the paper cannot address.
Sampson, et al. surmise that "collective efficacy appeared to partially
mediate widely cited relations between neighborhood social
composition and violence." '99 But, even so, this set of links seems
hard to disentangle from the set of conditions that we would expect to
find in those neighborhoods with low crime rates. Nevertheless, in
196 Id. at 919.
'9' Id. at 920.
'9' Id. at 919-20.




drawing on the Sampson study, Kahan and Meares confidently, if
ambiguously, assert that
the level of supervision of teenage peer groups, the prevalence of friendship networks,
and the level of neighborhood participation in formal and voluntary organizations like
PTAs, local school boards, and community policing organizations help to explain the
often-noted link between the structural characteristics of a community (such as race,
family disruption, and low economic status) and crime. 200
Proper norms thus apparently will emerge if the social structure is the
right one, but Kahan and Meares fail to rebut the suspicion that the
right social structure is caused, or actually constituted, by the right
norms, since, other than self-restraint from crime, the processes
described here are in some ways the best norms themselves.
Kahan and Meares assert that law can assist here by lending the
decisive marginal assistance to an otherwise sound structure-so that
parents can fulfill their supervisory roles if simply abetted by
curfews. On the other hand, tough arrest strategies are said to thwart
these efforts by creating the discomfiting impression that crime is
insolubly rampant. In terms of examples, Kahan and Meares repeat
the argument about the efficacy of order-maintenance policing that
cracks down on panhandling, graffiti, prostitution, and public
drunkenness. Deterrence, they insist, cannot explain why such
policing would reduce violent crime, nor does it affect underlying
social conditions, and thus it is "likely to prevent crime through its
effect on social influence. 2'°  They note that unrepaired broken
windows exert a normative social influence that ultimately leads law-
abiding people to leave the area. But this is also a sociological
phenomenon long-documented, and it is a material phenomenon that
gains no clarity from the vocabulary of social meaning in the Kahan-
Meares sense. Indeed, the very fluidity of the population in these
neighborhoods only underscores the difficulty of conducting any
useful discourse about norms when one relies on an unexamined
word like "community., 20 2
2. The Example of Guns
As for gun possession, while continuing to assert that it results
from "social influence," Kahan and Meares seem to concede that it
may result from a fairly mundane matter of defensive fear: "[o]nce a
200 Kahan & Meares, Law (and Norms), supra note 183, at 811.
2' Id. at 822.
202 See Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Dangers of Community, UTAH L.
Rav. (forthcoming 2003).
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few youths outside of the drug market acquire guns, the perception
that gun carrying has become a general phenomenon rather than a
drug-specific one can generate higher levels of fear among youths,
which in turn support ever higher levels of gun carrying."2"3 But they
cite one study to suggest that students report carrying guns in order to
impress friends, and thereby conclude that gun-possession is
"infused" with social meaning. Aggressive direct police attacks on
gun possession are said to "reinforce the message of defiance
associated with gun possession and thus increase the expressive
value of that behavior."0 4 Conversely, bribing youths to turn in
fellows who possess guns is said to give them an incentive to
dissociate themselves from this imagery. Kahan and Meares describe
this as "a policy that is believed to be effective."205
When students fear that their peers will report them, they are less likely to display
their guns; when students are reluctant to display them, guns become less valuable for
conveying information about attitudes and intentions. In addition, the perception that
onlookers are willing to sell out possessors counteracts the inference that possessors
have enough high status among their peers. Encouraging snitching thus reduces the
incidence of gun possession both by deconstructing its positive meaning and by
disrupting behavioral norms-including the ready display of guns-that are essential
to that activity's expressive value.
206
Thus, this program worked because its deterrent effects were
"multiplied by its positive influence on norms that determine whether
gang members and non-gang members decide to carry guns. 2 7 But
the empirical evidence for the success of these efforts is troublingly
thin, and "social meaning analysis" here yields a surfeit of possible
interpretations. 20 ' After all, why would the cooperators not suffer
grave social stigma?2
0 9
203 Kahan & Meares, Law (and Norms), supra note 183, at 825.
204 Id. at 825.
205 Id. at 822.
206 Id. at 825. Kahan and Meares acknowledge, but never really refute, the argument by
David Kennedy that an order-maintenance anti-gun program in Boston was essentially just a
classic deterrent crack-down. See David Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders,
High-Crime Settings and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 449, 466-68, 475
(1997). Coincidentally, the violent crime rate has now begun an alarming new rise in
Boston, arguably because the tough crackdown approach gave way to the community-
minded interventions celebrated by Kahan, Meares, and others. See Frances Latour, City
Strayed From Strategy on Violence, Co-Creator Says, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2002, at B I.
207 Kahan & Meares, Law (and Norms) supra note 183, at 826.
208 Harcourt, After "The Social Meaning Turn ", supra note 15, at 183-86.
209 Harcourt himself has taken up the challenge of lending some substance to the
question of the "social meaning of guns." Bernard E. Harcourt, Measured Interpretation:
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Similarly, Kahan and Meares insist that reverse drug stings (in
which undercover police act as sellers, not buyers) alter the social
meaning of drugs."' But it is standard criminology now to view
these stings as cost-effective as a conventional market intervention,
and though redistribution of the stigma of drug arrests obviously
helps the morale of the "community" in which the sellers live, this is
the necessary result of changing police targets and has nothing to do
with norms more generally.
2. The Church-State Linkage
The most notable aspiration in the Kahan-Meares inner-city
program to change norms is to encourage cooperation and trust
between two key agents-the church and the police. They cite a few
examples of (unquestionably laudable) efforts to link police and
church leaders and conclude:
Rather than a public-centered notion of law enforcement, which envisions the police
as the primary agents of social control through the utilization of a politically
legitimized monopoly on force, achievement of cooperative alliances among
community organizations that are facilitated by government can set the stage for
"private" law enforcement, in which social control takes place primarily through the
enforcement of norms as opposed to law.
211
This is how they describe the mechanism:
Introducing the Method of Correspondence Analysis to Legal Studies, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
979 (2003). Harcourt set out to get the actual words juvenile inmates used in describing
guns, and, relying on extensive interviews, analyzed the verbal data through highly technical
statistical-linguistic devices that, Harcourt notes, are closely tied to European structuralist
philosophy. Id. at 984-87. He uses these techniques to determine relevant emphases,
contexts, and linkages of expressions and ideas. Thus, for example, he tabulates responses in
terms of the juveniles' expression of interest in guns in terms of such "primary meanings" as
protection, belonging, danger, attraction, power, recreation, respect, self-defense, suicide,
and revenge. Id. at 991-98. Harcourt then cross-checked the expression of these meanings
with background information about the respondents-i.e., whether they own or carry guns,
their arrest records, and so on. He concludes by tentatively assaying the possible practical
implications of this analysis for law enforcement. Many of his conclusions are fairly
intuitive-such as that regular carriers of guns are associated with "action/protection"
markers, while less frequent carriers are linked to "recreation/commodity" markers. But a
few are interestingly counter-intuitive. For example he infers that gang members are more
linked to carrying and action/protection markers, so that non-gang users, who tend to view
guns more as economic commodities for exchange, are more susceptible to rational choice
incentives. In addition, he notes a disproportionate attraction to guns as a way of
"belonging" for youths who have never been incarcerated, thereby suggesting that a "taste of
jail" may be very effective here. Id. at 1002-09.
210 Kahan & Meares, Law (and Norms), supra note 183, at 827.
211 Id.
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Law enforcement agencies are uniquely situated to provide resources and direction for
organizational efforts by private individuals and groups. Participation by residents in
community policing programs is itself an aspect of local community solidarity. Such
activity, moreover, not only reinforces the community social processes that prevent
crime but also constructs and transmits law-abiding norms .... The newly formed
connection between the church and the police has produced new species of social
capital that can be directed at violence control: the police have access to new sources
of information that can assist them in criminal investigations, and church leaders have
been assured of greater responsive members to the crime affecting their congregants.
Church leaders are now even playing an active role in recruiting and screening police
academy applicants from their congregations.
2 12
As for the prayer vigil, "the commander's requirement that each
corner post at least ten individuals created opportunities for the
members of various churches to meet each other." '213
It would be churlish to deride this example as a sentimental
example of a "faith-based initiative" or to link it to some Foucauldian
conspiracy to enlist all the disciplines in social mind and behavior
control. Indeed, as a matter of urban policy the church-police
partnership is clearly admirable. But Kahan's & Meares's use of the
example raises, but does not help resolve, the question of what deeper
social conditions made this link possible, and of what specific
immediate conditions that might make it successful. Moreover, the
proposal to deploy church leaders seems overly optimistic about the
risks of "privatizing" criminal law by delegating norm-changing
power to non-state forces, eliding the difference between the obvious
and uhiregulated effect of private influence on criminal behavior and
the state's deliberate appropriation of private organizations.214
We learn nothing about what motivated the police, and have no
idea if curfews had bad externalities. Each type of behavior Kahan
and Meares discuss carries multiple possible, and changeable
meanings, and nowhere can we be sure that it was the force of, or
internalization of, a norm that made a difference, as opposed to
rational choice.
212 Id. at 827-29.
213 Id. at 828-29.
214 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1859, 1870-71 (1999) (conceding some of
the risks of privatization but insisting that the only alternative to experimentation with
private sanctions is "state-sponsored behavioral regulation, including severe penalties and
heavy-handed street policing") (emphasis omitted).
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3. Constitutional Rights in the Inner City
The perilous vagueness of the term "community" is augmented
by the political significance Kahan and Meares impute to this
concept." 5 They clearly mean to treat the rise of African-American
influence in city politics as a "constitutional moment"-a change in
national political and social values so broad and dramatic as to
amount to, and to call for, changes in constitutional doctrine. 1 6 And
they mean to remind liberal readers not just that blacks are the major
victims of inner city crime, but also that African-American residents
answer polls with remarkably mainstream or conservative views on
criminal justice policies. But the authors' failure to distinguish such
notions as "residents," "citizens," and "community" renders perilous
their constitutional and political conclusions, especially since the
degree of local control over crime is hugely dependent on structures
of urban politics and districting which they only vaguely address.
Kahan and Meares offer us a strange kind of identity politics-a
moral relativity of constitutional concerns, or a kind of identity-
politics federalism. They pay fealty to liberal constitutional concerns
by conceding or assuming that individual liberty is a dominant, if not
the dominant, value, but they note: "[t]he only way to figure out what
their net effect on liberty is under the circumstances is to determine if
the norms [that elements of community policing] regulate are
welcome or unwelcome by a majority of the persons who are subject
to them."2"7  Kahan and Meares assume that people need legal
reinforcement to be able to refuse to act a certain way, and so, in their
view, legal restrictions "free" people from having to obey norms.
Whether liberty is decreased or increased depends on how many
individuals resented the norm and how intensely they resented it
before the law went into effect, a matter, Kahan and Meares say, that
is beyond the empirical power of judges to determine.
But assuming the law is one that affects the average citizen in a meaningful way, she
can determine through introspection whether the norms that fuel the regulated conduct
are welcome or unwelcome. Indeed, the overwhelming support of inner city residents
for the elements of the new community policing is strong evidence that these laws are
liberty enhancing on net.
218
215 See Weisberg, supra note 202.
216 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, TRANSFORMATIONS 87-88 (1998) (discussing
constitutional moments).
217 Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 20, at 1182.
218 id.
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Harcourt refutes most of the empirical claims about the efficacy of
gang ordinances and gun-snitch laws on which Kahan and Meares
rely.2"9 Moreover, he. notes that even where those policies find
support in empirical correlations, that hardly proves that anything
"normative" changed in the behavior.2 ' Harcourt concludes that
more "Geertzian" research is needed, and stresses that it needs to
have the highly self-conscious anthropological self-awareness
promoted in much cultural anthropology.' As he notes, Kahan and
Meares continue to hedge their bets by saying that their claims are
speculative and have yet to be tested. But this is a very insufficient
concession, because, given the vagueness of their concept of
mechanisms of norm transmission, Kahan and Meares have not
proffered a sufficiently coherent set of hypotheses to be tested; rather,
they have approved a variety of unrelated policies, all of which beg
for empirical testing.
In a separate paper, Kahan connects this notion of collective
efficacy to the theory of reciprocity, a component of game theory.22
This paper posits an important refinement of rational choice theory-
that people will take somewhat self-sacrificial actions so long as they
believe that others will do so as well. Thus, the assurance that others
will not free-ride is the best goad to selfless communal action. But
left unanswered in Kahan's application of this reciprocity principle to
law is the question of what factors can cause mutual trust to arise.223
The use of this game-theoretic principle here accomplishes little
in terms of application to criminal justice. Kahan repeats his
common trope that some version of his theory has "explanatory and
prescriptive" power, and he claims a dramatic insight in linking
reciprocity theory to a broad umbrella called "New Community
Policing.2 24 By this Kahan means a lot of different things, including
219 Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ", supra note 15, at 183-86, 191-94.
220 Id. at 193-94.
221 Id. at 189.
222 Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1513 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]; see also Dan M. Kahan, Trust,
Collective Action, andLaw, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 (2001).
223 In a sensible and useful paper, Peter Huang and Ho-Mou Wu use game theory to
show that, assuming some modicum of trust in other agents' sincerity and reliability, this
mutuality of trust can be greatly beneficial in solving collective action problems and
reducing costs by enabling informal norms to reduce corruption. More Order Without Law:
A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 1. L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994).
The key here is that the authors make no claims to establish the source or prevalence of this
trust and hence make no claim to global legal recommendations.
224 Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 222, at 1514.
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the order-maintenance/broken windows policy described earlier, as
well as the "community self-policing" he finds exemplified, for
example, by links between church and the police. His major claim is
that what he calls conventional deterrence theory-in this case
focused on extra severe penalties-thwarts both of these efforts by
weakening reciprocity. For example, severe penalties signal state
concern for high levels of criminality and cause law-abiding people
therefore to infer that other people must be lawbreakers. On the other
hand (and not clearly relevant to reciprocity), heavy penalties signal
such a strong state commitment to law enforcement that it crowds out
motivation for community self-policing (that is, assuming they are
substitutes for each other).225 This application of reciprocity theory is
simplified to fit into justifications for other earlier, highly vulnerable,
proposals. Indeed, Kahan again offers perfectly good refutations of
his own statements, saying, for example, that order-maintenance
policing creates far more numerous encounters between police and
citizens (even if over less-important violations) and might thereby
aggravate community-police tensions.2 6 Similarly, Kahan again
acknowledges that the "privatization" of law enforcement through
greater reliance on churches produces huge problems with the
unintended consequences of state entanglement with religious
heterogeneity.227
4. Labor Markets, Material Factors, and Norms
A refreshing contrast to the questionable normative grounding of
the Law (and Norms) of the Inner City paper, and its shaky reliance
on the collective efficacy study, comes in a recent paper written by
Meares with Jeffrey Fagan.2 28
The Fagan-Meares paper is a critique of the hyper-punishment of
African-American males in modem America. It indeed searingly
criticizes a certain version of deterrence theory-the blunt kind that
relies solely on the immediate direct effects of incarceration. But it
makes no pretense of offering a dramatic new concept of alternative
punishment or a new behavioral discipline to unpack the complexities
of subjective internalization of norms. Rather, it corrects what it sees
225 Id. at 1525-26.
226 Id. at 1529.
227 Id. at 1535.
228 JEFFREY FAGAN & TRACEY L. MEARES, PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND SOCIAL
CONTROL: THE PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (Col. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10, 2000).
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as a futile and counter-productive version of deterrence theory by
recalling the more nuanced principles of truly classical deterrence
theory. And it then elegantly demonstrates that this classical theory
always assumed that the indirect effect of incarceration on the
informal social controls of society was a key element in deterrence.2 9
Moreover, and more important, Fagan and Meares cast their
view of social control and order in the fresh direction of linking the
efficacy of social organization to material matters generally, and to
the relative state of the legal and illegal labor markets and the effect
of unemployment on the marriage rate more specifically. 230 They
also rely on conventional categories of sociology, such as notions of
social conformity and social deviance, to explain how informal social
controls work.
Fagan and Meares make it clear that informal social controls are
meaningfully discerned only in "specific social conditions" which
require a very concrete sense of economic context. They also address
the effect of highly concrete legal and social forces, such as the
unintended consequences of school bussing on the stability of
neighborhood organization and the resulting susceptibility of bussed
youth to gang recruitment. 21 They recognize that the key context for
the experience of social control is the general phenomenon of work,
not some amorphous notion of "community life," adding that the
attractions of gangs and other sources of antisocial organization
substantially depend on the opportunities they offer for income.
Moreover, Fagan and Meares draw on a rich body of classical
sociological doctrine that traces the effect of material circumstance
down even to the level of marriage stability, where domestic violence
breeds in the "failed economic enterprise" of a marriage and leads to
social disorder.232 They trace the specific criminogenic effects of the
return of former inmates to neighborhoods, with their already weak
and destined-to-be-weaker investment in positive social capital, along
with the loss of the informal networks that make access to future
labor feasible. Finally, Fagan and Meares offer an extremely
nuanced version of the phenomenon of legitimation of the criminal
justice process, noting considerable differences among racial or
ethnic groups in the degree to which their acceptance of the
229 Id. at 6-11.
230 Id. at 9.
231 Id. at 17.
232 Id. at 27.
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legitimacy of the system depends on outcome equity or procedural
fairness.
This paper might be said to revisit the same terrain, and, at a
very high level of generality, it might be said to take the same tack-
of criticizing standard deterrence theory for failing to appreciate the
role of informal social controls and norms on constraining crime. But
the resemblance to Law (and Norms) of the Inner City stops there,
and the dramatic difference in these projects only helps to illustrate
the intellectual danger of relying on "social norms" and "social
meaning" as useful explanatory concepts.
C. THE PROBLEM OF STICKY NORMS
1. The Concept of Stickiness
If the law-and-norms school claims to have identified for the
study of criminal law a distinct social phenomenon called norms,
allied with distinct components called social meaning and social
influence, then perhaps the boldest statement of this claim comes in
Kahan's recent article about "sticky norms."
I believe, however, that the problem of sticky norms reflects the primitive
understanding of how laws and norms interact. I want to suggest a more realistic
account, one that should help reformers see how the law can be used to make sticky
norms become unstuck. 233
Kahan also asserts as his objective "to demonstrate the appropriate
and mutually reinforcing contributions that theory and empirics make
to analysis of the sticky norms phenomenon. 2 34  Thus, Kahan's
initial premise of "sticky norms" analysis is to be value-free; he does
not intend to tell us which norms should be changed by law, but
rather how to employ incrementalism to enhance the efficacy of any
legal or normative change otherwise desirable. The simple point is
that if the law gets too far ahead of society, nullification may only
reinforce the norm and weaken the legal signal. At first glance, this
recalls a very old debate about over-criminalization, focusing on drug
and other sumptuary crimes in particular, that arose at the time of the
drafting of the Model Penal Code (MPC). Thus, Sanford Kadish and
the drafters of the Model Penal Code argued decades ago that trying
to punish what society does not condemn will only weaken respect
233 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 608.
234 Id. at 622.
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for the law.23' Likewise, Paul Robinson, without any need for the
apparatus of norm theory, recently has quite sensibly demonstrated
that the drafters of the MPC must have compromised their
consequentialist goals in the name of concession to popular
retributivist views. 36
Kahan, however, not acknowledging this established line of
debate, believes he can offer a bold new explanatory scheme. He
cites "empirical evidence that shows that individuals have a taste for
punishing others who violate norms, prefer to reward those who
behave consistently with norms, and favor proportionate over
disproportionate sanctions when punishment is due." He also notes
that: "[e]mpirical evidence also shows that all else equal, individuals
prefer to carry out their legal obligations, '  and he concludes that a
person's "desire to discharge her duties makes her willing to enforce
a law that she personally regards as unduly condemnatory, although
only up to a point."2 38 From this he draws the following deduction:
If the law condemns the conduct more substantially than does the typical
decisionmaker, the decisionmaker's personal aversion to condemning law too severely
will dominate her inclination to enforce the law, and she will balk. Her reluctance to
enforce, moreover, will strengthen the resistance of other decisionmakers, whose
reluctance will steel the resolve of still others triggering a self-reinforcing wave of
resistance.
If, however, the law condemns the behavior only slightly more than does the typical
decisionmaker, her desire to discharge her civic duties will override her reluctance to
condemn, and she will enforce the law. Her willingness to enforce will now
strengthen the willingness of other decisionmakers to enforce, which will in turn
reinforce the inclination of others to do the same. In the resulting wave of
condemnation, lawmakers will be able to increase the degree of condemnation
reflected in the law without prompting resistance from most decisionmakers.
239
A few mathematical graphs are used to illustrate this point.2 40 Kahan
invents a utility function that is the sum of three variables: the
person's personal view of the right severity; her commitment to
235 Sanford Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 160 (1967);
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries) Pt. II,
at 435-36 (1980).
236 Paul Robinson, The Legal Construction of Norms: Why Does the Criminal Law Care
What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1839 (2000).
237 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 612.
238 Id. at 613.
239 Id. at 608.
240 Id. at 610, 612, 616.
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discharging her duty; and the propensity to confirm to the actions or
standards of other decisionmakers. He then makes a graph out of this
function. But it does not do what graphs should do. It does not
translate difficult verbal formulations into clarifying pictures. Nor
does it illustrate a mathematical equation. Rather, it obscures and
aggrandizes a fairly straightforward simple verbal assertion. Kahan's
graphs then rely on "empirical evidence" that, for example, other
things being equal, people, prefer to carry out their legal obligations.
Here is the explanation for the one of three graphs:
As the severity of condemnation moves from 0 toward what I personally regards as
appropriate, the value of P increases; as severity exceeds what she personally regards
as appropriate, the value of P decreases, and at some point becomes negative, at which
point she declines to enforce. This relationship is consistent with empirical evidence
that shows that individuals have a taste for punishing others who violate norms, prefer
to reward those who behave consistently with norms, and favor proportionate over
disproportionate sanctions when punishment is due.
241
Kahan then relies on highly focused studies of small group
dynamics-like judicial panels-to develop his point about cascading
responses to legal stimuli, but he leaves unexplained how these
studies bear on the behavior of the wide variety of institutional actors
he lumps under the term "decisionmakers."
The phenomenon of "group polarization" refers to the tendency of deliberating
individuals to migrate toward the extremes rather than the middle. If opinion within a
group starts out as only modestly weighted toward one position or another on some
factual or evaluative issue, it is likely to end up decidedly skewed toward that position
as individuals learn how others feel and why. Convincing experimental and empirical
data suggest that "group polarization" looms large in the behavior of juries and
judges. It is plausible to believe that the same dynamic affects the opinions of other
types of decisionmakers as well-from police officers to prosecutors to private
citizens-as they compare views on whether a particular law warrants aggressive or
only lax enforcement.
Kahan then goes on the provide more graphs and even more
elaborate-sounding explanations of "equilibria":
[I]f decisionmakers in tn perceive that about half of the other decisionmakers are
enforcing, then about half will choose to enforce in tn+I, which means that about that
many will enforce in tn+2 ... But the middle equilibrium is relatively fragile. If as a
result of some exogenous shock, more than fifty percent are induced to enforce in tn
(say, sixty percent), then an even higher percentage than that will be willing to enforce
in tn+I (seventy percent), leading to still higher percentage in tn+2, and so forth and
so on until the enforcement level tops out at the equilibrium at the upper right hand
241 Id. at 612.
242 Id. at 614-15.
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comer.... The comer equilibria, moreover, are relatively durable: exogenous shocks
may result in temporary boosts or drops in enforcement but unless they are big enough
to push the enforcement level back across the fifty percent tipping point, the
enforcement level will settle back into the comer equilibrium form which it started.
But if an increase in severity is ever so dramatic that it drives enforcement below fifty
percent, then the top drop off will not be temporary but will (consistent with Figure 3)
spiral downwards until it settles down into the far left equilibrium. At that point, the
lawmaker will be forced to reduce severity-substantially-in order to restore an
adequate enforcement level.
2 43
As in much of this work, Kahan claims critical self-consciousness by
acknowledging the complexities for which the basic model cannot
fully account. Thus he says: "[i]n some domains we might expect
individual decisionmakers to be disproportionately influenced by
what particular subgroups of decisionmakers (perhaps those who are
most conspicuous, or those with whom she identifies on social or
other grounds) are doing., 244  But these acknowledgments seem
somewhat rhetorical, and in all this exposition, we get little
refinement of what a norm is, or the level of generality at which it
operates, and hence it is difficult to determine when a norm becomes
"sticky." Perhaps we can only do so backwards-when we see that a
law fails to change behavior. Moreover, we get no useful measure of
stickiness, and therefore cannot tell if the model is falsified by
examples (which are fairly easy to think up) of laws that appear very
draconian in light of social mores. But the concept of "stickiness"
seems unable to account for the great prosecutorial utility of these
laws. Assuming some short-term coalition gets the law passed, such
a law can operate very independently of current social mores,
depending on voters' or politicians' inattention to the laws, or on
some more complex politics underlying the law's persistence.
Nor do we get sufficient sense of the different institutional roles
played by the actors lumped under the name "decisionmaker." To the
extent there is any institutional analysis here, we are shown a
triangulation between lawmaker, decisionmaker, and defendants. But
the blurring of prohibitory rules, degrees of penalty, and strictness of
centrally enforced guidelines is a crucial problem, as is the blurring
of the roles of officer, prosecutor, juror, judge, private citizen. Kahan
simply insists that these parties all act according to some combination
243 Id. at 616-18.
244 Id. at617 n.22.
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of their personal opinion of the behavior, their commitment to
carrying out law per se, and their commitment to imitating other
enforcers. Kahan claims to have produced a formal model that
moves from the "abstract and theoretical" to "concrete and factual"
and "real world." Yet later he admits that his approach is
"impressionistic" and nevertheless then insists that "the cumulative
effect of the illustrations should demonstrate the explanatory power
of the model overall, even if individual examples remain open to
counter-interpretation.",
41
Many questions are left open. Where exactly is the dividing line
between a "gentle nudge" and a "hard shove"? What are the relative
magnitudes of the various factors? Do they vary with respect to
particular laws? With respect to different sorts of decisionmakers?
The answer to this last question is yes, to the point of making the
argument somewhat self-nullifying. While claiming that the sticky
norms approach offers a "powerful set of concepts to guide inquiry
into why law sometimes succeeds in changing norms and why it
sometimes fails," Kahan eventually concedes: "[g]iven the
irreducibly contextual nature of social norms, the only way to
progress in making the model realistic is through minute observation
of the local enforcement that norms inhabit. '146 And, in general, he
admits: "[h]ow to implement the gentle nudges strategy will be
excruciatingly context dependent.,
247
I will deal with perhaps the most provocative example, date-rape
reform, below, in the context of Kahan's and others' advocacy of
shaming penalties. But on the whole, his concrete instances do not
clearly jibe with his general concepts and often seem disconnected
from the actual workings of the laws to which he would apply them.
For example, discussing the controversial acquittal of Bernhard
Goetz on attempted murder in the 1984 "subway vigilante"
shooting,248 Kahan argues that the court could have mitigated the
roiling political controversy of the case by the legal innovation of
allowing for a lesser included offense of "attempted voluntary
manslaughter. 2 49  But the prosecutor and judge could have
245 Id. at 622.
246 Id. at 622-23.
247 Id. at 641.
248 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986). At the end of the trial ordered by this
Court of Appeals decision, Goetz was acquitted of the attempted murder charge, but was in
any event convicted of a minor weapons possession charge.
249 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 620 n.27.
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authorized any number of conventional lesser assault charges
anyway; their absence from the case probably resulted from a gamble
by both prosecution and defense to play risk-preference.
2. The Example of Drunk-Driving
One of Kahan's examples is drunk-driving, where he notes that
criminal law deterrence has improved. He warns: "[i]t is difficult to
disentangle the respective contributions that increasingly
condemnatory norms and severe penalties have made to the reduction
in drunk driving in the last 10 to 15 years."25 But then he asserts:
"[s]ocial science studies link this change less to an increased
awareness or fear of criminal penalties than to a heightened sense that
drunk driving is socially unacceptable. Shame has repaired the
deterrence breach." '251 Unfortunately, the studies he cites support the
concern about the difficulty of disentanglement, not the conclusion
about shame having repaired any breach. These studies credit formal
legal changes, including increased penalties and lowered blood-
alcohol limits (not to mention the advent of drunk-driving second-
degree murder convictions in several states) with at least substantial
part credit for the reduction; moreover, these studies attribute much
of the survey response data on normative disapproval of drunk-
driving to heightened awareness of these legal changes.
Kahan does cite one key study in support of his claim for the
independent power of shame sanctions, because it correlates sharp
reductions in drunk-driving with such "moral" campaigns of the sort
associated with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).5 2 And
the authors of that study do indeed believe that the moral crusades
were better at effecting short-term reductions than legislation
pragmatically aimed at increasing the certainty of conviction and
actual perceived increases in the certainty of prosecution. Yet Kahan
ignores the central caveat of the study:
Whether the threat of shame for drunk driving could have increased independently,
without the legislative ferment that accompanied the moral crusade, is a question we
cannot answer. In the case of the drunk driving issue during the 1980's, the appeals to
250 Id. at 634.
251 Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).
252 Harold G. Gramsick, et al., Reduction in Drunk Driving as a Response to Increased
threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Legal Sanctions, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1993), cited in
Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 633.
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conscience and the legislation coalesced. Perhaps the legal changes were a necessary
symbolic prerequisite for changes in the moral factor.
253
In his own review of legal developments, Kahan credits the
normative campaign of MADD as having played a major role, which
explains why the reduction finally occurred even though laws had
been toughening for decades earlier. But MADD was intimately
involved in legal change, so he does not explain how it was an
independent normative force. Moreover, his notion of a gentle nudge
seems to slip from the apparent original definition-a small legal
change that abets, exploits, and catalyzes normative change-into a
non-legal change: "[i]nformal enforcement of the law, in the form of
privately imposed stigma, was the gentle nudge that shook loose the
sticky norms that condoned drunk driving. '2 11
3. The Example of Smoking
Like many within the norms school, Kahan finds the regulation
of smoking an irresistible subject.255 He treats this as a great success
of norms-optimizing legal regulation, concluding that early modest
regulations lent smoking an image of deviance without the hard
shove of total prohibition. Kahan finds especially clever the spatial
restrictions on second-hand smoke. Evidence of the harm of second-
hand smoke had been well-known for years but by itself neither had
nor indirectly induced any deterrent effect. Yet, he notes, the new
spatial restrictions seem to have quickly succeeded, even in public
areas where second-hand smoke was probably not a health-hazard,
because these restrictions enabled a wider moral resentment of
smoking. "Zoning" and "segregation" devices have worked, Kahan
believes, because they signal moral disapproval, if not condemnation,
while also stopping reassuringly short of prohibition. They also
reinforce the image of smokers as deviants, and this image itself
catalyzes further moral disapproval. Americans, he asserts, enforce
smoking laws better than do Europeans because we morally condemn
smoking, "although that disposition, to be sure, has been nurtured by
progressively more restrictive laws predicated, in part, on health
risk., 256 Once formal laws create some expectation that smokers will
reduce or hide their ugly habit, the public is empowered to express
disappointment at non-compliance.
253 Gramsick, et al., supra note 252, at 61.
254 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 634.
255 Id. at 625-28.
256 Id. at 627.
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But the mechanisms of deterrent social influence here remain
cloudy. Why do Americans morally condemn smoking if not for
health risks? Is smoking an aesthetic harm in some way
distinguishable from a health harm? Or is the lag in health
information relevant only as an independent spur to legislation that
then catalyzed a non-health-based condemnatory response?
Despite the gaps in the reasoning here, second-hand smoke
zoning rules offer a plausible, if non-falsifiable, story about how the
law has cleverly walked the subtle line that enabled efficacious
restrictions on smoking. But does that tell us anything about criminal
justice in general, about the wide variety of criminal behavior that,
unlike smoking, is associated with grave social deviance or harm or
that can lead to criminal punishment?
4. The Examples of Drugs, Alcohol and Harassment
Discussions of smoking as examples of criminal justice are a bit
of a lark, but they are a risky intellectual temptation for Kahan
because he moves abruptly from smoking to a most serious problem
of criminal justice, drug enforcement. Here is the bridge:
When [even mild] punishments are unmet, members of the public are likely to
demand more severe punishments, the enactment of which is likely to spur even more
condemnatory public attitudes, which are likely to lead to even tougher punishments,
and so forth and so on. This is the story behind America's spiral toward even more
draconian drug laws.
257
Kahan's concise review of the ups-and-downs of drug
enforcement is a set of loose historical generalizations connected by
an almost invisible causal chain. The drug laws at the end of the
Victorian era were mildly, non-condemnatory nuisances-largely tax
and license laws. Yet, to quote his mysterious verb-link, "they
underscored the untoward nature of these controlled substances.
Zealous moral crusaders and bureaucratically self-aggrandizing
enforcers fueled this perception, depicting addicts as frenzied
criminals and the physicians who serviced them as unscrupulous
'dope doctors.' 2 18  So the gentlest early nudges did something to
either cause, affirm, reinforce, or merely publicize a public concern
about drugs, moral or otherwise. Then norm-enforcers who for
reasons unexplained were vociferously opposed to drugs took
advantage of this normative effect, and politicians seized the
257 Id. at 643.
258 Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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opportunity to exploit it. As drug laws were somewhat expanded,
they were not much enforced, and the public was roused by the
thought of unenforced laws to demand both stronger enforcement and
stronger laws. "[T]ransformative 'gentle nudges' . . . can come as
just as big a surprise to lawmakers as can self-defeating 'hard
shoves."' 259 But what are the empirical bases of that and also the
following statement?
The enforcement of even these relatively mild laws, however, was sufficient to induce
members of the public to revise upward their assessment of the dangerousness of
drugs, a shift that predictably folded back on itself and led to increasingly tougher
laws. The story of drug regulation in America is a testament to the fragility, of
moderation in a moral and regulatory environment constructed by social influence.
Kahan notes that the spiral reversed itself on marijuana, but assures
us that "[tihis development, too, fits the hard shove/gentle nudges
model., 26' This is because "individuals' condemnation preferences
are not infinitely adaptable," and so here, because enforcement got
too rough in comparison to public moral views, a backlash occurred,
a self-reinforcing wave of opposition.262 But again, we are given no
way to explain, much less to predict these events.
The story of drugs contrasts with that of alcohol. There, we are
told, the reluctance of local officials to enforce new criminal laws
created the public perception that these laws were illegitimate, and
hence led to their repeal. Thus, to compare marijuana with alcohol,
we learn that repeal of harsh laws is sometimes caused by local
enforcement and sometimes caused by local nonenforcement.
Sometimes laws cause people to see drugs as having no licit value;
sometimes laws have no effect or backfire because the public does
not independently view drugs as illicit. We get politicians intent on
exploiting fears of drugs, though they may risk backlash (as with
opposition to marijuana prosecutions in the 1960s and 1970s),
because condemnation preferences are "not infinitely adaptable" so
they backfire.
The sticky norms concept then strangely unwinds over sexual
harassment. Kahan summarizes all the successes and failures of Title
VII and tort law and argues that all of them are consistent with his
thesis. 63 Indeed, his thesis seems to become a largely descriptive
219 Id. at 632-33.
260 Id. at 633.
261 Id. at 632.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 634-40.
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one-that because of the tension between law and norms, their
relationship changes cyclically or even randomly. Kahan sees sexual
harassment as an area of forward steps alternating with backlashes
from various parties. "The 'sticky norm' model can help to
illuminate these thrusts and parries, which reflect the extent to which
sexual harassment law has alternated at various points and along
various dimensions between 'gentle nudges' and 'hard shoves.' 264
Kahan says that harassment has gone from being an acceptable
behavior and the source of jokes to something "unacceptable" today,
and he concedes that "sexual harassment law is in part a consequence
of this shift in attitudes, but it is also in part the cause of it." '265 Then
he says that legal events like the $7.1 million jury award against
Baker & McKenzie creates the self-fulfilling appearance of a
266growing consensus.
For this to make sense, we must infer that this jury award,
however startling it seemed at the time, is a gentle nudge, not a hard
shove that creates a backlash. Thus: "[t]hrough the mechanism of
social influence, individuals predictably adapt their own values to
what they perceive others believe, thereby adding momentum to the
antiharassment bandwagon.2 1 67 And this adaptation has infused a
new sensibility into the workplace culture precisely because vicarious
liability has been imposed on corporations, and thus normal
deference by employees to managers now supplies momentum to this
norm. Managers are infused with the norm because of fear of huge
liability-predictably $15 million per litigated claim-and thus can
exploit typical worker loyalty and obedience to demand more
compliance of employees. Moreover, managers, even if they resist
internalizing the norm against sex harassment, will enforce rules
against it because of their commitment to upholding their authority as
rule enforcers generally.
Ultimately, or penultimately, Kahan sums up this phase of
American law as a great success of law-by-accretion. Compared to
the clumsy efforts of European countries to install sexual harassment
law all at once, the American incremental approach, he argues, is a
great success story of gentle nudges. But if we stop the story at this
point, it still is a strange one for inclusion under the sticky norms
thesis, because Kahan specifically notes that American law has done
264 Id. at 634-35.





better precisely by virtue of stressing the civil rather over the
criminal. By contrast, he laments, rape law and domestic violence
law have not been so successful: though all three "aim to dislodge
traditional gender norms," rape and domestic violence law are
"highly afflictive, and hence highly condemnatory" criminal
sanctions, and hence, he argues, they predictably generate greater
resistance among decisionmakers than do milder civil damage
remedies. 68 In addition, police and prosecutors, who are often the
great resisters to normative change in the gender area, play no role in
sexual harassment suits.
At this point, the logic of and support for the sticky norms
become elusive. Kahan, who generally advocates inexpensive but
efficiently condemnatory criminal sanctions, takes sexual harassment
law as proof of the inefficacy of criminal law, and even suggests it
thereby as a positive civil model for rape and homicide and assault
law. He has not told us anything about the normative conflict over
sexual harassment that would explain why it could not be regulated
through some sort of criminal law-and most strikingly, he has not
distinguished it in this regard from date rape law. Moreover, we are
left without any formula or set of criteria by which to determine the
appropriate form or occasion for gentle nudges. Though we may
have thought, for example, that the jury's role in the Baker &
McKenzie suit ensured that it would be a constructive "gentle
nudger," we are now told that it was the very absence of a jury role in
early federal harassment suits that ensured progress without populist
resistance.
Ironically, Kahan then risks self-contradiction in an effort to
acknowledge the political reality of widespread resistance to these
legal reforms. Indeed, he describes this resistance or backlash in
terms of a new outbreak of victim-blaming-a normative
phenomenon if there ever was one.269 So for example, it is now lower
court judges who might most resist, to the point of nullifying
legislative and Supreme Court commands. This resistance occurs
even though we were just told that it was the use of bench over jury
trial in early sexual harassment cases that protected plaintiffs'
victories from the dangers of populist backlash. Moreover, though
we were told earlier about employee deference to managerial norm-
expression, we are now told that workers resist managerial sub-
regulations for being too harsh.
268 Id. at 637.
269 Id. at 638.
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Ultimately, Kahan opts not only for a non-criminal but for a non-
precedential or non-legal remedy in the form of mediation. He
credits mediation with cutting out the role of resistance-prone legal
actors altogether, while also avoiding the condemnatory visibility of
formal legal judgments that might provoke populist backlash.
Apparently, judges are prone to reject harassment claims by
borrowing from the anti-reformist blame-the-woman arguments that
have thwarted progress in rape and domestic violence law. This, we
are admonished, is what happens when we call on judges to repudiate
laws which they have internalized. But in addition, we are told,
judges in low-level equitable suits, while they may resist changes in
gender norms, will, if they can be persuaded to issue protective
orders, enforce those orders vigorously. This is because their judicial
role obligates them to demand obedience to their injunctive powers,
despite the lag in their appreciating new norms about gender.
Perhaps Kahan believes that some judges at bench trial will hand
down progressive judgments, while a few will resist and their
resistance will have regressive social effects because of precedent
and publicity-he refers to the danger of conservative activist judges
having available a "stockpile" of precedents. 270  But we get no
analysis whatsoever about the distribution of roles, attitudes, or
actions of judges. Nevertheless, Kahan assures us that successful
mediations will inspire complainants to come forth and will gently
enhance normative change.2 7'
In regard to domestic violence, Kahan says that well-financed
special interest groups forced extreme changes in the law which
"decisionmakers" then refused to enforce. He therefore assumes
that many of these groups have far more power over legislators than
over implementers in the executive and judicial branches. Because of
the resistance by these implementers, Kahan suggests mostly gentle-
nudge shaming for domestic abusers, such as media anti-machoismo
270 Id. at 640.
271 Id. Fending off any charge of self-contradiction, Kahan then says this all differs from
other areas of law because it has been patterned by shifts and countershifts. But mediation,
he assures us, will "smooth out" this pattern, and his sticky norm theory explains why:
Mediation will minimize opportunities for conservative judges to slow the evolution of
American sexual harassment norms, and will also reduce the stockpile of unusual or
anomalous cases that conservative activists exploit to tar sexual harassment law with the
image of cultural extremism. And this will be especially true where the mediation results in
neither compensation for the complainant nor any punishment of the wrongdoer, but only
forward-looking improvement of workplace conditions.
272 Id. at 627-30.
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campaigns. He also believes civil and criminal contempt remedies for
violating court orders are better than regular criminal sanctions.
Here, contrary to the strong claim in most of his work that the law
should seek to catalyze the condemnatory views of society at large,
he argues that expressing the lesser "expressive wallop" of civil
sanctions is a good long-term strategy, while presumably criminal
penalties achieve just short-term expressive-cathartic gains.273
By this point, we cannot be sure whether a gentle nudge is a non-
legal, a civil, or a modest criminal penalty, or any of the above.
Indeed, Kahan minimizes the advent of specialized domestic violence
prosecutors and, by implication, specialized rape units, asserting that
because they seek to enforce outside the normative mainstream of
most implementers' views, they will become "marginalized." Kahan
in fact compares these to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, but never explains in what way it has become
"marginalized." '274 This is a series of questionable assertions, paying
bare fealty to institutional dynamics.
It is only in discussing domestic violence that Kahan even
vaguely acknowledges these institutional concerns; throughout the
rest of the paper, he implicitly adopts a median-voter approach.275
He ignores most principal-agent problems, even though the range of
agent discretion is immense in criminal law, along, with
paradoxically, the documented ability of the legislature to restrain
agent discretion when it does so with brutal explicitness. Ultimately,
all we can glean from the paper is that there may be some
hypothetical way to optimize the effect of a norm or a law, and we
can all find instances of pareto-inferior versions or applications of a
law or a norm. In short, people will be more likely to act in accord
with a law or a norm they substantially agree with.
Finally, Kahan offers his large conclusion: renounce greed; pay
attention to social meaning; harness moral resentment; prefer civil to
criminal; be wary of compromise.
Those who opposed morally intrusive norms, then, should be loath to accept even
relatively mild legal enforcement of them, lest a "gentle nudge" initiate an avalanche
of illiberality. By the same token, citizens who support such norms should not be
overly disappointed when the law only mildly condemns deviancy, given the potential
273 Id. at 630.
274 Id. at 630-31.
275 E.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Thoery of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J.
POL. ECON. 135 (1957).
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of a morally equivocal regime to transmute into an unequivocally denunciatory
276
one.
But he offers no sense of the relative weight or efficacy or
substitutability of any of these. Rather, the tropism is toward
weakening penalties-even in areas, like domestic violence, where
the law can hardly be accused of being too punitive. And this then
leads us to Kahan's major programmatic arguments about a more
norm-driven notion of criminal sanctions.
D. SHAMING AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS:
1. The Call for Alternative Sanctions
Kahan has strongly promoted alternative sanctions as a general
matter, and in a few specific legal areas. The elements of his general
thesis are as follows: a key and overlooked variable among sanctions
is the degree to which a sanction expresses consensus moral
condemnation of the act; this condemnatory message both helps the
punishment win more support from the public and enhances
deterrence by bringing normative pressure as well as material or
physical cost to bear on a potential offender; our biggest general
mistake in this regard is to rely too much on imprisonment and fines;
imprisonment may send a condemnatory message but is inefficient
because the physical restraint is too costly for both sides and
unnecessary once we devise more symbolic ways of expressing
condemnation; and fines and such other alternative measures as
community service utterly fail because they do not carry any
condemnatory wallop at all.2"'
In laying out this general thesis, Kahan occasionally makes
qualifying concessions or assumptions. At one point he denies, or
disavows, any claim that expressive meaning itself can be operative
without any material sanction.278 Indeed, he asserts-or concedes-
that instrumental and expressive functions cannot be disentangled,
thereby suggesting that even a supposedly purely deterrent strategy
carries with it moral appraisal.27 9  But he insists that certain
punishments do operate through meaning expression or alteration that
276 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 24, at 643.
277 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 20, at 643.
278 Id. at 600.
279 Id. at 602.
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distinguishes their effects from the pure costs of overt material
sanctions.
The contribution of the social meaning analysis here is elusive.
Most strikingly, Kahan notes the general consensus that corporal
punishment is a poor idea, but he mocks the na've explanation that it
fails simply because it is "brutalizing" or humiliating to human
autonomy. Kahan insists that the explanation lies elsewhere-in
social meaning-and he traces our collective image of corporal
punishment to the days of putting people in stocks and, worse yet, to
slavery."' 0 He then concludes that corporal punishment fails now
because it expresses hierarchical norms at odds with our
contemporary "egalitarian" norms."' He may be right about corporal
punishment, but one wonders what else he thinks was on the mind of
people who denounce corporal punishment as too debasing. He has
simply identified the obvious historical associations of one form of
punishment to explain social attitudes towards it, and he fails to note
that the distinction between hierarchy and egalitarianism is so vague
and contentless that it cannot do the work of telling us why we
approve other forms of punishment. Indeed, his treatment of corporal
punishment is bizarrely at odds with what he says later about
community service. There he notes that some oppose community
service because it allows the criminal to take on the image of the
noble civic servant. His solution is to require the community service
subject to wear some identifying color, or to limit community service
to obviously humiliating work, like manure-shoveling.282
Next, Kahan hedges on the phenomenon of internalization,
acknowledging that shame is an inward subjective experience and
that many people condemned or deterred will not feel inwardly
shamed; indeed he says that in many cases it is the recalcitrant
"shamelessness" of the unrepentant that only underscores how
worthy of condemnation he is.283 But he also says that shaming
penalties can deter by affecting "preference formation, .... adaptation,"
"belief-dependence," and "goodwill"-phenomena which seem
ambiguous as to changes in actual inward belief versus changes in
receipt or use of information about the beliefs of others.284
280 Id. at 610-15.
281 Id. at 612.
282 Id. at 651.
283 Id. at 631,636.
284 Id. at 603-05, 638-39.
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Then Kahan acknowledges that shaming penalties seem
inherently more feasible in close-knit village-type societies, as
compared to the more anomic modem world. Nevertheless, he says
that more targeted shaming penalties work within certain specific
"civic and professional communities" where people remain very
vigilant of each other's beliefs and status. 28" And then, on the other
hand, he suggests that shaming penalties work best for a certain class
of crimes for which incapacitation is not a likely altemative-a class
that includes, somewhat puzzlingly, white-collar crimes, drunk-
driving, and "nonviolent sexual assaults and the like." '286 Finally, in
terms of evidence, he concedes that much of the support for specific
sanction ideas rest on impressionistic fact, and he even allows that
identifying the mechanisms by which shaming supposedly work is
conceptually as well as logistically difficult.287 This is because "it's
unclear how a legislature would even start to transform the
understandings that make corporal punishment express inequality,
fines moral indifference, and community service public-
spiritedness.,"288 As historical background, Kahan has relied heavily
on the failure of corporal punishment, which certainly carries
expressive condemnatory force, but backfires because it violates
consensus norms through its reminders of slavery and tyranny.
Nevertheless, he says with some confidence that shaming penalties
carry no such meaning-baggage of tyrannical hierarchy.
2. Shaming
In generally describing shaming, Kahan advocates employing it
in several forms: "literal stigmatization, self-debasements, and
contrition." '289 To keep his approach parsimonious, he opts mostly for
direct commendatory messages, because they are cheaper and less
debasing. On the other hand, he suggests that this is consistent with
attaching some expressive message to otherwise non-condemnatory
community service: thus, this can be publicly labeled "shameful
service" and can favor, for example manure-shoveling over
community gardening.9 '
285 Id. at 642.
286 Id. at 648.
287 Id. at 607.
228 Id. at 630.
289 Id. at 632-35.
290 Id. at 651-52.
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But to give the shaming arguments a fair chance, we can
examine them in the two specific contexts in which the law-and-
norms school has most fully elaborated them.
a. Shame and White Collar Crime
In a paper applying shaming sanctions to white collar crime,
Kahan and Eric Posner seem to rely most heavily on a purely
instrumental model of norms. They start anecdotally, with the
example of Hoboken, New Jersey clamping down on the self-help
on-the-street toilet behavior of local yuppies by publicly shaming the
offenders through advertisements in their local papers or by requiring
them to mop up their offenses.291
They then move to more serious matters with the example of
insider trading. They conceive insider trading as morally indifferent
in the public's eye, until its adventitious association with some bad
event like a market crash. As Kahan & Posner narrate this
association, insider trading is blamed, rightly or wrongly, for the
crash, and insider traders are then shunned by others, for whom the
act of shaming underscores their own appearance of moral strength;
and the deviant image of insider trading then comes to serve as a
deterrent. Moreover, the new norm not only deters the behavior, but
deters people from believing more generally that people who engage
in the behavior are desirable cooperative partners. So, by this
reckoning, we start out with a change in belief about the morality of
insider trading, but this change achieves a secondary effect whereby
it becomes bad market-reputational strategy to associate with, and not
to condemn, insider traders.292 "Shaming destroys one's reputation,
but this injures the victim not because reputation is intrinsically
valuable, but because now people will not trust him, thus preventing
him from obtaining future gains either through honest cooperation
with others or through exploitation of others under the guise of
honest cooperation. 293  Any hold-outs soon experience so-called
"cognitive dissonance," which they overcome by joining the norm-
obeying and deviant-shunning bandwagon.294 People now invest in
the shunning because it is good for their market reputations, and it is
a worthwhile investment precisely because it is risky. That is,
"guessing wrong" about the acceptance of shunning-talk is more
29 1 Kahan & Posner, supra note 9, at 365.
292 Id. at 372.
293 Id. at 370.
294 Id. at 378.
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costly for "public" than for private gossip, because it might be
disbelieved or meet retaliation. Therefore, shunning-talk in the
public sphere has a bigger payoff when one guesses right.295
Kahan and Posner suggest that people will avoid the offender for
two reasons: (1) the offender is revealed as a bad type, who is thus
likely to be unreliable in cooperative endeavors; and (2) even to the
extent it might be profitable to continue to deal with the offender
(because, for example, he has special skills), by ostentatiously
avoiding him one can show that one belongs to the good category,
and one can thereby reveal oneself to be an attractive partner for
others. The resulting reputational harm can be quite severe, and yet it
costs the state much less than a comparable term of imprisonment.
Shaming, they assert, is a more effective economic burden than fines,
because it reaches the reputational asset that fines cannot reach. It
deprives the offender of his trade.296
So Kahan's and Posner's major point is that expressive utility
changes behavior indirectly by changing meaning. Ironically, Kahan
and Posner virtually concede the venerability of this insight by citing,
for example, Jeremy Bentham, who said that corporal punishment
"inspire[s] the public with sentiments of aversion towards it," and Sir
James Stephen, who says people react to hangings with as much
horror at the offense as fear of the punishment.2 97 Yet Kahan and
Posner invite reliance on incredibly slim evidence of success, merely
asserting that their Hoboken example is a success story. More
important, they assume some kind of efficiency equilibrium, namely,
the success of shaming penalties will deter legislatures from over-
punishing. But quite the opposite may be true, if voters and
legislators are far more interested in the condemnatory effects of
large penalties than in the deterrent necessity or fairness.298
295 Strangely, while Eric Posner warmly embraces this signaling approach in his book,
see POSNER, supra note 2, Kahan has harshly denigrated it, largely on the ground that he
believes it is dominated by "reciprocity theory." Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or
Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367
(2002). The irony of Kahan's attack-he complains that signaling theory under-explains
because it assumes all behavior is mostly sensitive to costs and over-explains in that it so
malleable as to be tautological-is that it captures many of the problems with Kahan's own
work generally.
296 Kahan & Posner, supra note 9, at 369-71.
297 Id. at 382. See also AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION, THE UTILITARIANS 339 n. 181 (1961); SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863).
298 Kahan & Posner, supra note 9, at 365-67.
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Kahan and Posner lament the passing of older, publicly
dramaturgic penalties (a lament whose historical justification has
recently been brilliantly skewered by Paul Mahoney,)2 99 but they
believe the efficacy of these penalties can be reclaimed. °0 They
assert, for example, that public shaming of urinators in Hoboken has
been highly effective-though (a) their evidence for this is weak, (b)
the case is too trivial to mean much, and (c) whether this is white-
collar crime is a matter of the most fundamental definition difficulty
in the field of white collar-jurisprudence. Moreover, they themselves
concede that we lack the speculative social science methodology to
test this notion.
Hoboken supposedly "illustrates" how shaming penalties
"gratify rather than disappoint the public demand for condemnation"
and also effectively incapacitate the white-collar criminal in the way
he needs to be incapacitated-his ability to defraud.301  Kahan and
Posner then address possible objections. They concede that shaming
can be costly, and they acknowledge the impossibility of saying at a
useful level of generality whether the costs associated with any given
shaming penalty exceed the cost of imprisonment that would be
necessary to achieve the same level of deterrence; they also
acknowledge that the social and economic circumstances of many
offenders may not be susceptible to reputation-threatening
penalties.0 2
Shaming produces highly imperfect deterrence because the injury to the offender is a
function of the value of his skills, the importance of cooperation in the sale of his
skills, and the willingness of other people to trust people who are shamed-which is
itself a function of the proportion of bad types in the population, people's beliefs
about the proportion of bad types, and the importance to these other people of
establishing good reputations themselves. All these variables are outside control of
the state and are not likely to be known by the state.
3 03
299 Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. RICH. L.
REV. 387 (2002). Mahoney shows how ill-fitted the modem notion of shame-signaling is to
its supposed source in the public stigmatizing punishments of the colonial period, given that
the targets of these were often so destitute and obscure that no increment of shaming could
stigmatize them, and that, in the case of public executions, the crowds attracted were most
likely there to provide moral support to the offender. Id.
300 Kahan & Posner, supra note 9, at 379.
301 Id. at 383.
302 Kahan and Posner concede in a footnote that because people choose shaming when
given a choice, it is more likely to under than over-deter. Id. at 374 n.23.
303 Id. at 373.
[Vol. 93
NORMS AND CRIMINAL LA W
Kahan's and Posner's conclusion from this agnosticism is that
lawmakers should avoid any categorical rules and instead take a
more-case-by-case approach.
Kahan and Posner also note that just as shaming by private
individuals might not work if these individuals' motives are suspect
(for example, if they are competitors of the shamed person) so in
some circumstances the government itself may be suspected of bias.
Hence
the government should use shaming penalties only when there are no widespread
doubts about the motives of government actors, and whether the underlying behavior
is condemned by a broad consensus or the effect of the behavior is ambiguous enough
that people will believe objections to it leveled by the government. These are
empirical issues that should be studied .... 304
Ultimately, Kahan and Posner adopt a middle-ground on the
appropriate level of specificity. They remarkably suggest that the
United States Sentencing Commission can draft implementing
guidelines: the guidelines should call for formal advertisement of the
conviction, with the venue and format to depend on such factors as
the severity of the crime and the nature, number, and specificity of
victims; and these advertisements, of course, can be combined with
fines or community service." 5
It is difficult to tell whether this is meant to be taken at face
value, but as a "thought-experiment" it is decidedly feckless. It tries
to derive some purchase from the extant guidelines for corporate
wrongdoers, °6 though it overlooks the quite powerful shaming and
humiliating devices already provided for in the general federal
304 Id. at 375.
305 Id. at 373, 384.
306 The current guidelines state: "In addition, the court may, if feasible, require the
organization to create a trust find sufficient to address that expected harm, § 8B1.2, or to
impose on the corporation 'community service' that is 'reasonably designed to repair the
harm caused by the offense."' United States Sentencing Guidelines § 8B1.3. (2002). Under
§ 8DI.3(a), "any sentence of probation shall include the condition that the organization not
commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of probation." Further,
according to the Policy Statement for § 8Dl.4(a):
The court may order the organization, at its expense and in the format and media specified by the
court, to publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the
punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar
offenses.
See, United States Sentencing Guidelines Ch. 8, Sentencing of Organizations (2002).
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prosecutorial process-an institutional phenomenon that Kahan and
Posner utterly ignore." 7
It is hard to argue against a call for further research, but consider
the research questions Kahan and Posner pose:
Does the revelation of an offender's crime reduce his or her ability to obtain
employment?
Second, does it deter criminal behavior, or does it have little effect, or even encourage
criminal behavior?
Third, can the deterrent effect be predicted from whether the offender is part of the
mainstream of society?
Do people who are shamed drop out of society and turn to lives of crime?
If shaming has a deterrent effect, is it consistent or does it vary across individuals? If
the latter, are there discontinuities?
Is there evidence that shaming changes people's views about the harmfulness of
criminal behavior?
30 8
The first question could conceivably be addressed by serious
study of the employment effects of the wide range of "shaming
penalties" now available in the form of state and local laws and
practices, and of the important issue of past employer revelations of a
person's background. The second and several others, of course,
assume that we establish enough systematic shaming penalties in the
first place to make a regression study possible. The third and last
seem conceptually impossible out of vagueness. Thus, it is not clear
what this paper has accomplished other than to assert that there is a
supposedly distinct phenomenon as shaming and that its effects ought
to be studied. Indeed, the list of questions makes more sense as a set
of rhetorical questions implicitly arguing for the grave limits of any
effort to devise penalties of this sort.309
307 For an incisive rejoinder to Kahan, by means of a review of the shaming processes
already inherent in conventional white collar prosecution, see John B. Owen, Have We No
Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, "White Collar" Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 49 Am. U. L. REV. 1047, 1053-567 (2000).
308 Kahan & Posner, supra note 9, at 388.
309 And, ironically, this re-writing of the list is in some ways what happened when one of
its authors, Eric Posner, wrote separately on this subject. See infra notes 326-31 and
accompanying text.
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b. The Humanist's Understanding of Shame
The tendency of the norms school to superficially allude to the
manipulation of emotion only underscores the inadequacy of any
jurisprudence built at the level of generality of the concept of the
social norm. It thereby tends to ignore or disrespect the complex and
contested psychology of emotions-and all the issues concerning the
difference between innate and "learned" emotions, or between their
moral and their cognitive aspects. In this context, as an admonitory
counterpoint to the norms school, Toni Massaro has brilliantly
examined the complexity of shame in particular. Reviewing both
psychological, sociological, and literary understandings of shame, she
demonstrates how it indicates some sort of "narcissistic defeat," but
also cautions that the deeper studies of shame leave us no idea
whether it is a universal phenomenon or even a potentially
constructive one.3"' It is a mysterious "sentry" patrolling the
boundaries between one's ego and others, but it is wildly complex,
with widely variant causes and behavioral responses and utilities, as
well as varying interactions with other emotions, such as anger or
envy or love.31" ' Moreover, as she depicts it, the complexities of
shame may be most vexing in the case of the most willfully deviant
people-serious criminals.312  Hence, it is especially arrogant for
government to claim to exploit this emotion in criminal law.
A similar elision of important complexities occurs if one identifies crimes that may
evoke disgust in others and then enlists the fact of this disgust (that one feels it) as
evidence of its moral authority (that one "ought" to feel this emotion) .... [T]he
move from any emotion ... to what "ought" to trigger it must recognize the internal
circularity of asserting that law can and should shape the cognitive content of our
emotions-a social constructionist account-while simultaneously invoking an
objective, moral vocabulary to feed these emotional condemnations of particular
behaviors an offenders, a vocabulary that is premised in part, on these very constricted
emotions.... [O]ur emotions are profoundly malleable; they can be, and are, molded
to various ends, ends that may or may not be normatively sound.
313
As Massaro argues, there is no discipline that can supply any
consensus understanding of shame.31 4 Shame may be biologically
310 See generally Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal
Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645,660 (1997).
311 MASSARO, SHOW (SOME EMOTIONS), supra note 98, at 80. For a similar attack on
shaming sanctions as excessive and unpredictable inflictions of harm, see Whitman, supra,
note IS.
312 MASSARO, SHOW (SOME EMOTIONS), supra note 98, at 91.
313 Id. at 94-97 (emphasis in original).
314 Id. at 84.
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innate, but that does not mean that we have any sure way of capturing
its manifestations, nor any means of predicting the outcome of any
state-sponsored effort to induce it, or how, even if shame is produced,
it interacts with a myriad other emotions.3
Massaro's deep treatment of shame can be extended to consider
its power as a humanistic concept, a concept that is flattened and
cheapened by borrowing from its moral capital to establish new
devices for mundane criminal stigma. A key example is the essay on
shame by the great literary critic Erich Heller." 6 Heller refers us to
the famous last line of Kafka's The Trial: 'Like a dog!' he said: it
was as if the shame of it must outlive him." '317 Heller points out a
crucial ambiguity in German vocabulary not capturable in English.
When Kafka referred to shame he used the term scham-which
indicates an absolute condition of humanity, to be distinguished from
schande, which is more of a situational disgrace." 8 Heller notes that
the Greeks made a god of shame-aidos, the soul's virtue that
distinguishes us from animals. For the Greeks, says Heller, shame
was an aspect of the sense of awe humans felt before the holy,
simultaneously an embarrassment at one's body and a sense that it
masks a holy mystery within." 9  Indeed Nietzsche, the great
Nineteenth Century rediscoverer of Greek sublimity, also saw shame
as a mystery by which humankind feels itself a tool of a greater
power. "The belly is the reason why man does not find it too easy to
take himself for a god."32  Shame for Nietzsche had a necessary
social component-it had to be there for others to see-but the sense
of exposure is the reminder of the mortal condition and not the
condition itself. "Scham" must be felt for us to be truly human;
indeed, notes Heller, "shamelessness" is a deviant condition or moral
defect. 2' He laments most modem writers' classical understanding
of aidos by trying to fit in it into particular historical or moralistic
schemes. 22 The manners of shame may be the stuff of historical
35 Id. at 85, 90. For a carefule critique of shaming as a purported means of rehabilitating
sexual offenders, see Kenya Jeakins, Note, "Shaming" Probation Penalties and the Sexual
Offender: A Dangerous Combination, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81 (2002).
316 ERICH HELLER, IN THE AGE OF PROSE: LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 217-33
(1984).
317 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 288 (1948).
3 18 HELLER, supra note 316, at 217.
319 Id. at 226.
320 Id. (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN (1986)).
321 Id. at 222.
312 Id. at 223-24.
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detail, but shame itself, Heller argues, is the "the warrant of
humaneness., 323 He concludes that
man is capable being ashamed of almost anything that is nature about him, nature's
nature, as it were, not human nature; of anything that shows him to be enslaved by
laws and necessities impervious to his own will, and be it only the laws of gravitation
that, conspiring against his upright dignity, brings him to fall on a slippery pavement.
In such a moment he prefers not to have onlookers all around him.
324
Bernard Williams echoes Heller in arguing that shame is
essentially a matter of internal self-gazing.325 But that does not mean
it is solipsistic, nor heteronomous in the sense of a contingent
concern about particular people's condemnation. Williams infers
from the Greeks that for shame to operate correctly, it matters, in a
subtle sense, not who the actual gazer is, but how the imagined or
idealized gazer is conceived. It must be the perspective of the moral
ideal to whom the persona aspires, but it must be ascribed to another
human being, because shame has an irreducible social component in
the sense that it reminds us that we are not morally autonomous.326
Aidos is always paired with nemesis-the shock reaction at any
violation of aidos; their pairing is at the heart of being human, which
means having a sense of honor and also and being sensitive to
violations of it. 327
Thus, Williams importantly distinguishes shame from an
emotion much more relevant to practical criminal rules-guilt. Guilt
is in this sense not a condition, but a reaction to a particular act or
omission-it calls out for punishment and can be redressed by
reparation. The world of guilt is characterless-it involves
compliance with an externally imposed law. By contrast, if shame
were only at the actual discovery of one's wrongdoing by particular
condemnors, then no one would have a moral character at all.328
Of course, to consider these deep philosophical and literary
treatments of shame is not to deny that there may be honestly
"parsimonious" uses of shame in such practical matters as economics
and law. Invoking the term "shame" is harmless and potentially
useful if it is stipulated to mean something limited and concrete in
social behavior and does not purport to describe a deeper
323 Id. at 227.
324 Id. at 229-30.
325 BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 81-82 (1993).
326 Id. at 82-84.
3127 Id. at 78-80.
328 Id. at 95.
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psychological or social phenomenon that a legal program could not
possibly comprehend. In his book on social norms, Eric Posner
rightly notes that for purposes of policy analysis, the best we can do
is be sensitive to some of the economic tradeoffs where the
commodities are trust and solidarity.329 In effect, he offers a form of
behavioral economics, using simply logic and modest and clear
assumptions. He assumes that the relevant commodities are
reputation by itself, and also various material and non-material
commodities that one obtains most cheaply through cooperation with
certain other people; hence a reputation as a cooperator among those
others is itself valued. Norms, in effect, are behavioral signals-you
behave in a certain way, or you invest in a costly commitment to a
certain behavioral norm, in order to signal that you are a worthy
cooperator for a certain group. And this norm-obedience has a
simple secondary mechanism-you shun someone violating the norm
both because you do not trust any exchange with that individual and
in order to signal your adhesion to the norm.330
Then there is the norm entrepreneur: Posner rightly notes that
norms most often arise as historical accidents or mere statistical
patterns, or in response to some wholly exogenous force.33 Norms,
he asserts, then take on some independent valence as behavioral
signals of trustability. They indicate "meaning" only in this
admittedly superficial sense of behavioral association, and thus can
be affected or created at the level of political sloganeering and
consumer advertising. Thus they carry no necessary philosophical
depth, nor any necessary political implications, and they are clearly
endogenous to behavior. They are different from merely value-
maximizing customs or rules, but not profoundly so. For purposes of
norms analysis, reputation and cooperative opportunities are the only
329 POSNER, supra note 2 at 88-11 1.
330 An interesting corollary is supplied by Jon Elster, who suggests that if there is any
interesting link between material sanction and the emotion of shame, it lies not in the
financial cost of any penalty to the target, but rather in the cost to the sanctioner of the
shaming effort and the target's resulting emotional reaction to that expenditure. Jon Elster,
Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 47, 67 (1998). Elster offers another
interesting insight-that shame affects future behavior not by adding a cost to the target's
utility function, but rather by so distressing that target that her discount rate vastly increases.
Id. Note that Elster's insights simply assume that a penalty induces some negative emotion
and suggests possible metrics for appreciating its effects, and so it does not fall prey to the
dangers of law-and-norms shaming jurisprudence generally. It does not purport to find
deeper meaning in the concept of shame, nor, does he suggest, to that lawmakers try to
engineer its effects in the name of deterrence.
331 POSNER, supra note 2, at 28-32.
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currency you need to assume; the norms entrepreneur is motivated by
sheer returns. Cooperation produces internal advantages but some
externalities-which can be good (like information) or bad
(discrimination). As for "social meaning," Posner suggests no more
than that a law changing equilibrium directly affects behavior but
also has a "hermeneutic effect"-that is, it can change the
associational imagery of a certain form of behavior.33
The potential limited efficacy of shaming follows logically: It is
a potentially cheap form of law enforcement. But as Posner notes, its
drawbacks are several: it is impossible to calibrate the degree, or even
the direction, of the effects of ostracism.333 Indeed, some objects of
ostracism may be lionized thereby, while others will be immune-
whether by virtue of great obscurity or great fame. Some innocent
relatives or associates may get uselessly ostracized, some legitimate
objects of ostracism will suffer excessive reputational harms, and the
ostracizers themselves may be unconcerned with these effects-they
simply want to enhance their own reputations by investing some
visible cost in the act of ostracism. Indeed, for this very reason, the
government might stigmatize more successfully by imprisonment
precisely because it is visibly costly.334
These sensible remarks about shaming not only are a wise
admonition against intemperate or foolish policy prescriptions. They
also reflect a useful kind of academic self-knowledge for legal
scholars not claiming to draw on anything empirical beyond fairly
common-sense facts and assumptions, and anything more
methodologically innovative than the useful lessons of a behaviorally
sophisticated economics and game theory.335 But this sensible
332 Id. at 128-30.
333 See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tensions Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991 ).
334 POSNER, supra note 2, at 106. For another analysis of the deterrent benefits and
potentially criminogenic costs of shaming penalties, see Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime:
Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV L. REV. 2186
(2003).
335 David Skeel supplements this view in offering an example of shaming punishments in
a very controlled environment-corporate criminal liability-and thereby also suggests the
general limitations of shaming as a device of punishment. David Skeel, Shaming in
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). Skeel uses some concrete examples of
corporate shaming-CalPERS's lists of under-performing companies or certain negative
articles in major financial journals-and speculates on how these communications can deter
corporate misconduct. He is sensitive to the concern that because these devices often take
the form of conveying objective financial information through established media, it is not
clear whether they describe a distinct phenomenon of "shaming" at all. Moreover, he
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approach has been far less influential than the attractions of the
academic dangers it implicitly counsels against. Using the term
"shame" in this transparently stipulated way can be harmless if in the
service of modest instrumental analysis of behavioral incentives. The
danger of the law-and-norms scholarship, however, is that it
appropriates the deeper moral and philosophical capital of the
phenomenon of shame in areas of crime and law fraught with deep
dilemmas of morality and psychology. The area of rape is a prime
example.
c. Shaming and Rape
One of the norms school's favorite targets for shaming penalties
has been date rapists on campus. For one thing, the campus might be
the "close-knit" community where shame might work. For another,
the general under-enforcement of rape laws, caused presumably by
conflicting social views on the harm of unconsented to sex and the
meaning thereof, has often provoked calls for some different kind of
sanction. Thus, date rape is a key part of Kahan's call for alternative
sanctions and his notion of "sticky norms." He argues for shaming
penalties as an optimal intermediate sanction between the
theoretical-and rarely enforced-severe penalty against rape and the
de facto legal tolerance of it in certain social contexts. Kahan
repeatedly argues that "policies that are only weakly condemnatory
can be seen as signaling that the underlying conduct is not genuinely
worthy of condemnation, an inference that is likely to reinforce itself
insofar as moral appraisals are shaped by social influence." '336 Thus,
there is the danger that a "gentle nudge can devolve into a "sly
wink." '337 At the same time, he fears that certain "hard shoves" in
effect become "sly winks" because they condemn and punish so far
in excess of consensus norms as to be unenforced. His own
conclusion on this matter is actually an old-fashioned and much
discussed one: rape law needs an intermediate sanction.
carefully analyses the internal structural dynamics of corporations to determine whether
these communications are useful, taking into account, for example, the role of indemnity and
insurance for officers and directors in creating the need for distinct incremental punishments.
Id. at 1833. He also raises questions about the motivation or incentive of shamers who are
actual shareholders (such as CalPERS) and related questions about whether the costs and
benefits of shaming are internalized (in the economic, not psychological sense). Id. at 1828.
336 Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra, note 24 at 624.
337 Id. at 625.
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Because his notion of norms carries with it no distinct means of
measuring or clarifying social attitude, prosecutorial, or jury
behavior, or any other factor in determining degree of enforcement,
Kahan speaks in effect, at the level of general doctrine. But he does
not even acknowledge that notable criminal law scholars have
already quite intelligently exploited the resources of standard
doctrinal analysis-including perfectly traditional moral reasoning
and empirical speculation, to consider this very possibility. Thus,
Donald Dripps would create two new statutes to replace rape laws:
"Sexually Motivated Assault," a felony, and "Sexual Expropriation,"
a serious misdemeanor or minor felony.338 These would be the two
illegitimate and criminal means of procuring sex from the victim.
Dripps assumes that there is a greater social interest in freedom from
violence than there is in protecting sexual autonomy, and therefore a
nonviolent violation of a person's sexual autonomy should not be
punished as severely as a physical assault. At the same time, he
believes that focusing on the action of the defendant properly respects
the complainant's "property" right in bodily integrity from "theft."
"Sexual expropriation" would apply when the defendant completes a
sexual act over the verbal protests of the victim without purposely or
knowingly putting her in fear of physical injury.339 In a reply to
Dripps, Robin West praises his imputation of autonomy and integrity
to the victim; she sees this as a worthy corrective to the old
patriarchal notion that a woman's sexuality actually belonged to
some man, and that rape law thus protected that man's interest in the
woman's chastity, and she praises the reformist gain of removing the
concept of "consent" from rape law, a concept that often exculpated
men who threatened violence if their victims ultimately manifested
338 Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1780, 1799-81 (1992).
339 Dripps then asserts that the criminal law should ignore other admittedly questionable
sexual "transactions," as where, because of a "complex relationship," a woman offers sex not
for her own pleasure, but rather for such consideration as fidelity, economic security, or
friendship. He concedes that these "transactions" may be nonmutual and unpleasurable, but
he treats the means of procuring sex in them as "legitimate." Though these latter
transactions may reflect the maldistribution of bargaining power between men and women,
he points out that neither the criminal law nor even the civil law of contracts attempts to cure
all the maldistribution that somehow arises in our society. Id. at 1789-92, 1801-03. Dripps
explains in a follow-up piece that by "legitimate" he meant only that these transactions are
lawful, not that they are morally admirable. Donald Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex,




"consent" to sex.34 ° On the other hand, West argues that division of
the law of rape into a violent and non-violent parts wrongly assumes
that rape is only violent in the first case, where some collateral threat
of violence is the means of procuring intercourse. Rather, she argues,
in any case of illegitimately procured sex the act of intercourse itself
is necessarily a violent physical act and the notion of a "larcenous
taking" of sex becomes an inapt analogy.341
Kahan's norm analysis offers no more, and perhaps less. Kahan
admits that he has no idea whether his proposal will work, or indeed
will backfire. His analysis is self-canceling: if a gentle nudge is too
gentle, it can signal that the underlying conduct is worthy of serious
condemnation; if too harsh, it will turn into a morally unconvincing
or unpersuasive shove and will cause disrespect for the law. At this
level of generality, anecdotal examples can be found consistent with
any outcome, but no part of the theory can actually be falsified.
But promise of a more elaborate and nuanced airing of the
proposal for shaming penalties in date rape cases comes from
Katharine Baker.342 In one article, without relying on the patent
vocabulary of social meaning or social norms, Baker deftly illustrates
the complicated and sometimes paradoxical relationships among the
purposes and effects of legal rules and social understandings of
rape.343 Baker attacks the premises and likely consequences of the
new federal rule broadly permitting "prior offense" evidence in rape
cases. She refutes its implicit premises that rape is a particularly
recidivist crime and that rapists exhibit a deviant compulsive deviant
mental pathology; instead, she argues that the real problem with rape
in modem America is that it is a widely distributed crime committed
by otherwise "normal" men.344 Moreover, she strikingly notes, given
the traditional pattern of rape prosecutions in the United States, the
federal prior offense rule is likely to disproportionately target black
defendants and thereby only reinforce many of the noxious
340 Robin West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM.
L. REv. 1442, 1444-47 (1993).341 Id. at 1448-49. West also argues that to carry out the full implications of Dripps's
view that sex is a commodity should require the law to grant a range of damage remedies to
women whose offers of sex do not receive the full-bargained for consideration-as in many
of the "complex relationships" Dripps would put outside the reach of the law. Id. at 1448.
342 Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 9.
343 Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1997) [hereinafter Baker, Once a Rapist?].
344 Id. at 578-83.
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stereotypes about race and sexuality under which pre-reform rape law
operated.345
In fact, Baker argues, the subtler and more important
"background" question on which juries need help is the motive(s) for
rape, which she sees as far more social and relational than
individually psychological. Avoiding the clich6 that rape is all about
power and control and not about sexuality, Baker notes how these
factors interact in varied ways. Young men sometimes believe they
are seeking legitimate sexual communication in some abstract sense,
but by virtue of immaturity and prejudice they are prey to warped
understandings of female emotions; thus, they are so imbued with a
notion of commodified sex that even though they may recognize their
behavior is wrong or even illegal, they grossly underestimate its
gravity, because they associate it, at most, with theft, not rape.346
Baker also notes how male-to-male relationships sometimes
encourage rape as a device for group association and sometimes,
paradoxically, in order to dominate and defeat other men.347 Baker
concludes that if lawmakers want to enhance jurors' understanding of
rape, they can exploit the traditional evidence rule permitting prior
act evidence as it bears on motive, and thereby avoid the dangers of
the more permissive new prior act rule.348  Thus her nuanced
depiction of rape motivation produces a subtle and provocative
approach to rape reform legislation.
But, as Baker's newer article turns to the toolkit of social norms
and meaning to propose a new shaming penalty for acquaintance
rape, the treatment of both offender psychology and legal response
lose precision and resilience.
Baker's shaming proposal is premised on the notion that men
seek sex as much to win peer approval for superficial masculinity as
for any other motive. This notion, while highly plausible, is backed
by anecdotes and popular culture facts, rather than any formal theory
or data. In seeking a deeper explanation of this phenomenon Baker
recurs to assertions about norms:
[One] needs to turn to the emerging literature on norms.... Richard McAdams
suggests that a preference for esteem is what explains much of the persistence of
social norms. A norm develops and thrives because conforming with that norm is a
means of securing the esteem of others. McAdams goes on to explain how this
311 Id. at 594-97.
346 Id. at 599-606.
... Id. at 606-07.
348 Id. at 612-20.
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esteem process can explain both adaptable, behavior specific norms and more abstract
internalized norms..... The two kinds of norms often interrelate. Behavior specific
rules support internalized ideals. ... Because behavior-specific norms can support
internalized norms, the internalized norm often gives social meaning to the behavior
required by non-internalized norms.
34 9
This distinction by McAdams provides some suppleness to the
dynamics of norms: abstract, internalized norms tend to stay constant
over time and place; and because internalized norms give social
meaning to behavior specific norms and because behavior-specific
norms can change over time and place, the meaning of certain
behaviors can change over time and place. Baker applies this
dynamic to date rape by describing the demonstration of masculinity
as the abstract internalized norm that gives meaning to specific sexual
conquests.35 °
Unfortunately, it is not clear that we have any way of measuring
internalization here; instead we may essentially have a restatement of
the fact that some norms are general and can be implemented by
more specific ones. But Baker pushes this as a theoretical insight,
and, performing what has become a ritual citation trope, she notes:
"[a]s Dan Kahan reminds us, 'Actions have meanings as well as
consequences."' 35  She goes on to assert that the meaning of rape is
tied up with biased gender attitudes, which, she asserts, are
disproportionately prevalent among sexual criminals. 352  "The
remarkably strong adherence to traditional sex-roles within the date
rapist population supports this hypothesis. Gender roles explain both
why date rapists fail to appreciate the importance of consent and why
date rapists have such an exaggerated desire for sex." Sexually
aggressive males, Baker notes, are more likely to have "rape-
supportive" beliefs.35 3 By contrast "pro-feminine attitudes" correlate
with more sympathy toward women as rape victims-and this means
those with "female sex-role orientations. 354 Just as important, Baker
34 Id. at 672 (citing McAdams, supra note 38, at 342). Hence one mows one's lawn to
show one is good neighbor, or makes one's child wear bike helmet to show one is good
parent.
30 Id. at 673.
"' Id. at 673 (citing Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 20, at 597).
352 Id. at 674. For the notion that a proclivity to date rape is rooted in sexism, see, for
example, M.P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National
Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT II 1988 (Ann
Wolbert Burgess ed.,1988).
353 Baker, Once a Rapist?, supra note 343, at 674 & n.55.
314 Id. at 674.
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asserts, "sex role paradigms" explain why date rapists persistently
seek sex. "Date rapists see and endorse stark distinctions between the
masculine and the feminine." '355
Proving oneself heterosexual and proving oneself masculine are one in the same
act .... Furthermore, in a world in which the masculine is given more esteem that the
feminine, men are likely to have more need to prove their gender, lest they be
mistaken for someone less worthy of esteem or power.356
Baker quotes with approval the following assertion: "[i]ndividuals
thus refrain from criminality not because they fear the threatened
punishment, but because they have no desire to engage in such
behavior; and they have no desire to engage in such behavior because
they know it is deemed worthy of criminal punishment.",3 " But it is
not clear how knowing that something is worthy of punishment is
related to knowledge that it is illegal, and so we cannot be sure
whether we see here the internalization of a norm or the awareness of
a legal rule.
In any event, in Baker's depiction, rapists show little remorse or
regard for law. Perhaps inconsistently, they often offer alcohol and
drugs as excuses. But, Baker notes, alcohol may operate more
through the social meaning of drinking than through its biochemical
effects, because studies show that placebo alcohol makes men more
aroused at pornographic images.358 Baker notes that these misogynist
attitudes are especially prevalent in competitive all-male
environments-such as athletic teams and fraternities-whereas more
egalitarian gender attitudes are more dominant among men, for
example, serving as student government leaders.359 But, Baker
argues, these attitudes are sufficiently "sticky" in this country that
date rape is difficult to punish. Thus, by implication, a lower level of
charge might both increase the certainty of punishment and unstick
these recalcitrant social attitudes. Baker insists that "alternative
sanctions will also allow communities to steer social influence. So
Dan Kahan has written, '[t]he phenomenon of social influence...
reveals that individuals' assessments of both the value and the price
... Id. at 674-75.
36 Id. at 676.
117 Id. at 680 (quoting Dan Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
the Criminal Law, 96 CoLum. L. REv. 269, 356 (1996)).
311 Id. at 682.
359 Id. at 676. See also J. Garrett-Gooding & R. Senter, Attitudes and Acts of Sexual
Aggression on a University Campus, 59 SOCIOLOGICAL. INQUIRY 348, 366 (1987).
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of criminal activity are endogenously related to their beliefs about the
attitude and intentions of others.' 360
Baker seems ambivalent about the nature of the change she calls
for. Is it loss of status or is it the internalization of a gender-
enlightened norm? She explicitly abjures the goal of de-linking
sexuality from gender and depolarizing gender in the short-run. But
her stated goal is to change the meaning of date rape, in order that it
be viewed with the same horror with which we now view sex with
small children. Nevertheless, she argues, because of differing
perceptions of truth, we need a truth that both parties can share; there
can be no normative change without social discussion, and on
campuses these days there is insufficient discussion.36' It is unclear
whether she means wide public discussion or a promulgation of an
ethic whereby intimate sexual communication is done verbally rather
than through body language. 362
As we move to Baker's programmatic solution, the legalistic
mechanics are not sketched out, so even though she claims that the
cohesion of the campus can make the punishment more efficacious,
she no more describes the institutional dynamics of prosecution than
Kahan does for general society.363 She merely suggests that we shift
the evidentiary burden in student disciplinary proceedings. More
important, Baker later makes explicit her hopes of morally reordering
the conscience of offenders. She says that this is not a matter of
moral decline of enforcement of a norm, "because the normative
proscription on date rape had never existed., 364 So the goal here is to
invest date rape with the moral or political capital of other norms, and
Baker assumes this can be done efficaciously on a campus because of
its cohesion and homogeneity, two concepts she assumes without
ever defining or describing. But more broadly, her goal is also
explicitly
to change the definition of sex, so that it is understood to be not so much about
intercourse, as about the communication involved in affirmative assent. We must
change the definition of sex so that the failure to get affirmative assent is seen not as
360 Baker, Once a Rapist?, supra note 343, at 694 (citing Kahan, supra note 3, at 359).
361 Though note that most campuses are awash in "awareness" events about date rape, as
a virtual obligation of dormitory life.
362 Id. at 687 (discussing the famous-or infamous-Antioch College requirement of
express consent to sex).
363 Id. at 698-99, 710.
364 Id. at 707.
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an alternative to consensual sex, but instead something completely other, like sex with
a four year old.
365
Thus, the shame sanction will cause men to regulate themselves, and
it will borrow from John Braithwaite the idea that "Shame is a route
to freely chosen compliance., 366 It will accomplish this by having the
perpetrator stay in campus, wear a shaming armband, and apologize
in class; it will also use college newspaper announcements to
explicitly link the crime to fraternities or athletic teams with which
the offender is associated-a sort of corporate liability-and the
offender himself will be banned form extracurricular activity and
alcohol use.167
For this period of time he would be stripped of all of the traditional means of
acquiring masculine esteem. After completing his sentence, however, his penance
would be over and he should be allowed to re-integrate himself into the
community.... The perpetrator would not have to admit criminal wrongdoing, but he
would have to admit wrongdoing. The class would not be allowed to jeer .... The
rapist should have to acknowledge publicly that his behavior was morally wrong and
worthy of scorn, He might also be asked to deliver to his victim, every day or every
week, reparations of some kind.
368
If not only the individual, but his entire peer group, risks public
humiliation, there might soon be strong peer pressure to avoid this
risky behavior. Baker concludes:
By using demeaning sanctions, like public display, communities can destabilize the
link between sexual conquest and masculinity instead of enhancing the perpetrator's
masculinity, taking sex without consent could result in an emasculation of the
perpetrator. In addition, stopping short of rape could suggest that one's masculinity
and the status of one's peer group were important enough to forego the risk of a
demeaning display. Instead of being seen as a "wimp," the man who does not join in
the sexual exploits could be seen as the man more capable of valuing masculinity,
honor, and peer affiliation.
369
But to make the "emasculation" more morally efficacious, we are
reassured that the offender is not to be forced to wear women's
clothing, since that would "complicate the signal." This is seen to be
an example of, in Lessig's terms, ambiguation.37 ° So we cannot "curb
date rape simply by telling people that date rape is "real rape."
365 Id. at 697.
366 Id. at 698 (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 10
(1989)).
367 Id. at 698.
368 Id. at 699-70.
369 Id. at 701.
370 See Lessig, supra note 3, at 968-72 (dueling example).
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Emasculation must therefore be achieved more indirectly . . . by temporarily
prohibiting men from displaying the masculine qualities of independence, pride,
control and righteousness and requiring them to acknowledge publicly their
dependence, humility, limitation and wrongdoing. The key is to make date rapists feel
sorry for what they did and make others uninterested in emulating their behavior.
371
And Baker confidently concludes that the effect will be to "change
the social meaning of rape" and to ensure that the changed meaning is
internalized. 72
Baker acknowledges Massaro's criticisms of any superficial
legal exploitation of shame, and concedes the risk of
"dehumanization." But she finesses these criticisms by insisting that
it does not dehumanize to impugn someone's masculinity, because
humanity should not be gendered anyway.373 Thus, the shaming
sanction's purpose is to morally reorder the man's humanity and, in
any event, it is not dehumanizing because any loss of privacy to him
simply matches the loss he imposes on the victim. This may seem a
very roughly compensatory or retributive model, but Baker simply
claims that it is virtually rehabilitative because the man's loss of
privacy will necessarily cause him to empathize with the woman's.
In an unusual utilitarian balancing, Baker argues that women must
yield their privacy when they complain, but men must suffer some
compensatory loss of their own privacy. Baker even extends this
implicit balancing argument to say that if the punishment seems
"base" or "bestial," it is thereby a perfect match for the nature of the
crime.374
Baker's article reveals the problems that the norms approach
poses for analyses of the interaction between law and social behavior.
The norms approach purports to capture the moral culture in a
particular social context, but it relies on neither psychology nor
sociology in any systematic way, nor can it offer any economic
metric for calibrating punishment. It purports to capture the meaning
of behavior and sanctions but can do so only at a level of social
stereotype and speculation. It claims pragmatism by offering what
seem to be highly specific, carefully honed proposals, but it is vague
and overly general about the operational dynamics of the shaming
sanctions, and yet jarringly specific in describing particulars without
sufficient institutional context.
371 Baker, Sex, Rape and Shame, supra note 9, at 705.
372 Id. at 706.
173 Id. at 706, 710-11.
374 Id. at 713.
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An argument for blunt shaming might be a provocative idea if
offered as a deliberate shock therapy, with no claim of its likely
effect other than the possibility of jarringly new deterrent value that
cannot be measured, and with meaning-making value that cannot be
assessed. An essay into the value of shame over sexual aggression
could proceed from highly particularized studies of sexual and social
relations, and could draw from the well-established, if under-
enforced, penalties for date rape now extant to provide for grounded
speculation as to how shame might operate. In addition, since the
supposed attractiveness of shaming penalties is the inefficacy of other
penalties, speculation raising the question of shaming might provoke
useful analysis of why the other penalties are not working. Most
obviously, in this context, the almost complete absence of formal
criminal prosecutions of college males is oddly paralleled by the
almost complete inefficacy of internal administrative sanctions.
Is it possible that the right step is to give up any pretense that
college officials can police date rape, and instead move the system
back toward inviting the police to intervene? Surely prosecutors will
resist these cases and surely reporting might be reduced further. But
it is also possible that targeted use of true criminal sanctions will
serve the meaning-changing goals of the shaming penalties very well.
Perhaps the real problem of the social meaning of date rape is that it
has come to be viewed as a matter of college discipline, not criminal
law. Whatever the right solution to date rape on campus, the
conceptual devices and vocabularies of social norms and shaming
penalties have proved as much a constraint on as a generator of useful
approaches to the problem. As Massaro rightly asks,
[W]hat is the proper role of the government... in shaping social norms and thus our
emotional makeups through criminal and civil laws that define what is, or should be,
shameful, embarrassing, outrageous, or disgusting? What shape should this
governmental intervention take? Should it be punitive? Educational? Therapeutic?
Redistributive?
375
IV. DETERRENCE AND EXPRESSION IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE
In recent work Kahan has tried to offer a wider jurisprudential
perspective on how the experience of living in a norm-filled world
puts us in tension with other values. And, for Kahan, it is a strangely
roiling experience indeed. His most expansive effort in this regard is
375 MASSARO, SHOW (SOME) EMOTIONS, supra note 98, at 92.
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his essay The Secret Ambition of Deterrence. 376 The gist of the paper
is that people are animated in their legal and political views mostly
by normative appraisals of others' behavior, but that there is a
traditional American ban on public moralizing. Hence, people must
find a value-neutral medium of discourse and must hope they can
align that discourse with their moral views. And, Kahan asserts, in
the area of crime, that value-neutral discourse is deterrence.
377
This new phase of norms scholarship curiously confirms the
risky plasticity of the concept of social norms. In this new phase, the
notion of a norm slides from an arguably concrete behavioral
standard to a an almost free-floating clusters of notions of "belief'
and "value." It thereby leads norms commentary to implicitly claim
status not just as a tool of social analysis, but as a new discipline of
political science or political economy, or indeed even a new form of
cultural anthropology or cultural studies. And the Secret Ambition
essay thereby illustrates the tropism of this new stage of norms
scholarship to so heavily invest in the norm-rooted nature of political
life as to devour and render irrelevant other social phenomena.
It is only at the very end of the paper that its pragmatic purpose
becomes fully evident. Kahan aims at advising "liberals" about how
to conduct public discourse about crime. That is, he offers
political/rhetorical advice as to when it is efficacious to use
normative or expressive language about values and when it is
efficacious to make only instrumental arguments. But at the same
time, Kahan proudly claims that the discovery that punishment is
fraught with expressive meaning and moral judgment "supplies a
powerful tool for making sense of common intuitions about criminal
law." '378 For example, he notes, rape is considered more serious than
aggravated assault, fines are considered inappropriate punishments,
and theft is wrongful but competition is not.379 Kahan notes that
criminal trials and legislative debates about crime are arenas for
competition over norms and values, though he does not cite Thurman
Arnold's famous essays on the cultural role of litigation in America
that elaborated this theme seventy years ago.38 In any event,
376 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413 (1999)
[hereinafter Kahan, Secret Ambition].377 Id. at 417.
378 Id. at 420.
379 Id.
380 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 130-48 (1935) (making the
same point).
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Kahan's treatment lacks a sufficiently distinct definition of
"meaning" here to differentiate it from some common-sense
understanding about the types of harms society seeks to insure
against through criminal laws.
Kahan's purported discovery of a suppressed moralizing under
the veneer of deterrence discourse may find proof in obvious facts of
political life which require no such grand theory. But as an empirical
matter, it is hard to find any evidence of this ban on public moralizing
that Kahan asserts is a core American cultural value. Moreover, if he
means to impute this ban solely to the faction he calls liberals, we
have no coherent definition of liberalism to use here. Kahan may be
referring to "philosophical liberalism" and, in some deep
philosophical sense, American liberalism may indeed scorn assertions
of deontological value.38' Yet, even on this score, the supporting
citations hardly prove his point. Thus, says Kahan, John Rawls urges
that in civic debate we should not appeal to "comprehensive religious
and philosophical doctrines" or claims of "the whole truth, but rather
to explain our actions reasonably in a manner consistent with
freedom and equality." Other liberal thinkers ask that we refrain
from claiming "privileged insight into the moral universe" but rather
appeal to principles that can be shared by fellow citizens of "diverse
moral persuasions." '82 These positions hardly amount to a ban on
normative expression or value claiming in civic debate. But in any
event, Kahan elides several levels of generality and assumes that this
deep philosophical aversion acts itself out at the level of popular
politics.
Moreover, even at the conceptual level, Kahan's binary
distinction is between something he alternately calls expressivism
and moralizing on the one hand, and deterrence on the other. This
division of categories overlooks important complexities, especially
on the deterrence side, where deterrence seems to do the work of
instrumentalism in general, and thereby ignores the complex possible
forms of utilitarianism. Most relevantly, this division forces an
38. Id. at 478 (citing John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM
214-15 (1993); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (Yale Univ.
Press 1980); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55
(1996)).
382 Rawls, supra note 381, at 224-25.
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artificial distinction between instrumental and noninstrumental
motivations of punishment, a distinction crucial to his thesis.383
Kahan complains that deterrence requires an impossible
valuation of harm (he does not consider the standard economic notion
that preferences are supposed to be fixed). Deterrence, he says,
requires a consequentialist theory of value, but, he laments, nothing
intrinsic to deterrence supplies one, and if expressivism were to
supply particular valuations, deterrence would be powerless to object.
Thus, Kahan worries that people may want to punish abusive
husbands more than murderous spouses, even though the latter is a
more efficient use of resources.384 Finally, he makes a strangely
sentimental binary distinction about the emotional content of these
two types of discourse. He assumes that deterrence talk is cool and
pacific while expressivism, merely by offering contestable value
judgments, is harshly condemnatory toward someone. Yet he ignores
the perfectly obvious possibility that deterrence talk can obviously be
explicitly brutal in its honest treatment of individuals as means to
social ends, while much legal "expression" is cloyingly "humanistic"
in its claim to transcend moral judgment or political hierarchy.385
Sometimes Kahan acknowledges this problem of slippage
between laws expressing values and enforcing norms. He argues for
the partly independent role of expressivism by showing that moral
judgment and expression are necessary components of deterrence and
retributivism. But no one would really disagree with this assertion,
and it is a huge non-sequitur to jump from this to the conclusion that
active moralistic expression must be employed to serve these other
ends. Thus, it is precisely in noting the inadequacy of deterrence
discourse that Kahan says that it presupposes an external theory of
value it cannot directly supply. When we differentiate manslaughter
claims, how do we value the psychic gains of different killers?
"Unless we know whether and how much we disvalue a particular
species of conduct, we can't determine whether the cost of deterring
any particular amount of it is worth paying." '386 But in so framing the
issue, Kahan casts doubt on the strength of his thesis.
383 See Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A
Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. R. 1, 9 (2002) (criticizing norms theory for false
choice between retribution and deterrence, which are "functions of punishment, not theories
of punishment").
384 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 426-27.
385 See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 196-17
(2000) (discussing the risks of sentimentalism in law-and-humanities scholarship).
386 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 427.
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The positive part of the paper tries to be a sort of historical
sociology of American discourse about criminal punishment, and it
purports to discover deep divisions and groupings built around
normative meaning. In fact, this classification tends to devolve into a
conflict between contemporary conservatism versus contemporary
liberalism in the crudest form, both reflected in obvious pop-politics
journalistic discourse, and the former, though not the latter, finding a
historical antecedent-Southern white honor culture. Also, Kahan
claims to have discovered that people do not really believe their
deterrence arguments, but use them because of the ban on public
moralizing. Now, it is trivially true that most people's posturing
about the death penalty opportunistically and hypocritically exploits
instrumental arguments when available and discards them when
inconvenient.387 But the motive for this is precisely the economy of
posturing. Thus, liberal politicians, quite transparently, undergo
death penalty conversions by announcing that whatever the statistics
on marginal deterrence might say, they believe the death penalty
deters.388 The relationship between deterrence and value speech in
this typical delivery is far more transparent than Kahan suggests.
Kahan's basic historical text is Holmes's treatment of self-
defense doctrine, and, more generally, the peculiar Nineteenth-
Century American rule which refuses to require retreat from by a
person facing a deadly attack even when that avenue is reasonably
possible.389 Various state court judges before and after Holmes
asserted honor as a sufficient moral justification for refusal to retreat.
Holmes may have acknowledged this value privately, but in his
famous Brown opinion he merely alludes to the belief in honor as an
incurable social fact, and so it is arguably the futility of deterring the
honor-motivated attacked person from deadly response that causes
Holmes to side with the then-traditional American rule.39 °
In fact, the famous Missouri court opinion representing the
traditional rule speaks of having to balance rights recognized in
law;391 hence Kahan does not tell us how to distinguish "normative
expression" from common law or constitutional recognition of rights.
387 Kahan makes this seem like a remarkable discovery. Id. at 437.
388 Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as Cultural Document: Seeking the Morally
Optimal Death Penalty, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 283, 283-85 (1996).
311 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46 (Dover 1991)(1881), discussed
in Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 429-435.
390 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
391 State v. Bartlett, 71 S.W. 148, 151-52 (Mo. 1902).
20031
ROBERT WEISBERG
But Kahan needs to have Holmes acting strategically, suppressing his
normative beliefs, because he believes Holmes thereby intended and
achieved a pacification of an expressive war over criminal justice.
Holmes, Kahan suggests, may have privately believed that honor
truly did counsel a proud man not to retreat.392 On the other hand, he
may have recognized that even if excusable fear, not pride, were the
salient part of human nature in the case of self-defense, the no-retreat
rule was not the only logical consequence.39 3 Either way, Holmes's
stated deterrence rationale seems disingenuous, but it is strategically
so, because the language of deterrence avoids invoking the injunction
against moralizing, and "Holmes's authoritative reconceptualization
of the rule strips it of the evocative vitality that it needs to underwrite
expressive conflict. 394  Indeed, Kahan says that Southern and
Western forces were obviously pleased by the rule, even if they found
it morally tepid for lack of expressivism, Easterners were satisfied
that even if the no-duty-to-retreat rule was affirmed, Holmes at least
did not affirmatively endorse Southern values.
This interpretation is too ambiguous to be useful or verified.
Does Kahan mean that a duty-to-retreat rule would have led to a
roiling national debate? Did Holmes's opinion on federal criminal
law affect all state court opinions-and if so, in which regions?
How, given the supposed effect of the Holmes opinion, did the retreat
rule issue revive itself in modem domestic violence cases? Is it
because feminists learned to exploit the Holmesian utilitarianism?
Kahan actually concedes that his explanation may not be the right
one, but insists "that this is one of the questions that we ought to ask
if we are trying to evaluate Holmes's argument." '395 But, what
evidence could we possibly find for his historical claim? And what
does Kahan think is the basis of the "liberal" expansion of self-
defense rights for battered women?
Thus, Kahan argues that liberalism promotes enough deterrence
talk to suppress kulturekampf s:
Most of the time, however, politicians and ordinary citizens alike blunt the sharp
edges of their expressive commitments with the softer idiom of deterrence, the logic
of which doesn't assault either sides' fundamental commitments, at least not
392 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 434.
... Id. at 430-31.
394 Id. at 433-34.
311 id. at 435.
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frontally ... What deterrence rhetoric helps each side avoid disclosing.., are their
culturally imperialistic ambitions.
396
But elsewhere Kahan finds kulturekampf s breaking out with
regularity. Most notably, he asserts that the death penalty issue is
likely to be unusually susceptible to the risk of expressive conflict
overwhelming more civil deterrence debate, though he also says this
only happens episodically. Here his example is the Willie Horton
issue in the 1988 Presidential election, where, he says, both sides
used "excruciatingly judgmental expression."'3 97
It is not clear that this is even mundanely true because, in fact, in
the 1988 race, the Democrats did not respond in expressive kind; they
tried to dodge the issue altogether. But even if they had fought an
expressive battle, Kahan's historical interpretation does not tell us
why the conflict happened in 1988 and not at other times. The
Horton affair, however, does provide Kahan with an opportunity to
say something about discourse strategy; indeed he actually faults
Dukakis for not being as expressively vitriolic as he could be, thereby
suggesting that sometimes fire must be fought with fire. But, again,
it is not clear when this is true, since the only cited failure by the
Democrats was one overly tepid Dukakis remark itself. Nevertheless,
for Kahan, the Willie Horton issue "constructed a conflict between
two fundamentally opposed cultural styles. Authoritarianism clashed
with egalitarianism, righteousness with tolerance, southernness and
westerness with easternness, compassion for victims of crime with
compassion for victims of social deprivation." '398 This statement
manages to be both obvious and false. "Egalitarianism" is not a
meaningful term here, nor is the notion of Willie Horton as victim,
since those appalled by the advertisement were far more concerned
with its wider denunciatory implications for black males than for its
treatment of one foul criminal. So this turned out to be a brutal war
of expression that Dukakis would not fight. But at that point in the
debate, says Kahan, "deterrence talk was clearly not up to the task of
returning the expressive genie to its bottle. 399
At the same time, the dynamics that generated the Willie Horton dispute suggest that
the heat of the death penalty debate is bound to reach this temperature periodically,
notwithstanding the cooling potential of deterrence. Most of us don't want to talk in
the way that Americans talked to each other during the 1988 presidential campaign.
396 Id. at 459-60.
'9' Id. at 449-51.




But some of us do want to talk this way, at least when there's some obvious political
gain to be had in doing so.
4 00
What happened in the wake of Willie Horton? The death penalty did
not figure prominently in the next two presidential debates, not
because deterrence talk suppressed expressive conflict, but because
Democratic hypocrisy took the issue off the table altogether. In any
event, there is no evidence whatsoever that American politicians
either distinguish expression from deterrence or that they have any
fear of bold normative appraisal in their discourse.
A. GUNS, HATE, AND DETERRENCE
In discussing two other key examples, gun control and hate
crimes, Kahan asserts that in both cases, opponents try a mix of
arguments. He sees the debating sides on these issues opting for
expressivism, finding things getting overheated, and then moving to
deterrence. In doing so, Kahan confounds such diffuse but different
things as "meaning," "cultural style," "identity," and "value."
Guns tum out to be an equivocal case.4"' In Kahan's view, both
sides in the gun control debate try to argue instrumentally, but do not
say all they think, since, in his view, both sides are engaged in a
stealth culture war under the noise of gun-policy arguments. "The
protagonists in the gun control debate, like those in the death penalty
debate, are fighting to control the expressive capital of the law.
Deterrence rhetoric conceals, but barely contains, each side's illiberal
ambition to proclaim its cultural and moral ascendancy through the
law."4 °2 This view permits Kahan to descant on the rather obvious
journalism-level cultural politics of Marlboro men vs. San Francisco
feminist liberals. Again, he makes an almost self-canceling
concession-in this instance, that there are other cultural styles that
attach social meaning to gun, such as inner city gun owners. But he
nevertheless insists that these are the dominant cultural styles.
Oddly, Kahan asserts that gun-owners and their allies have repelled
all but the most trivial forms of gun control in large measure because
the ambitions of the gun-controllers are perceived as essentially
expressive. Thus he suggests that gun-controllers here would find it
efficacious as an offensive strategy to urge deterrence arguments,
especially since the majority of the public actually sides with them,
400 id.
411 Id. at 451-58.
402 Id. at 451.
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and he hints that the gun-owners have exploited the political
economy of fund-raising and lobbying intensity to exploit this
advantage. And because it is their cultural identities at stake,
[t]his "action-reaction" dynamic makes expressive arguments for gun control
inexpedient as well as illiberal. To dampen the intensity of opposition, it is essential
to assure gun owners that control is not motivated by disgust for their cultural
identities. Indeed, moderate advocates of control implore their allies to disavow
strident, ideologically charged rhetoric. This strategic motivation, along with the
norm against public moralizing, helps to explain the prevalence of deterrence
arguments in the gun control debate.
403
At this juncture it has become very difficult to distinguish among
Kahan's positive, normative, and strategic arguments.
Kahan assumes that what he calls liberalism can be defined in
large part by its commitment to the principle that harm is a
prerequisite for regulation. But he never explains why we should
assume this or whether contemporary progressives, as opposed to
disembodied, abstracted liberals, must logically subscribe to the harm
principle themselves, or indeed why "values" cannot include harm in
the broader sense. Nor does Kahan link his treatment of the gun issue
either to the distinction between libertarianism and liberalism, or to
the whole history of the Second Amendment.
Kahan's argument is more explicitly self-canceling on the
subject of hate crimes, where he appears to find both pro- and con-
arguments alternating between expressive and deterrent
justifications.0 4 He assures us that questions of social meaning recur
in the debate over hate crimes: "[w]ork in social psychology, for
example, suggests that individuals who hold homophobic views tend
to belong to communities that assign status according to traditional
hierarchical gender norms."4 5  Meanwhile, "[i]ndividuals who
belong to communities that prize egalitarian norms" tend to be
tolerant and to express their views so as "to affirm their membership
within these communities." And these individuals find hate crimes
laws useful expressive mechanisms that send the message that the
offender was wrong to see the victim as lower in worth by virtue of
his group commitments."' In this way, they assure the victim and
those who share his commitments that they are full members of
society. Then, eliding a subgroup with the recurrent vague concept
403 Id. at 462.
404 Id. at 465-72.




of "community," Kahan says that these laws "affirm the larger
community's commitment to the value of equality."4 7 He concedes
that the laws might thereby be instrumental in promoting tolerance
and respect, but he insists that they also have "inherent value."40 8 At
the same time, asserts Kahan, opponents of hate crime legislation
read in the laws a different meaning-an expressive devaluation of
the categories of people unprotected by the laws.
Kahan's penultimate argument seems to be to that it is salutary
for us all to continue complying with the alleged ban on public
moralizing, because it offers a kind of noble truce in the culture wars.
He encourages us to disavow privileged positions and seek the
middle ground of uncontested principles. But this notion of a middle
ground bears no logical relation to the proliferation of identity
movements spawned by modem progressive politics. At best, Kahan
roots it to practices of judicial restraint, but then he ignores the
legislative side of politics and lawmaking. He believes the ban on
moralizing is designed to promote popular acceptance of law, and to
undergird autonomy. "Expressive arguments overtly appeal to
values-from hierarchical conceptions of honor to contested
conceptions of equality, from individualism to civic solidarity-that
belong only to particular moral visions and cultural styles."40 9 And so
the infusion of moral value into political debate "aim[s] at the
exaltation of one subcommunity's moral view and the disparagement
of another's."4 0 Thus, he concludes, the law should get out of the
business of sending messages if it wants to stop igniting zealotry.
This is because to affirm a contested value is to show contempt for
opponents. More specifically, "[c]onsequentialist arguments are
likely to strike citizens as imperialistic about conceptions of the good
only when those arguments clearly specify the account of the good
that they are trying to maximize." '' In short, the more transparent
the law is about the good it seeks to enhance, the more destructive the
law is.
Kahan acknowledges that liberals often are not advocates of
deterrence, 2 yet he strongly, if inconsistently, urges liberals to
407 Id. at 465.
401 Id. at 466.
409 Id. at 480.
410 id.
411 Id. at 483.
412 Indeed, Kahan cites two eminent liberals: JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONS1B3LITY 95-251 (1970), and Jean Hampton, The
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choose deterrence to suppress conflict-except when he rethinks the
other approach is better. He says liberals who "disparage deterrence
are guilty of indefensible recklessness." '413 And he proffers one
alternative device to suppress zealotry-"voluntarism"-which, he
laments, works less well. This is a curious argument, since if he were
to elaborate his definition of voluntarism, it would not likely turn out
to be inconsistent with deterrence.
Ultimately, Kahan recommends deterrence-discourse as a
strategy because expressive arguments, by stressing contested values,
attack individual autonomy by humiliating the cultural identities of
opponents. "Like the decision of a judge to invoke formal grounds
rather than moral ones, the decision of a citizen to rely on deterrence
rather than on expressive arguments shows respect for her cultural
adversaries." '414 But, in Kahan's view, at other unpredictable times,
liberals make a big mistake by using deterrence discourse, because
they thereby yield the field to their enemies.415 He tries to connect
legal change with advertising and pop culture as forces in norm
changing. "Because it is commonly understood to express
community values, criminal law in particular is an important cue
about what others believe." '416 And by trying (do they?) to strip law
of its progressive potential, progressives squander an opportunity to
overthrow bad norms.
Absent normal sanctions of public moralizing-a system that we don't have and
couldn't have under the First Amendment-this collective action problem can be
solved only by social norms backed up by the informal sanctions of personal guilt and
Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 135
(1988).
413 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 485.
414 Id. at 481.
415 Id. at 487. As Massaro notes:
[tihis description of our inner emotional state, which assumes that unsuccessfully repressed
powerful emotions will find their outlet through other, less controllable means if they aren"t
released properly in formal rituals, hardly derives from the social norm theory accounts of status-
seeking, rational-choice-executing citizens that is the premise of the new approach to deterrence
of crime. Rather, this psychological description of out submerged, unresolved, and ill-
understood emotional conflicts signals [a]... subtle shift ... to a Freudian frame .... She
sardonically notes that this Freudian account makes little sense where the "analysand" is actually
the people in general, who are not present at the analytic session and may not know or care very
much at all about the courtroom ritual designed to release their outrage.
MASSARO, SHOW (SOME) EMOTION, supra note 98, at 99-100.
416 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 487.
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public scorn ... Expressive zealots ... invariably breach the expressive peace and
force more moderate citizens to take up arms as well.
4 17
Kahan gives the example of Maryland Judge Cahill, who notoriously
gave a wrist-slap sentence to a wife-killer. He offers Cahill as a
prime example of an expressor whose refusal to bury his moralism in
deterrence discourse flushed him out and led to his expulsion from
office. But consider the key infamous statement in the Cahill matter:
"I seriously wonder how many men married five, four years...
would have had the strength to walk away without inflicting some
corporal punishment., 41 1 If anything, this sounds just like the
moralism-avoiding, instrumental concession to practicality that
Kahan had earlier credited to Holmes.
In seeking a final global perspective, Kahan concedes that all
sides can play the norm manipulation game, and that there is no
guarantee of who will win. Thus, the liberal defense of expressive
detente risks enhancing the status quo, since hierarchical norms are
now still predominate.4 19 For Kahan, this means, for example, that
political support for the death penalty, as well as occasional judicial
mitigation for homophobic killers, can express "hierarchical and
individualistic" norms. Thus, because "[public] reason" is a "public
good," at some times undetermined "accepting the expressive detente
urged by liberalism would make progressives complicit in the life of
hierarchical and individualistic norms that are in fact ripe for
annihilation. "42 Putting aside whether there is any coherence to
conceiving the moral enemy of liberalism as something called
"hierarchy and individualism," we are left with no measure of where
and when to break this so-called detente.
Then Kahan shifts to a compromising flexibility and caution: we
need a "fairly fine-grained and contextual understanding of how
citizens perceive different styles of argument.""42 And he now teases
us into thinking that he can supply it. Thus, in his view, here, as in
the case of Willie Horton, conservatives fight a bitter expressive war,
and liberals must fight back. Moreover, he believes, liberals should
sometimes welcome the expressive moralism of the other side,
because it sometimes exposes the ugliness of their views. Thus, his
417 Id. at 489.
418 Id. at 490 (quoting She Strays, He Shoots, Judge Winks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994, at
A22).
419 Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 376, at 488.
420 Id. at 492.
421 Id. at 483.
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infamous Judge Cahill, who also excused a gay-basher from any
prison sentence by expressing sympathy with the killer's prejudices,
did us a useful deed. This is because had Judge Cahill instead tried a
"deterrent" argument, arguing this as some sort of emotional
disturbance excuse, liberals would have had to flush out his moralism
in order to achieve the type of public denunciation the judge
suffered.422
Kahan finally purports to offer us a rhetorical scheme or menu to
help us choose the most efficacious form of discourse for the
circumstances. Actually, he offers two separate menus.423 As a very
general matter, he argues that liberals should mostly rely on what he
calls deterrence arguments, suggesting that deterrence discourse
should appeal to three groups: (1) ordinary citizens who hold views
but not passionately;4. 4 (2) officials and opinion leaders who are
committed to cleansing public debate of moralizing as a matter of
principle; and (3) strategically sophisticated and emotionally
disciplined leaders, who will be attracted to the conflict-suppressive
value of deterrence arguments.
Then he offers a more calibrated-looking menu. He ultimately
asks whether the "discourse management" of deterrence is good or
bad. "Does it cleanse public debate of excessive zealotry? Or
contaminate it with hypocrisy? Does it facilitate convergence of
citizens of diverse cultural identities? 4 25 He finds no sure answer,
but urges us to "pragmatically adapt our style of talk to the nature of
the issue at hand, although even this strategy tends to defeat itself
when self-consciously pursued. 4 2
6
First, where we are motivated by commitment to good norms
that already enjoy political consensus or by bad norms that are far
outside the mainstream-as with "extreme fighting"-we should use
deterrence rhetoric, since victory is likely, and there is no point in
"piling on" with excessive expressive denunciation of our opponents.
Second, Kahan addresses instances where we are motivated by
opposition to bad ("hierarchical or individualistic") norms that are
currently efficacious, but whose further applications could be
422 Id. at 467, 490.
423 Id. at 474-75.
424 "For them, the value of revealing their expressive allegiances in public is smaller than
the gains of complying with the liberal social norm against contentious public moralizing."
Id.




thwarted by strong opposition. In these instances, he recommends
that we should speak expressively to achieve normative change.
Finally, where we face bad norms of overwhelming social
valence, we should revert to deterrence to as not to risk overt defeat
on our normative position-and wait to fight another day.
Kahan actually concedes that his pragmatic strategies
unrealistically assume that participants in policy debates enjoy a
sophisticated and complete understanding of the norm-shaping styles
of different types of discourse they have available to deploy and that
participants can coordinate and control their tactical choices. Yet
given the way the strategies are laid out, it is hard to tell when you
are in one category or another. Finally, he concedes that we face an
old-fashioned rationale expectations problem: however you contrive
your appearance to your opponents, they will psych out your strategy
and discount the very appearance you present.
So Kahan's thesis all turns back on itself:
The secret ambition of deterrence is thus only a slice of an insoluble discourse
dilemma. The liberal defense of deterrence as public reason respects individual
dignity and mutes counterproductive political conflict, but also subsidizes bad social
norms by shielding them from critical appraisal. The antiliberal critique of deterrence
liberates the norm-reforming potential of expressive condemnation, but gratuitously
stigmatizes harmless deviancy and risks provoking reactionary backlashes. A
pragmatic strategy, which shifts between deterrence and expressive condemnation,
promises to combine the best elements of both approaches and to avoid the worst, but
is impossible to execute as a practical matter.
427
So what theory is best for managing public discourse? There simply
is no answer, at least when the question is posed this globally.
428
The Secret Ambition paper portrays strangely but tellingly the
world that Kahan conceives. It is a rather binary one, where rational,
instrumental understanding of harm is at war with "cultural" values
that seem inherent but unexplained as psychological or attitudinal
preferences in people. He waffles between recommending on the one
hand, emphasis on otherwise discredited liberal discourse that
suppresses value expression in the name of a denatured emphasis on
social science, and, on the other hand, urging honest, indeed
purgative social dialog on these preferences. That this is the world he
depicts is readily clarified by a follow-up paper which makes this
binary view even more explicit.
427 Id. at 500.
428 For a fervent critique of efforts to devise optimal mixes of punishment in the absence
of any coherent theory of punishment, see Huigens, supra note 383, at 4.
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B. BACK TO THE GUN DEBATES
This paper, by Donald Braman and Dan Kahan, begins by
reviewing the statistical debates about the efficacy of gun laws and
concludes that the debate is an insoluble "wash" and that it may be
irrelevant anyway, because popular views on gun control are driven
almost entirely by something else-variously called "cultural values"
ol social norms.429 In the view of Braman and Kahan, both sides
purport to agree that public safety is the key issue. One side believes
that safety is better served by reduced access to guns, while the other
side freer access to guns. The debate then is about the nature and
degree of risk, and Braman and Kahan rely on recent studies in risk
evaluation to conclude that these differential risk assessments can be
traced to attitudes and values quite independent of any rational
assessment of actual risk.43 Ironically, given the concern of the
Secret Ambition essay about the "imperialist" ambitions of certain
"expressive" norms and values, this extension of that essay into the
specific area of gun control illustrates norms commentary itself in its
strangely imperialist avarice of over other disciplines, indeed
virtually deploying empirical social science in the service of proving
the irrelevance of empirical social science.
The Braman-Kahan paper purports to be both descriptive and
prescriptive. The premise of its prescription is stated as follows:
Instead of continuing to focus on the consequences of various types of regulation,
academics and others who want to help resolve the gun controversy should dedicate
themselves to identifying with as much precision as possible the cultural visions that
animate this dispute and to formulate appropriate strategies for enabling those visionsS ,•  431
to be expressively reconciled in law.
We are not told how this reconciliation might occur, nor, indeed, why
it would even be desirable.
In any event, the paper proceeds to suggest that a phenomenon
variously described as "cultural values" or "social norms" best
explains individual notions about the efficacy or desirability of gun
control. Braman and Kahan note that risk perceptions are influenced
or skewed by both moral attitudes and cognitive filters that can be
429 DONALD BRAMAN & DAN M. KAHAN, MORE STATISTICS, LESS PERSUASION: A
CULTURAL THEORY OF GUN-RISK PERCEPTIONS 3-4 (Yale Law Sch. Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, No. 05, SSRN-286205).
430 Id. at 5-12; see generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE
(1982) (elaborating relationships among risk evaluation, social norms and political conflict).
431 Braman & Kahan, supra note 429, at 4.
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traced to these values.43 They then sort out these cultural values
along two dimensions or axes: hierarchical vs. egalitarian views of
society; and individualist vs. solidarist views. They then proceed to
an empirical study, drawing on the categories of social attitude about
masculinity and honor described in the Secret Ambition paper.
The survey questions cover such hot-button attitude issues as the
death penalty; laws on interracial marriage; homosexuality; gender
roles in domestic work; guns vs. butter questions about the economy;
and the relative importance of spending public money on the
environment, crime, drugs, foreign aid, welfare, etc.,433 but is not at
all clear how these questions define anything we can coherently call
cultural values. They are sound-bite questions about public issues
much discussed in the media, and they are invitations to people to
project desirable images of themselves through a kind of social
posturing. This posturing could be related to something called
culture, or norms of behavior, if we had more information about, or
better definitions of, those things. But the survey itself is about
willingness to express fairly simplistic or binary attitudes on
superficially framed issues.
The result of the regression analysis, Braman and Kahan
conclude, is striking. At the start of the paper they see the landscape
of political division about guns: "pitting women against men, blacks
against whites, suburban against rural, Northeast against South and
West, Protestants against Catholics and Jews, the gun question
reinforces the most volatile sources of factionalization in our political
life." '434 But now the dominant explanation of views on guns is the
clustering of the attitude answers along the hierarchical/egalitarian
and individualist/solidarist axes. And, they conclude, this
explanation trumps all others (except gender), including race,
religion, ethnicity and even party affiliation.43
The authors make much of this last point to stress that these
"cultural values" are more important than "political ideology,"
432 Id. at 6.
433 If one wants to quibble with the methodology, one can wonder why the authors
include all these variables as single variables, but do not look at any interactive effects (e.g.,
the effect on gun control attitudes for individuals who are both, say female+urban, or
female+catholic+black).
414 Id. at 1.
435 "Nevertheless, the precise difference in values that might explain why women are
concerned with some risks and men with others seems to evade the hierarchy-egalitarianism
and individualism-solidarism framework central to exiting work on the cultural theory of
risk." Id. at 22-23.
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though they do not explain what they mean by ideology in a way that
connects it to stated party affiliation. But more significant for them is
the supposedly dramatic advantage that the cultural values factor has
over race, ethnicity, and religion. If this factor is designed to identify
something called culture distinct from these other factors, then it is an
unexplained and odd form of culture. There is something
suspiciously illogical about cultural values that do not significantly
correlate with the mundane categories of social grouping, such as
race, ethnicity, and region. If they are separate, what indeed is
culture and where in the world does it come from?
The authors also plausibly observe that cultural factors dominate
any factual basis or fear of a particular risk-such as perceived crime
rates, prior victimization or actual local crime rates. According to
Braman and Kahan, these values also dominate the so-called
availability heuristic, because, as they note, the Columbine school
massacre did not measurably alter public opinion about gun
control.436 What Braman and Kahan fail to note, however, is that the
availability heuristic could still obtain in the absence of any change in
public opinion, because both sides of the debate could have been
reinforced by the incident. That is, the massacre was wholly
susceptible to competing interpretations-either that guns needed to
be removed from the reach of school youth, or that more guns should
be present in public buildings to thwart killers. In any event, Braman
and Kahan insist that norms construct "worldviews," "cultural
orientations," and "psychological profiles," and thereby render views
of the efficacy of gun control irrelevant to the debate.
So Braman and Kahan ultimately pose the question of what will
resolve the gun debate. But the weak answer is something like an
Athenian rhetorical theater of cleansed value expression. "In order to
civilize the gun debate, then, moderate citizens-the ones who are
repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varieties-must come out
from behind the cover of consequentialism and talk through their
competing visions of the good life without embarrassment." '437 They
note that there are examples
of communities successfully negotiating culture-infused controversies-ones between
archaeologists and Native Americans over the disposition of tribal artifacts; between
secular French educators and Muslim parents over the donning of religious attire by
Muslim school children; between the supporters and opponents of abortion rights in
France and Germany. Rather than hide behind culture-effacing modes of discourse,
436 Id. at 25.
437 Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
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the individuals involved in these disputes fashioned policies that were expressively
rich enough to enable all parties to find their cultural visions affirmed by the law.
438
At times they speak of "social meanings" as if they are exogenous
and unchangeable and not worth arguing about, and they refer
approvingly to what Kahan had earlier described as the liberal ban on
moralizing discourse. Yet they also vaguely hint that these social
meanings are changeable through suasion, just as in earlier pieces
Kahan had suggested that social meanings are manipulable through
surgical legal interventions.
Ultimately, the Braman-Kahan thesis seems to be that
scholarship on gun control is misguided and wasteful because the
debate on gun control does not ultimately turn on empirical studies
showing the costs and benefits of gun control; rather cultural attitudes
are more helpful in explaining how people view the issue. Braman
and Kahan thereby "straw-man" the empirical scholarship on gun
control; but their skeptical dismissal of empirical studies of guns is
unconvincing. This type of empirical work is important because it at
least encourages people on both sides of the debate to talk (more)
honestly about the consequences of having or not having gun control.
The empirical work, to be sure, remains divided and divisive, because
of (a) political bias, because some studies are rigged to reach a
certain result; and (b) incompetence on the part of some empiricists.
Nevertheless, this indeterminacy does not mean that empirical work
should be discarded, but that it should be held to a higher standard.
But Braman and Kahan also "straw-man" the entire gun control
debate. They express disdain for the empirical scholars for (as they
attribute to them) believing that empirical studies should resolve the
debate but they even seem to disdain the very relevance of policy
analysis itself. They suggest that the debate can be better discussed
and possibly resolved by looking at cultural issues. But the gun
control debate may be inherently unresolvable, and, in any event,
resolution is not necessarily desirable or necessary for the public
good. Some people believe in the right to have guns, irrespective of
the consequences, whether for constitutional, safety, or other cultural
reasons. No amount of empirical evidence showing the social cost of
gun ownership will change their mind. Some people hold the
opposite view, and no amount of empirical evidence showing the
social benefits of gun ownership will change their minds. So, in a
sense, the empirical work does not resolve the debate. But neither
438 Id. at 34-5.
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will a discussion on cultural issues at the level of generality which
Braman and Kahan suggest.
V. A RETURN TO HUMANIST INTERPRETATION?
I have suggested through this essay that the norms school has
implicitly and occasionally explicitly drawn on the capital of
interpretive and humanist approaches to law to support its claim that
"social norms" and "social meaning" make a distinct contribution to
understanding social behavior and law. Nevertheless, the overall
thrust of the norms writing has been to offer itself as a corrective to
instrumental or social science understandings and predictions, a
corrective, like behavioral economics, that purports to refine and not
step outside of the boundaries of social science. Yet it is hard for the
norms school to resist returning to humanist principles and
interpretive methods to advance its claim of distinctness. In that
regard, a recent foray by Dan Kahan into humanist interpretation of
social behavior offers a useful look at the capacity of the norms
school to simultaneously absorb and respect humanistic interpretation
or cultural study.
William Ian Miller's An Anatomy of Disgust is a rare example in
recent scholarship of a study of subjective emotion and moralizing
from an interpretivist perspective. It is one of a series of books by
Miller comprising an unusual cultural project with interesting
implications for enriching our understanding of law, but with no
claim of or desire for any specific application to law.439 I hardly
purport to summarize this complex book in the brief space here, but a
quick review of its goals and thesis, and a quick sampling of the
literary flavor of this strange book, can help set up the point to
follow-the way it has been construed in relation to social norms.
Miller says that his "central mission in this book is to demonstrate
that emotions, particularly ones like disgust and contempt, make
possible social orderings of particular stripes, and that it behooves
social and political theory to care about these emotions and how they
structure various social, moral, and political orderings. 440 Miller's
key thesis is that "matter matters and that only polemical foolishness
439 See, e.g., WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION (1993); THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE
(2000).




will allow us to ignore the fact that some of our emotions generate
culture as well as being generated by it.""' 1
The book quite deliberately wallows in what Miller calls "life
soup" of sensations and emotions.44 Miller experiments with
understanding the relationship between our more refined and abstract
aspirations and "the grotesque body, unrelenting physical ugliness,
nauseating sights and odors... suppuration, defecation, or rot" of our
daily lives.443 Miller maintains that this visceral disgust is a major
element in our humanity-not only in personal life, but also in civic
and social life generally. And, necessarily, the experiment requires
him to draw on a variety of sources and disciplines, including
psychology, literature, and history. He considers how disgust
enriches our understanding of misogyny and homophobia, and of
class distinctions of various sorts. Indeed, the concept of disgust
helps us understand any form of prejudice or social classification or
distinction that can draw on misanthropy and might derive from some
sort of deflected or projected self-hatred for our natural condition.
Miller describes how cultures often call on disgust to back their
moral ordering and then how they must work hard to override the
entailments. Disgust exists in a tense dialectical relationship with
notions of the pure.
Disgust signals our being appalled, signals the fact that we are paying more than lip-
service; its presence lets us know we are truly in the grip of the norm whose violation
we are witnessing or imagining .... The avowal of disgust expects concurrence. It
carries within it the notion of its own indisputability, and part of this indisputability
depends upon the fact that disgust is processed so particularly via offense to the
senses .... When you say you love or that you feel regret I am never quite sure of
your inner state in the way I am when you say you are disgusted.
444
Disgust, for Miller, has other powerful communalizing capacities and
is especially useful and necessary as a builder or moral and social
community. It performs this function by helping define and locate
the boundaries separating our group from their group, from pollution,
the violable from the inviolable.
Central to Miller's unique project here is to posit distinct
emotional conditions as having distinct characters and personalities
and cultural missions. So disgust actually has a very complex and
sophisticated cognitive content. Disgust is "about something and in
441 Id. at xiii.
442 Id. at 18.
441 Id. at 5.
444 Id. at 194.
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response to something . . . [it] necessarily involves particular
thoughts, characteristically very intrusive and unriddable thoughts,
about the repugnance of that which is its object." '445 These thoughts
revolve around the notion of a particular type of danger for the self,
"the danger inherent in pollution and contamination, the danger of
defilement."" 6  Disgust evaluates its object both as base and as a
threat. Thus, it is closely linked both to fear (for the self) and to
contempt (for the object).447
To refine our understanding of disgust, Miller offers a carefully
calibrated taxonomy of emotional conditions so he can distinguish
disgust from other conditions. He is hardly offering this taxonomy as
a scientific classification of emotions, even in the sense of descriptive
sociology. Rather, he is engaged in a unique kind of cultural
experiment, though one with Renaissance and Neoclassical
precedents such as Montaigne or Sir Richard Burton.448 Contempt,
for example, is more clearly social and less physical than disgust; it is
a way of expressing moral and social value upward and downward on
the social scale. Contempt is the emotional complex that articulates
and maintains hierarchy, status, rank, and respectability, and indeed
differentiated status and rank are eliciting conditions of contempt. So
what we have is a kind of feedback loop in which contempt helps
create and sustain the structures which generate the capacity for
contempt, and there is good reason to believe that the particular style
of contempt will be intimately connected with the precise social and
political arrangements in which it takes place. Thus, says Miller,
"[k]ings and lords inoculated themselves somewhat against the risk
of punctured pomposity by privileging fools and lower-class jesters
who were allowed to ridicule their superiors to their faces." '449
Contempt is a pleasant emotion-mixed with pride and self-
congratulation. Contempt, moreover, often involves decorous, decent
treatment of the inferior and thus can be gentle and even loving.45
445 Id. at 8.
446 id.
447 Id.
448 Id. at xii.
449 Id. at 223.
450 Id. at 33. Miller quotes Chesterfield's warning against "insolent contempt" by which
we posture by using contempt to establish status. Says Miller, "[s]o close is the connection
between status and contempt that one frequently sees people inept at reading all the subtle
properties of contempt's regulation, promiscuously spraying contempt about in the belief
that the mere display of it will secure their rank." Id. at 217.
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Contempt also can be sardonic; it smacks of indifference and
complacency, and, in turn, it must be distinguished from shame and
hatred. Hate is less instantly visceral-it builds, it "bespeaks a
history. Hate wishes harm and misfortune on the object of hatred but
is very ambivalent about wishing the hated one gone." '' "We expect
people to quarrel, to fight, even to kill those they hate under some
claim of their own right to do so" as compared to the "miasmic
gloom" of disgust.452 And then, says Miller, there is indignation:
indignation tends to be more precise in its manner, focusing on
particular wrongs by particular agents, whereas disgust is a more
generalizing moral sentiment casting blame on whole styles of
behavior and personality traits. Indignation also may be inadequate
to address truly horrible things. It can operate in the "light of day."4 3
But disgust, like contempt, has political significance. It can
respond to and help create status. Disgust "presents a nervous claim
of right to be free of the dangers imposed by the proximity of the
inferior. It is thus an assertion of a claim to superiority that at the
same time recognizes the vulnerability of that superiority to the
defiling powers of the low. '45 4 It differs from other emotions by this
aversive style. But Miller concludes:
Even in the informally regulated domain conceded to us by law and politics to sort out
for ourselves we find serious restrictions imposed on the sanctions we can visit upon
those who are the objects of disgust. Thus open mockery and even less malign forms
of shunning are marked as unjustifiable or even illegal. We are left only with the
private experience of our disgust and the suspect pleasure of a contempt which colors
our sense of self-congratulation for being so much better behaved than the deformity-
mocking gods of Olympus.
455
A. KAHAN ON MILLER
Kahan finds The Anatomy of Disgust irresistible material for
incorporating into his criminal jurisprudence. In a long review-essay,
Kahan laments that Miller did not apply his treatment of disgust to
criminal law, and he now offers to fill the gap.456 To carry out this
elaboration of Miller, Kahan contrasts two judicial decisions
451 Id. at 35.
452 Id. at 36.
413 Id. at 35.
454 Id. at 9.
411 Id. at 203.
456 Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy ofDisgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621
(1998) (reviewing MILLER, ANATOMY, supra note 440) [hereinafter Kahan, Disgust].
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exemplifying what he might call "sentencing disgust." One is
Commonwealth v. Carr,457 a murder case which rejected a mitigation
argument by the defendant that he was tempted to kill by the sight of
two men in sexual activity and therefore was supposedly only guilty
of heat-of-passion manslaughter; the other is State v. Bednarski,458
where, conversely, a judge reduced the defendant's sentence because
he sympathized with the killer's disgust at homosexual conduct.
Kahan makes much of these cases chiefly as a means of elaborating
the theme of his Secret Ambition article about the death struggle
between expressivism and deterrence. And he is equally
unsuccessful here.
By contrasting Carr and Bednarski, Kahan suggests that the
criminal law is put to an extreme binary choice between types of
disgust, but the examples hardly prove his point. The criminal law
category of voluntary manslaughter law has always walked a fuzzy
line between viewing "adequate provocation" as a matter of causal
mechanics or moral evaluation, and because of or despite this, the
homophobic killer does not present much of a challenge.459 At least
as Kahan describes the Bednarski case, there is no doctrinal basis for
any formal mitigation, and the trial judge's disgust-based decision to
do so is an uninteresting, if revolting, outlier. To understand the
doctrinal basis for this decision, we would have to probe beyond
voluntary manslaughter to diminished capacity doctrine, a doctrine
now largely overruled.46 In the end, we would confirm that the judge
in Carr could legitimately excuse all psychiatric evidence; he would
be mundanely free to express disapproval of Carr's prejudice, and
there would be no great moral significance to the case at all.
In setting his foundation for his reading and assimilation of
Miller, Kahan asserts that the dominant themes of criminal
jurisprudence are what he calls consequentialism and voluntarism,
and he laments that these themes are insufficient to accommodate the
rich range of our emotional lives, because they only allow for
4" 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
458 Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 15, 1988 (Dallas County D.C. Nov. 28, 1988). See Lisa
Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of Two Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1988, at A8; Judge is Censured Over Remark on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1989,
at A28.
459 For a rich recent discussion of the many interpretations of the doctrine, see Joshua
Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86
MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).
460 Id. at 984-89.
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expression of fear and anger, respectively.46" ' But Kahan's definitions
of these concepts are insufficient to explain this assertion, especially
on the side of voluntarism. Voluntarism for Kahan seems to mean
calibrating criminal punishment according to the individual's
capacity to conform her behavior to the law and, thus, presumably
can include expression of anger at a person for failure to conform if
that person has capacity. But the voluntarist perspective nevertheless
leaves open the question of the definition of the norm being violated
or the harm being caused, and it is not clear why the harm to be
avoided cannot include matters associated with strong emotional
revulsion. In any event, as Kahan confirms later in this essay, he is
reprising his earlier argument that "liberal discourse" suppresses
moralizing and, in this case, expressions of moral revulsion, and he
rightly notes that Miller is in accord with this.
The problem lies with the way Kahan then takes a Procrustean
turn in flattening Miller's nuances into a formula. Kahan infers from
Miller what he calls four "theses," though this thesis structure makes
no appearance in Miller. The "evaluative thesis" holds that disgust is
not just a visceral physical instinct but also a form of moral
disapproval. Next, the "hierarchy thesis" simply holds that disgust
draws status boundaries. Next, what he calls the "conservation
thesis" holds that disgust is some sort of zero sum of moral energy in
the world and, if suppressed somewhere, will arise elsewhere.
Finally, there is the "moral ambivalence thesis," by which Kahan
means something vague about how disgust can accord with both good
and bad moral values and thus requires reference to some
independent moral norm.462
When Kahan then turns to voluntary manslaughter, he views the
Carr and Bednarski cases as being all about using disgust to express
moral indignation either in favor of or against homophobia. He says
that neither voluntarism nor consequentialism takes any overt stand
on the moral quality of the offender's values.
Clearly offenders who kill (or assault) on the basis of "homosexual panic" are
disgusted by their victims. Under the evaluative thesis, what would be distinctive
about their aversion wouldn't be its psychological intensity- a mechanistic notion -
but rather its embodiment of the offenders' appraisal of gays and lesbians as inferior
and contaminating. Under the hierarchy thesis, the offenders' animus would be
constructed by and reinforce status norms, which the offenders understand to be
threatened by homosexuality. By the same token, we would have to understand courts
461 Kahan, Disgust, supra note 456, at 1631.
462 Id. at 1632-33.
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to be evaluating the offenders' disgust sensibilities and constructing norms of
hierarchy by deciding how severely to punish them. Decisions that withhold
mitigation would be doing this every bit as much as ones that grant it. Indeed,
consistent with the conservation thesis, we should expect to see the forces who are
committed to raising the status of gays and lesbians engaged in their own effort to
seize hold of the law's machinery for expressing disgust and redirecting it against
homophobes.
4 63
But Kahan fails to acknowledge the rich history of voluntary
manslaughter law, which has always been a shifting and complicated
blend of psychological and socially-grounded moral factors.464 He
also ignores the modem cases, especially in the area of domestic
violence, that have prompted a huge debate about the relationship
between the apparent moral relativism of modem formulations of the
doctrine and the need to constrain the mitigation doctrine by
reference to consequentialist and moral themes in feminism. 65
Kahan treats homicide doctrine, though, as largely mechanistic.
Indeed, he argues that without the tool of disgust to address moral
issues, it would be logical to expect these cases to turn entirely on
scientific evaluation of whether the syndrome of homophobia causes
loss of full volition. But this view of homicide law drains voluntary
manslaughter doctrine of all its traditional, if contested, moral
content. He brings in the apparatus of his four theses to explain, for
example, that the killers were expressing disgust in order to assert
hierarchy over people they thought inferior. Notably, the killer in
Carr was convicted of first-degree murder, presumably for
premeditating the killing, so to characterize him as in the throes of
moral revulsion may be at odds with the case. Kahan concludes from
this that the first-degree judgment serves to confirm that the court
would allow no claim of right in a homophobic killing,466 but the
premeditation formula has historically been surely as much a
mechanistic as a moral one.467 Carr, in other words, may have been
motivated by a coldly sociological discriminatory attitude based on a
low evaluation of homosexuals, but it is not clear that any passionate
463 Id. at 1635.
464 E.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1332-38 (1997) (modem voluntary manslaughter doctrine
tends to reinforce social judgments that cause heightened, as much as accommodate,
heightened emotions).
465 See generally Dressier, supra note 459.
466 Kahan, Disgust, supra note 456, at 1637.
467 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (reviewing




disgust played any role in his motivation. Similarly, Kahan makes
much of the fact that what aroused anger at the judge's mitigating
remarks in Bednarski was that he spoke in terms of his own disgust at
homosexuals.46 But the quoted disdainful remarks could easily
indicate a range of other negative emotions, such as contempt or hate,
which Miller has taken pains to distinguish from disgust, or possibly
not much emotion at all.
Kahan's prescription is to return to his critique of liberal
discourse and to urge the "outing" of disgust as a way of honestly
confronting it on the theory that it suppression makes bad disgust win
over good disgust. This prescription, of course, is consistent with the
expressiveness he (inconsistently) urges on gun control and other
matters. Kahan then construes Miller to be admonishing that we
ignore disgust at our peril-because it puts "[our] moral world at
odds with itself' and violates many professed beliefs of fairness and
justice. Kahan says that Miller usefully describes
the sensibility of revulsion that individuals experience when confronted by others-
whether sexual deviants or sadistic criminals-whose values seem shockingly alien
and dangerous. The desire to separate them from the rest of-literally or
symbolically-motivates individuals to lash out against them in violence, and
communities to punish them in appropriately severe and expressive ways.469
Then again comes a near self-refutation from Kahan: "I have no stake
in demonstrating that the salient features of this species of 'disgust'
are in fact essential to all the diverse sensibilities conventionally
assigned that label."47
Despite this disclaimer, Kahan goes on to assert that courts must
acknowledge that they are constructing normative hierarchies, and
that withholding mitigation does so every bit as much as granting it.
Indeed, he says, consistent with the "conservation thesis," we should
expect to see the forces who are committed to raising the status of
gays and lesbians engaged in their own effort to seize hold of the
law's machinery for expressing disgust and redirecting it against
homophobes. But this is a tautology. Kahan offers the discovery that
homophobes have a moral hierarchy that condemns homosexuals.
And in a nonsequitur, he says Miller's conception of disgust "helps to
explain a peculiar doctrinal disconnect in the homosexual panic
cases."
471
468 Kahan, Disgust, supra note 456, at 1622, 1655.
469 Id. at 1631.
470 Id. at 1632.
471 Id. at 1637.
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Thus, in the cases of Carr and Bednarski, if we take Kahan's
mechanistic view of homicide doctrine, we may be forced to accept
an excuse; if we take an evaluative approach, we may consciously or
inadvertently be engaged in justification. If the latter, we must be
prepared to back up our disgust responses with solid moral
justification. Disgust is an expression, and expressive punishments
convey condemnation that offender does not respect the true value of
things. Kahan suggests that the court could have admitted Carr's
psychiatric disgust evidence as provocation and then asks which of
the two judges got it right. Yet he leaves us wondering how an
abstract analysis of the phenomenon of disgust can tell us anything
about this. Kahan argues that had the judge in the Bednarski case
cloaked his decision in voluntarism or consequentialism, not disgust,
the expressive consent of the opinion would not have been so
salient.472 But is it not equally plausible that the mere announcement
of a light sentence would have been read by the public in the very
same expressive way? Or even an opinion justifying the low
sentence in some sort of consequentialist form?
Kahan also observes that in its indifference to mechanistic
notions of voluntarism, disgust seems willing to condemn people for
things they may not choose. In his mechanical view of the way
criminal law comprehends behavior, he suggests that this kind of
strict liability indicates a radically non-voluntarist view of the
criminal mind. Of course, if that is true, he might be expected to
rethink his entire notion of shaming penalties, but Kahan never
fleshes out the significance of this supposed willingness to tolerate a
kind of strict liability, and he thereby reveals the real problem in his
reading of Miller. Miller interprets disgust as expressing
condemnation without any necessary regard for the condemned
person's volition, because of the subtle way that disgust captures a
larger social vision of social hierarchy and worth. Kahan might thus
have been motivated by Miller to elaborate on the meaning of the
strong negative emotions he sees as important and potentially useful
in criminal law. He might have seen how concepts like disgust have
interpretive value in helping understand pragmatic tools to execute
those judgments.
Kahan unequivocally cites hate crimes as confirming the
disgust-expression thesis-as if de-linking them entirely from civil
rights laws and anti-discrimination laws more generally.
473
472 Id. at 1636.
471 Id. at 1634-38.
2003]
ROBERT WEISBERG
Distinguishing hate crime laws from his (oddly mechanistic) view of
voluntary manslaughter doctrine, Kahan says that in the case of hate
crime laws we express counter-disgust at those who express disgust
at gays (though he then makes the half-hearted concession that this
may have nothing to do with disgust at all). In interpreting hate
crime laws, Kahan cites newspaper articles and columns that
explicitly use the word "disgust" to condemn acts of criminally
violent prejudice, and he thereby concludes that disgust is precisely
the emotion that motivates hate crime laws.4"4 But the game is given
away when he approves hate crime laws on the ground that they
condemn the moral position exhibited by the hateful act-the
wrongdoer's failure to respect "the true value of things." '475 Respect
for true value is a vague and amorphous concept that can include a
range of systems of value or animating moral emotions associated
with retributivism, and it bears no necessary relation to disgust.
Similarly, Kahan throws in a plug for shaming penalties as
supported by Miller's notion of disgust, even though Miller takes
great pains to distinguish shame from disgust to give them distinct
characters. Moreover, Kahan never reconciles the link between
disgust and shame in this essay with his numerous arguments in other
papers that shaming penalties, if properly administered, should
promote, in Braithwaite's terms, reintegration,... and hence are
inconsistent with the bad hierarchical attitudes he often conflates with
disgust.
Finally, Kahan appropriates his disgust-competition concept for
the death penalty and uses it half to explain and half to partly justify
the unresolved debate over how modem statutes and procedures can
constrain without eliminating discretion. Indeed, he says, rather
Panglossianly,
the response of that doctrinal regime is to conserve the insights of all our moral
sentiments rather than privileging only a subset of them. Consistent with the moral
ambivalence thesis, the law remains faithful to both the certainty of our disgust
sensibilities and the second-order doubts we have about whether that certainty is
warranted.
477
Kahan concludes with the bizarrely idiosyncratic case of
Commonwealth v. Beldotti,478 where a sadistic sex killer requested
474 Id. at 1638.
411 Id. at 1641.
476 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, supra note 366.
477 Kahan, Disgust, supra note 456, at 1647.
478 669 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)
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that after his trial his "property"-various instruments of sexual
torture-be returned to him under state law. The court denied the
request, and Kahan finds this decision highly salient in American
law, because, as he interprets it, the court had no basis for its refusal
other than a sense of disgust. Kahan seizes on this case because, in
contrast to the homicide cases where he seems to realize his disgust
scheme provides very weak explanations, Beldotti is a virtual
controlled experiment for testing the salience of disgust. The case is
thus a challenge to those who might advocate a disgust-free criminal
law-the indefinable group he calls "opponents of disgust in criminal
law.
479
But where is the danger he has warned of? Kahan says that
granting Beldotti's request would have allowed him "to continue
degrading [the victim's] death"-indeed, would have made the state
complicit in his depravity. This is supposedly a challenge to
liberalism, since Kahan fears, liberalism would resist any normative
judgment here. We should not eschew expressions of disgust in
criminal law, but rather we should "oppos[e] unjust forms of disgust
with just ones."48  Kahan concludes: "[i]f our confidence in the
intuition that Beldotti was correctly decided outstrips our access to
the empirics that would substantiate the deterrent benefits of
forfeiture of his property, then something else besides deterrence
explains the intuition." '481 But of course one can imagine quite a
range of principles or sentiments which justify denying the request
here; inventing the binary distinction between the instrumental goals
of minor forfeiture law and the specific phenomenon of disgust
hardly seems justified by this case. Indeed, Kahan himself would
surely, if pressed, have agreed that "liberalism" would find some
non-disgust-based norm here. Liberalism, Kahan at one point
concedes, does promote what he calls "hierarchies," but his
occasional gesture in imputing some normative commitment to what
he calls liberalism aims at easy targets:
Even egalitarians hold pedophiles and sadists in low esteem, for example, not just
because such persons threaten physical harm, but because their values reveal them to
be despicable .... On this account, the proper course for liberalism is not to obliterate
disgust, but to reform its objects so that we come to value what is genuinely high, to
despite what is genuinely low.
4 82
479 Kahan, Disgust, supra note 456, at 1649-52.
480 Id. at 1657.
481 Id. at 1651.
482 Id. at 1652-53.
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But what is the normative or descriptive content of Kahan's reference
to the term "despicable" here? What independent measure does he
have? Does Kahan assume that we experience a visceral disgust at
the thought of pedophiles, and thus must deploy it in the criminal law
to fight off possible liking of pedophilia? Indeed, he admits to the
contradictory and indeed incoherent nature of his notion of
"liberalism" when he acknowledges Miller's view that "[t]here is,
sadly, no reliable moral theory that stands outside our disgust
sensibilities and that we can treat as normative for them." '483 We can
only try to test and temper disgust with respect to other emotions.
Thus, this one foray by Kahan into the Humanities shows how
the norms approach risks a Procrustean misreading of the distinct
value of Humanities and law scholarship-which is to induce deeper
critical understanding of law's operations, and perhaps to indirectly
effect reform, but hardly so mechanically.
This problem is illustrated by two important general misreadings
of Miller by Kahan. First, he insists on calling Miller a "social
constructivist. '484 The whole point of Miller's book is that disgust is
an innate human characteristic which finds social objects where it
needs them and creates culture. The loose term "social
constructivist" suggests quite the opposite, and though Kahan says he
recognizes that Miller sees instinct and meaning as mutually causal,
his insistence on constructivism misses the originality of Miller's
approach, in fact, of Miller's refusal to see the emotion of disgust as a
"social construct." Equally important, Kahan criticizes Miller for
speaking too universalistically about disgust and for lumping too
many things together under the umbrella of disgust.485 Kahan thereby
shows his failure to appreciate Miller's unique interpretive method.
Miller is identifying a type of reaction that is coherent even if it has
many manifestations or occasions. His project only make sense if
one grants his intellectual premise, that is, if one allows him to posit a
distinct personality and cognitive scheme for each of the emotions he
portrays. If his concept of disgust seems too "universal," that is
precisely because Miller is not a social constructivist in the sense
Kahan means, and, in any event, as noted above, Miller goes to huge
lengths to distinguish disgust from other aversions, as Kahan notes
but does not fully respect.
483 Id. at 1633 (citing MILLER, ANATOMY, supra note 440, at 197).
484 Id. at 1625.
411 Id. at 1630-31.
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Finally, in justifying the application of Miller's notions of
disgust to practical questions of law, Kahan expresses concern that
because of its flaws, Miller's "theory" may be "false," but Kahan
offers the comfort that that even an "admittedly false" theory can be
pragmatic.486 But it is impossible to tell what Kahan means here,
because there is no meaningful sense in which an interpretive inquiry
like Miller's experimental ruminations on disgust can be "false."
Social science may recognize that flawed or false causal theories can
meet the suppler tests of pragmatism, but that has little to do with the
Humanities. And if the law-and-norms school feels it must pay fealty
to the proof demands of the social sciences, it cannot at the same time
so glibly appropriate the contribution of the Humanities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In considering the relationship between interpretive concerns
with cultural meaning and social scientific understandings of
instrumental cause in the study of criminal law, we can turn,
paradoxically, to a sociologist for an especially telling example of the
former. In Jack Katz's remarkable study, Seductions of Crime,487 the
"text" is the inner and outer behavior of the criminal, as recorded in
Katz's interviews and observations, and as captured, and
misrecognized and reconstructed, by legal categories. Katz reviews a
wide variety of criminal artists-in-the-self-making: the killer who
engages in "righteous slaughter" who kills out of moral justification
even where no law recognizes the defense; 488 the petty shoplifter who
acts out a sensual fantasy of "sneaky thrills." '489 But perhaps the key
social identity discovered by Katz to underlie and somewhat escape
our formal legal definitions is the type of the "badass." In portraying
this character, Katz uses interpretive methods and imagination to
deepen our understanding of criminal motivation by giving us a sense
of what actions and symbols "mean" to criminals. But Katz knows
that his utility to the study of criminology and law cannot be one of
direct instrumental application, so much as a deeper and more
complex perspective.49 ° A collective version of the badass's
416 Id. at 1631.
487 JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING
EVIL (1988).
488 Id. at 12-51
489 Id. at 52-79.
490 For Katz, "meaning" is vital. The badass's guiding purpose is not so much to threaten
particular violence but rather to show that he "means" it, and so he must distinguish himself
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individual composition of identity is the phenomenon of the "street
elite," which expresses itself through the rituals of street fighting.
Street elites also exhibit their indifference to, indeed their
transcendence of, the utilitarian calculus, engaging in provocative
cursing, the semiotics of violence, and the retrospective attestation of
the profundity of attackers' offended dignity. As Katz shows
violence enables gangs to transform their principles of association
from symptoms of childhood to standards of glory; they make a
metaphor of sovereignty respected by peers and feared by society;
they sustain their claim of elite status in an aura of dread.49 A related
example is that of the type of robber he calls the "Hardman." In his
chapter "Doing Stick-Up," '492 Katz shows how even the most
professional robbers create elaborate symbols that make an aesthetic
project out of demonstrating their calculating utilitarian commitment,
while at the same time their lives are pitifully self-destructively
irrational.493
What, if any, policy implications might flow from Katz's reading
of crimes as Nietzschean aesthetic projects? Perhaps little more than
the caveat that the causal chain linking incentives to crimes is
incalculably more twisted than conventional criminology imagines.
A cultural reading of crime might provoke us to rethink the criminal
law's libertarian emphasis on the actor's wrongful intentions at the
moment of acting, and to focus blame instead on the character and
persona from which the wrongful act seems to flow unreflectively.
Thus we may want to broaden our inquiry into the actor's
responsibility for the character he has become, for the aesthetic
project he is embarked upon. But if a cultural analysis of criminal
violence may sometimes expand responsibility by broadening the
temporal inquiry, it may undermine the utilitarian case for
punishment. If violence is an aesthetic project of defining one's self
by contrast to officially enforced norms of civility, it will not easily
from imitators who do not "mean" it. Moreover, the specifics of his "meaning" must be
elusive, in order to reinforce his awesome, ominous presence. The badass alone controls the
boundary between rationality and irrationality, and lets the world know that he is not
beholden to make this meaning intelligible to others by clarifying the distinction. Id. at 80,
110-12.
411 Id. at 114-63.
492 id.
493 As Katz shows, for the "Hardman" the aesthetic aspect of the act is apparent in the
tendency of robbers to formally characterize their actions by announcing, "This is a
robbery!" He achieves a subjective moral advantage through this declaration of aesthetic
control. Id. at 164-69.
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be commodified and reduced to the logic of price. An effective crime
policy may not be a law enforcement strategy at all, but a cultural
strategy. On the other hand, the perverse inventiveness of the
criminal countercultures Katz uncovers should discourage any
confidence that the state can dictate the identities its stratagems
engender.
Compare Katz's work with that of criminologist Mercer
Sullivan, who would in no way deny that social science can identify
certain invariances in criminal conduct, such as age-crime curves,
and who can absorb the meaning-making aesthetic goals of Katz's
criminals. Sullivan echoes Katz in suggesting that crime by the urban
poor is "driven not by self-perpetuating deviant values but by
survival strategies that have their own logic, at least in the
unavoidable short term, as adaptations to their environments." '494 But
he chastises the strand of "community studies" that fail to connect
these factors to the deep effects of labor market on crime, and hence
what might be called a criminal culture of money.495 He argues that
community studies must consider how social patterns within a
neighborhood are in act organized in response to larger outside
networks and indeed to national and international economic and
social systems.496
The subtlety of Sullivan's work illustrates why the concept of a
social norm may, in its claim to substance or precision, hinder more
than help the study of crime. Sullivan accepts the standard
refutations of simple crime-unemployment correlations, but sees the
relationship of labor opportunity and crime as complex. In a youth's
life, crime may precede even the possibility of work, and occasional
crime can overlap with early employment; indeed manual shop
training can provide some criminal skills. But overall, the influence
of employment is long-term and involves "character-building"-it
does not constrain crime in the short run. The key is not the
employment of the individual, but the density of consistent
employment in the neighborhood. This material factor, more than the
temptingly more complex-looking factor called collective efficacy or
the various names the norms- writers attribute to it, is the one most
494 Mercer L. Sullivan, Neighborhood Social Organization: A Forgotten Object of
Ethnographic Study?, in ETHNOGRAPHY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONTEXT AND
MEANING IN SOCIAL INQUIRY 208 (Richard Jessor, et. al., eds. 1996).
495 MERCER L. SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY
226-50 (1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID"].
496 Sullivan, Neighborhood Social Organization, supra note 494, at 210.
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worthy of analysis. But it is not a singular material factor, because it
includes, for example, the efficacy of local job networks, which
distinguish blue collar neighborhoods where education rates are not
necessarily high. And of course distant macroeconomic forces
probably affect crime rates,497 factors like the outsourcing of
manufacturing to the Third World, and conversely, the immigration
of Third World laborers to American cities. Other factors that can
only clumsily be captured by the vocabulary of norms are more local,
including various local attitudes that include tolerance, exhaustion or
resistance in the face of criminal victimization, along with acceptance
of a certain amount of wealth redistribution from crime. But
whatever these material forces, criminals tend to be as in Katz, fairly
creative entrepreneurs responding to social situations.498
Nevertheless, Sullivan avoids a potentially reductionist term like
"culture" and is even wary of the old culture-as-poverty theories of
the 1960's. The ghettoes he studies are ruled by many non-market
relations of reciprocity and redistribution and exchanges of goods and
services among kin cut off from conventional markets. Criminals
work in groups that share trends, attitudes, cliquish fads; to some
extent they are entrepreneurial teams as in the case of car theft/chop
shops, and to some extent they blend into a larger noncriminal
"community" that has ambivalent attitudes about crime and its
perverse benefits. These factors are complex enough to merit the
casual use of the term "culture," but more putatively precise notions
of "social norms" cannot capture the dynamic interrelations of these
forces, and treating them as able to do so probably thwarts serious
criminology.
In this regard, Sullivan's work reflects David Garland's call for
sociology to supply a complex of perspectives to illuminate how
crime affects the wider culture.499 And it reminds us that Durkheim,
and especially Garland's reading of Durkheim, can supply a deep
admonition to simplistic theories of norms as justifying punishment.
Garland celebrates Durkheim for his understanding of punishment as
a means of expressing communal values and of solidifying social
bonds of how punishment operates in a way that transcends the
technical and managerial."' But he also notes that Durkheim had a
117 SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID," supra note 495, at 226-28.
498 Id. at 231-50.
499 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
(1990).
500 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893).
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certain sense of punishment's tragic futility, that social solidarity is
often a very particular kind of solidarity-"the emotional solidarity
of aggression," a form of tribal group hostility. 0 ' So Garland, to
summarize a complex reading, warns against the Durkheimian
mistake of viewing the rules and ceremonies of belief and
punishment as being "coterminous with 'society' or [as] .
necessarily promot[ing] social harmony."5 2 Durkheim and Garland
bring us to a level of understanding about the expressive and
normative effects of punishment that the current norms scholarship
can hardly conceive, and implicitly offer warnings about its misuse
that law-and-norms scholarship hardly heeds.
501 Garland, supra note 499, at 76-77.
502 Id. at 80.
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